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Abstract 
This thesis explores four mid-twentieth century fictional texts in relation to concepts of 
action drawn predominantly from Anglo-American analytic philosophy and contemporary 
psychology. The novels in question are Anna Kavan’s Ice, Samuel Beckett’s How It Is, 
Vladimir Nabokov’s Pale Fire and Malcolm Lowry’s Under the Volcano. The theory of 
action provides concepts, structures, and language to describe how agency is 
conceptualised at various levels of description. My exploration of these concepts in 
relation to fiction gives a framework for describing character action and the 
conceptualisation of agency in my primary texts. The theory of action is almost 
exclusively concerned with human action in the real world, and I explore the benefits and 
problems of transferring concepts from these discourses to literary criticism. My approach 
is focused around close reading, and a primary goal of this thesis is to provide nuanced 
analyses of my primary texts. In doing so, I emphasise the centrality of concepts of agency 
in fiction and provide examples of how action theory is applicable to literary criticism.  
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Introduction 
  I 
This thesis circles around a concept of freedom, rather, a number of permutations of an 
idea of freedom. I make a major theoretical assumption which underpins this study and 
which relies upon a supporting notion of freedom: This is the common-sense claim that the 
experience of the feeling of action is the feeling that we are causing our own actions. This 
is the experience which is described by terms like volition and intention, terms which 
tether physical action to the agent’s decision to act in a certain way. When we act, there is 
volition, and the phenomenology of free will seems to emerge from the sense that we 
actively choose what we do and how we do it. The sense that we are active participants in 
our actions is tied to the idea that, in a way, our actions represent us. In most cases, we 
take responsibility for what we do, because we have chosen one course of action over 
others, and have faith that this course of action is best for us at the time of choosing. 
Implicit in this is an idea of rationality. An agent is responsible for actions which they have 
authored, and our common understanding of responsibility relies on the traceability of 
actions to agents. In part, this relies on free action representing the choices of an agent to 
act in particular ways. This gives us the term ‘autonomy’, which captures the idea that a 
free agent is self-governing. These ideas articulate and construct an idea of subjectivity, 
which is described through a cluster of interdependent terms: agency, autonomy, intention, 
freedom and responsibility. These are the terms often used to understand and describe 
action, in everyday life and in academic discourses. Particularly for my purposes, these 
terms and the idea of agency that they support can be seen to underwrite much of the study 
of literature, philosophy and the social sciences.  
Although this idea of agency seems to have intuitive force, it describes a very broad set of 
experiential features. The articulation of these features in academic discourse is, by 
necessity, more complex. This often takes the discourse away from what might be seen as 
a loose folk notion of agency: a description which is based upon assumptions and claims 
which ordinary people are likely to endorse. The particularities of certain methodological 
approaches mean that the ideas which are captured by an intuitive folk description are 
often subject to the standards of competing academic positions. This is the case even if 
these discourses are attempting to articulate a common-sense concept such as agency. The 
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concept of autonomy within Anglo-American analytic philosophy is a good example of 
this. Although there are often intuitive – folk – factors involved in the philosophical 
debate, there are also strong disciplinary norms. The primacy of autonomy within this 
literature has complex foundations. In one respect, the notion of a person that emerges in 
this brand of philosophy comes about through a process in which a particular philosophical 
outlook is defended as the most logically defensible explanation of a given concept. It is 
common for such approaches to reference, restate or defend historical arguments, and so 
the conceptual usage of a given term is not only subject to contemporary factors, but is in 
interaction with a series of historical manifestations of that same idea. In contemporary 
analytic philosophy, the ideas of autonomy, the will, and practical reason, for example, are 
often stated in ways which suggest their interaction with historical ideas of the subject. 
Kant and Hume are particular progenitors of the contemporary debate, largely because of 
their oppositional stances on whether reason can be thought of as a motivating power. Kant 
framed his view of free will around practical reason, in which he defends a position which 
relies upon the idea that human action can be directed by rational control. The classical 
rejection of this position is Hume’s suggestion that reason alone is unable to provide 
motivation which can result in action.
1
 References to the classical treatments of these 
problems are common in contemporary theory. The construction of an idea of the person, 
and what attributes a person should have, can be seen as an idea which emerges and 
continues through a specific philosophical tradition. I will address the main currents in 
contemporary action theory in detail later in this introduction.  
One particularity of the analytic philosophical approach is its apolitical focus. Agency, in 
this discourse, is frequently approached at the micro-level of behaviour, concentrating on 
the mechanisms of individual action rather than the environmental framework in which 
those actions take place. This contrasts with disciplines, such as psychology or sociology, 
which approach the individual agent as embedded in particular social structures. Although 
this micro-level often dictates the type of description that an argument adopts, this does not 
mean that philosophising is hermetic. Instead, and especially in recent times, there has 
been a move to adopt the insights of science and the social sciences at points which bolster 
or oppose philosophical theorising. In traditional analytic approaches to the question of 
                                                          
1
 For an explanation of the classical approaches, see: Christine M. Korsgaard, ‘Skepticism about Practical 
Reason’, The Journal of Philosophy, 83 (1986), 5–25; See also: Michael Bratman, ‘Review of Korsgaard’s 
Sources of Normativity’, in Faces of Intention: Selected Essays on Intention and Agency (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 265–79, in which Bratman defends a Humean picture of the will 
against Korsgaard’s Kantian view. 
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action and free will, the opposition which was negotiated through argument was the 
mutual incompatibility of autonomy, on the one hand, and determinism on the other. In 
this opposition, determinism stands for a causal view of the world, a broadly scientific 
view in which actions cannot be free because they are always caused by preceding events 
ad infinitum. When philosophical debate utilises insights from other disciplines, it is often 
to give specificity to this idea of causation. A case study from neuroscience might, for 
example, explain how neurons cause actions before we are aware of making a specific 
choice, and in this case, bolster the dominance of the determinist cause. The defence of 
free will in contemporary action theory always has to construct an argument which 
insulates the concept of autonomy from the threat of determinism. Different manifestations 
of free will theories generally differ in the specific way in which they protect the concept.  
The structural opposition between freedom and determinism is pervasive. In The 
Significance of Free Will, Robert Kane describes the relation as ‘the dialectic of selfhood’, 
and suggests that our central experience of individual agency emerges through contact 
with both poles of thought. In this structure, the idea of free will is a response to this 
dialectic. In his description of the system, Kane posits an originary myth as the first stage 
in a child’s introduction to the free will problem. In this first stage, the self is constructed 
as a causa sui; as separate from the world, and the absolute spring of action:  
[We] come to view ourselves as distinct sources of motion or activity in the world, 
separate from other things (animate or inanimate), which are moved by forces 
independent of our wills. We see our selves, on the one hand, as independent 
sources of motion over against the world, on the other, with its myriad sources of 
motion that are not directly under the control of our wills.
2
 
This position is not an end point. Rather, it is a feeling which comes into contact with, and 
under threat from, the discovery that the self is not isolated from the world, but embedded 
in it. Phase two of the dialectic is the recognition that this embedding provides a threat to 
the type of subjectivity formed in phase one: 
Perhaps we are not really independent sources of motion in the world at all, but are 
entirely products of the world, or of the not‐self. Perhaps we only seem to ‘move 
                                                          
2
 Robert Kane, The Significance of Free Will (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 93, original 
emphasis. 
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ourselves’ in a primordial way, when our motions are in fact caused by forces in 
the world of which we are unaware.
3
 
The way in which this embedding is conceptualised has taken countless forms across the 
history of ideas. These can be grouped under the term ‘determinism’, as they tend to share 
a materialist approach which places explanatory priority on causal theories of human 
behaviour which locate the causes of action outside the control of the agent. These theories 
range across genetics, neurology, psychology and the social sciences, and offer causes 
which happen at multiple levels of description. The attempt to describe the mechanisms of 
determinism is a very old practice, and though the specificity of contemporary offerings is 
marked, the underlying ideology remains largely unchanged. Although Mary Midgley 
ridicules the ‘odd spectacle of many competing determinisms’. each providing ‘the engine 
which runs all the other causes’, it is worth noting that a huge variety of scientific and 
quasi-scientific disciplines have attempted to describe exactly what is  involved in phase 
two of the dialectic.
4
 I will explore some of these ideas at greater length later in this 
introduction.   
With both poles of the dialectic in place, Kane suggests that our feeling of free will is a 
higher stage response to the determinist threat to subjectivity. Kane’s position, because of 
his particular loyalty to libertarian metaphysics, reasserts free will as the sense that we 
have ultimate control as distinct from determinist causation. This feeling is very similar to 
phase one of the dialectic, but it is forged anew from the confrontation with the detailed 
encounter with determinism in phase two. Even without adopting Kane’s metaphysically 
‘independent selfhood’ or his characterisation of determinism as a ‘seditious’ threat, the 
dialectic provides a useful model for representing the interaction between our subjective 
feeling of action and the world of determinist counterexamples.
5
 It is true that ‘we 
associate being a self […] with doing things – making, producing, creating, bringing 
about’, but this needn’t imply libertarian control.6 Others, Midgley and Thomas Nagel 
among them, have suggested that the philosophical challenge is to avoid reasserting either 
polarised doctrine, and instead ‘combine the perspective of a particular person inside the 
world with an objective view of the same world, the person and his viewpoint included’.7 
                                                          
3
 Kane, p. 94. 
4
 Mary Midgley, Science and Poetry (London: Routledge, 2006), p. 166. 
5
 Kane, p. 96. 
6
 Kane, p. 96, original emphasis. 
7
 Thomas Nagel, The View From Nowhere (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 3. 
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The dialectic model can come to stand for any approach which recognises the need to 
attest to our experience as agents who both act and curiously investigate the structures 
which make up our world.  
As I will describe in detail later in this introduction, analytic models of free will are just 
one response to the poles of freedom and determinism. They are often dialectic according 
to Kane’s model, because they attempt to marry these poles in a way which maintains a 
recognisable sense of freedom while admitting determinist explanations of the world. The 
way in which the poles are mixed varies greatly between factions and disciplines, with 
some hard materialists maintaining a position that is distinctly non-dialectic. As I will 
explore later in this introduction, epiphenomenalism is one conclusion of this way of 
thinking. The debate has also been approached from its opposite position on a number of 
occasions in the history of ideas. As Midgley suggests, Cartesian dualism responds to the 
problem of materialism (and implicit determinism) by positing two types of stuff; one 
physical and one non-physical. Historically, when this position has been taken seriously 
[I]t has usually tended to expand into absolute idealism – the idea that spiritual 
diamond-stuff is actually the stuff of the whole universe, a stuff that underlays 
physical matter as well as souls. Hence the mentalist tradition that runs through 
Leibniz, Berkeley, Hume and Hegel to modern phenomenalism.
8
  
The legacy of dualism is ongoing, and later sections of this introduction explore its 
contemporary manifestations in philosophy and psychology. These extreme positions – 
materialist and idealist – are not uncommon. However, the ‘dialectic of selfhood’ is also 
prevalent in theories, more or less successful, which attempt to unite the subjective and 
objective viewpoints.
9
   
 
 
                                                          
8
 Midgley, p. 119. 
9
 This has been the case for some time, with support from influential proponents. At the turn of the century, 
through the ideas of Bergson, Nietzsche, and William James, adapted theories of free will were in intellectual 
focus. As Mark Micale suggests, these ‘psychological philosophers’ were indispensable contributors to the 
‘intellectual-historical background’ of twentieth century psychology. All three dedicated energy to describing 
free will in ways which shifted focus away from traditional metaphysical problems in order to better describe 
a conception of agency modified in light of evidence of non-conscious and external control. See: Mark S. 
Micale, ‘The Modernist Mind: A Map’, in The Mind of Modernism: Medicine, Psychology, and the Cultural 
Arts in Europe and America, 1880-1940 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004), pp. 1–20 (p. 6). 
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 II 
So far, I have only described how the poles of freedom and determinism interact within a 
specific analytic philosophical context. Work in the social sciences has also structured 
debates according to models in which freedom and determinism are polarised. The 
structure of these debates is familiar, though the determinist intrusion on freedom is often 
less abstract than in the philosophical discourse. While analytic philosophy generally 
characterises determinism according to a broad causal model of the universe, the social 
sciences often investigate the particular mechanisms of everyday life in which action is 
unconscious or environmentally conditioned. This emphasis gives a slightly different 
conception of determinism, insofar as it models the social determinants of behaviour. 
Stanley Milgram’s experiments in the 1960s provide a clear example of how the discourse 
of freedom and determinism overlaps with the investigation of environmental determinants 
of behaviour. Milgram’s experiments also focus the timeframe of this discourse, as his 
research is conceptualised as a response to the Second World War. Although oppositional 
structure between freedom and determinism has a long cultural and conceptual history, 
Milgram shows how the debate becomes especially pertinent in the mid-twentieth century. 
His experiments were designed to show how obedience works, based on the assumption 
that it is a controlling social factor, ‘the dispositional cement that binds men to systems of 
authority’.10 These experiments were a specific reaction to the atrocities of the Second 
World War, which were made possible by the disposition to obedience: 
Gas chambers were built, death camps were guarded, daily quotas of corpses were 
produced with the same efficiency as the manufacture of appliances. These 
inhumane policies may have originated in the mind of a single person, but they 
could only be carried out on a massive scale if a very large number of persons 
obeyed orders.
11
 
Milgram’s experiments revealed close adherence to commands, which were apparently 
accompanied by a ‘reduction in conscious will’.12 It is this final point which reveals the 
structuring dialectic. Through his claim that there is a ‘reduction in conscious will’, 
                                                          
10
 Stanley Milgram, ‘Behavioral Study of Obedience’, Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 67 
(1963), 371–78 (p. 371). 
11
 Milgram, p. 371. 
12
 Daniel M. Wegner, ‘The Mind’s Best Trick: How We Experience Conscious Will’, Trends in Cognitive 
Sciences, 7 (65-69), 2003 (p. 68). 
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Milgram implies that there is a ‘conscious will’ to be manipulated. He conceptualises his 
own findings, which evidence the ways in which agency can be manipulated, against the 
idea of agential control. Here, there is a polarised conception of agency, with freedom 
naturally aligned with a conscious will that is threatened by determinism. In this case, the 
threat of determinism is pictured through the agent’s dispositional adherence to social 
pressures.  
Milgram suggests that ‘for many persons obedience may be a deeply ingrained behaviour 
tendency’, and that obedience is ‘the psychological mechanism that links individual action 
to political purpose’.13 These combined factors build upon an idea that environmental 
factors of behavioural control are not simply in the world, but are structured and 
manipulated by social forces. In this way, a distinction arises between abstract causal 
determinism, in which the individual is ‘controlled’ by blind physical forces, and social 
determinism, in which the individual is possibly subject to manipulation by other 
individuals. However, this distinction is not absolute. Even within the social sciences, 
there is slippage between specific experiments and evidence regarding behavioural control 
and more theoretical responses to the idea of determinism in its abstract causal 
manifestation. There is feedback between these conceptions of the problem, as evidence 
for behavioural control has been taken by some to prove broader determinist theses. In 
addition, some approaches to the social sciences maintain the interplay between free will 
debates and experimental research. Contemporary with Stanley Milgram, there was 
significant debate about the reach and ideology of the social sciences. Psychologists were 
called upon to describe the ways in which they thought their discipline and its findings 
interacted with folk concepts of freedom.  
In behaviourism, the ideology of causal materialism was deeply ingrained in the scientific 
outlook which inflected the psychological approaches and conclusions of that school. In 
this tradition, as I will describe later in this introduction, a scientific worldview is taken to 
be the single level of behavioural explanation. As such, causal determinism is seen to 
subsume and overwrite subjective experience. As such, subjective experience is reduced to 
epiphenomena. This is contradicted by approaches which regard the findings of science to 
be active at a different, theoretically distinct, level of explanation from subjective 
experience. This question was meaningfully raised in the famous 1956 dialogue between 
                                                          
13
 Milgram, p. 371. 
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the prominent psychologists Carl Rogers and B.F. Skinner. Skinner’s staunchly 
behaviourist stance positioned the scientific worldview as a way of overwriting the 
democratic myths of freedom and autonomy. As Skinner makes clear elsewhere, 
ideologies of freedom are in direct ‘conflict with the application of the methods of science 
to human affairs’.14 Rogers endorses the same conflict between science and individualism, 
but turns it into a paradox rather than a zero sum relation: 
Behaviour, when it is examined scientifically, is surely best understood as 
determined by prior causation. This is one great fact of science. But responsible 
personal choice, which is the most essential element in being a person which is the 
core experience in psychotherapy which exists prior to any scientific endeavour, is 
an equally prominent fact in our lives. To deny the experience of responsible 
choice is to me as restricted a view as to deny the possibility of a behavioural 
science.
15
 
Here, the question of individual freedom becomes entangled with methodology and 
ideology. While causation is the means through which science is conducted, the first-
person experience of action and choice is the way in which individual life is understood. 
While both theorists steer away from a dialectic mixing of freedom and determinism, their 
responses show just how complex and pervasive the concept of free will is, demanding 
either rejection by or extrication from the domain of scientific investigation.  
 III 
The debate between Rogers and Skinner took place within an intellectual environment in 
which psychology as an academic discipline was burgeoning. The Second World War saw 
the large scale funding of psychology as part of the war effort, particularly in the United 
States. This provided funding and experimental freedom, with a resultant boom in the 
behavioural sciences. The close contact between psychological research and the 
government also brought behavioural sciences into the mainstream political vocabulary. 
As Ellen Herman suggests, the  
                                                          
14
 B. F. Skinner, ‘Freedom and the Control of Men’, The American Scholar, 25 (1955), 47–65 (p. 47). 
15
 Carl R. Rogers and B. F. Skinner, ‘Some Issues Concerning the Control of Human Behavior’, Science, 124 
(1956), 1057–66 (p. 1064). 
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war had shown that controlling personalities, shaping attitudes and feelings, and 
guiding democracy through an era of emotional turbulence were major 
responsibilities of government. They were also the things that psychological 
experts did best.
16
 
The transition from using ‘psychology as a weapon’ during the war,17 to utilising insights 
from behavioural science as a way of maintaining ‘social well-being’ kept psychology on 
the government agenda.
18
 The importance of psychology as a military asset in the post-war 
years intensified with the advent of the Cold War, when safeguarding the ideological 
safety of the United States became an overt military concern. The practical application of 
psychological research to national concerns found responses both guarded and fervent. 
Talcott Parsons was a particular believer in the reach of the social sciences:  
Do we have or can we develop a knowledge of human social relations that can 
serve as the basis of rational “engineering” control? […] The evidence we have 
reviewed indicates that the answer is unequivocally affirmative. Social science is a 
going concern; the problem is not one of creating it, but rather of using and 
developing it.
19
    
The key phrase here is ‘control’, which positions the understanding of the social sciences 
as a tool through which the population could be manipulated. Just as Parsons is 
maintaining a structure in which behavioural science can provide evidence to predict and 
manipulate human action, Herman suggests that there is a distinct continuity between the 
militarisation of psychology in the Second World War and psychology’s Cold War history. 
The link between them comes from a ‘sustained vision of a rigorous and predictive 
behavioural science’20, a project which courted suspicion of state control and intrusion. 
The other side of this was the growth of a humanistic psychology, the influence of which 
contributed to a change in social policy by the 1960s, in which ‘“the political” was 
reconceptualised to encompass “the personal” and notions of social responsibility were 
saturated in the vocabulary of subjective experience’.21 The idea of a predictive 
                                                          
16
 Ellen Herman, The Romance of American Psychology (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 
1995), p. 81. 
17
 Herman, p. 130. 
18
 Herman, p. 239. 
19
 Quoted in: Herman, p. 128. 
20
 Herman, p. 135. 
21
 Herman, p. 241. 
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behavioural science need not clash with the attempt to prioritise the psychological well-
being of the nation as a government concern. This idea, in fact, chimes with the democratic 
capitalist ideology. As Herman points out, the psychological growth industry was not only 
there to cater for the militarised ‘social strains’ of the mid-century,22 it also grew 
symbiotically with late-capitalist consumerism: 
Economic affluence and an ethic of avid consumption allowed people to think of 
empathy and warmth as items to be purchased without recoiling from the 
commercialisation of human connection […] experts’ promise of supportive 
understanding also nourished the ongoing quest for existential meaning, just as new 
levels of geographic mobility did by placing more people than ever out of reach of 
the kin and community ties with which they had grown up.
23
 
Herman’s diagnosis points to the complex post-war milieu in which psychology grew in 
the west, a context in which individualism came under focus though ideology, policy, and 
the social consequences of capitalism. As the 1956 debate between Rogers and Skinner 
suggests, the wide-spread theory and practice of individualism does not necessarily raise 
new theoretical questions about the self in action. However, it does create a popular and 
contemporary discourse of action which, like current philosophical approaches, dialogues 
with classical dilemmas of the self. 
The intertwinement of these discourses is present in other cultural modes, not least cultural 
criticism. Contemporary with Skinner and Rogers, Lionel Trilling utilises the classical 
language of action theory and the psychological ideology of self-improvement, which he 
combines in order to describe the state of the novel. Although Trilling’s claims can be seen 
in relation to the intellectual culture from which they came, he sets his claims within the 
long historical emergence of individualism. Trilling draws heavily upon the idea that the 
novel is aligned with subjectivity. In his preface to The Opposing Self, he suggests that 
‘the self that makes itself manifest at the end of the eighteenth century is different in kind, 
and in effect, from any self that had ever before emerged’.24 Part of this new self, he 
suggests, involves a specific kind of agency which prioritises individuality, insofar as 
agency ‘has become not merely a question of whether the action conforms to the 
                                                          
22
 Herman, p. 238. 
23
 Herman, pp. 239–240. 
24
 Lionel Trilling, The Opposing Self (New York, NY: The Viking Press, 1955), p. ix. This historical and 
literary claim is similar to that made by Watt in The Rise of the Novel. 
11 
 
appropriate principle or maxim of morality, but also of the manner in which it is 
performed, of what it implies about the entire nature, the being, of the agent’.25 This idea – 
that an action expresses the autonomy of an agent – is still very current in contemporary 
free will debates. I will return to this later in this introduction. Along with his historical 
claim, elsewhere Trilling makes substantive claims about the role that the novel plays in 
relation to this new, post-1800, concept of agency.
26
 In The Liberal Imagination, the same 
idea of agency is under focus, though here it is transposed to a specifically literary context. 
For Trilling, the ‘novel at its greatest is the record of the will acting under the direction of 
an idea’.27 Not content to recognise the common features of novels, Trilling psychologises 
the relation between the novel and society. Here, the novel is not only a product of the 
cultural context in which it emerges, it is in a dynamic relation with that culture. Offering a 
strong humanist claim, Trilling suggests that the novel has the potential for ‘reconstituting 
and renovating the will’ in the world.28 Trilling assumes the primacy of autonomy and 
freedom, and this underlies his didactic claims.
29
   
Without accepting all of Trilling’s conclusions, his analysis should be recognised for its 
integration of three separate discourses, a combination which sets the tone for this thesis. 
His example suggests that freedom is a point of importance and common understanding, 
that it can be described using psychological and philosophical terminology, and that it can 
be explored through literary fiction. This example opens doors theoretically. It also 
introduces the idea that the exploration of individual action is the defining characteristic of 
the novel form, a claim which is given special urgency by Trilling’s position within a 
cultural milieu that was increasingly finding the language to explore the complexities of 
individuals and their actions. The novels chosen for this study can also be grouped around 
this confluence. All of my chosen works were written by authors who lived through the 
Second World War, though the majority of the texts are Cold War products.  
                                                          
25
 Trilling, The Opposing Self, p. xi, original emphasis. 
26
 Similar claims are made in: Ian Watt, The Rise of the Novel: Studies in Defoe, Richardson and Fielding 
(London: The Hogarth Press, 1987), p. 13. Watt suggests that the novel’s ‘primary criterion was truth to 
individual experience - experience which is always unique and therefore new’. He closely associates this 
inward turn with Cartesian philosophy, in which ‘truth is conceived of as a wholly individual matter, 
logically independent of the tradition of past thought [...] The novel is the form of literature which most fully 
reflects this individualist and innovating reorientation’. 
27
 Lionel Trilling, ‘Art and Fortune’, in The Liberal Imagination: Essays on Literature and Society 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1970), pp. 255–80 (p. 265). 
28
 Trilling, ‘Art and Fortune’, p. 265. 
29
 For a full investigation of Trilling’s humanist literary criticism, see: Mark Krupnick, Lionel Trilling and 
the Fate of Cultural Criticism (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1986). 
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Anna Kavan’s Ice is an apocalyptic novel, published in 1967, in the midst of the Cold War. 
The novel is strongly engaged with the idea of agency, and the encroaching apocalypse is 
both an external and internal phenomenon. Complexly psychological, Kavan’s writing 
combines a strongly subjective narratorial style with an emphasis on the victimisation and 
passivity of her central character. Kavan had longstanding form in her rejection of the 
intrusions of society on the individual. In 1944, she wrote a piece for Horizon magazine, in 
which she set out the traumas of a hospitalised solider. ‘The Case of Bill Williams’ is an 
attack on the mechanising aspirations of wartime, and the values that this propagates 
within society at large. For Kavan, the rhetoric of war appears to become a political excuse 
to instigate a conformist agenda:  
Inevitably, right from the start, the social machine is the enemy of the individual 
Bill Williams. It limits the avenues of his mind, it trips his feet and lays traps for 
his fingertips and his tongue. Every door closing, every form filled in, every 
official, every broadcast, every regulation, every propaganda slogan, is ammunition 
in the war; Society versus Bill Williams.
30
 
Malcolm Lowry covers similar concerns in his 1947 novel Under the Volcano. Here, the 
main protagonist is an ex-Consul, a figure of transitional political allegiance. As Andrew 
Miller notes, the Consul has left the diplomatic service, and so his ‘words, actions, and 
desires have long since ceased to be clearly tethered to any state-based territorial 
formation’31. Instead, the political undertones in the novel are filtered through the strongly 
individualist focus of character and action. This is partly supplied by echoes of 
aestheticism, but is also shored up in part by Lowry’s reading of José Ortega y Gasset’s 
History as a System. For Ortega, as for Kavan, the ‘mechanical interpretation of the 
universe’32 is in contrast with the individual; the ‘self-made, autofabricated’ man.33 In 
addition to these social contexts, Lowry’s focus on agency in Under the Volcano is 
predominantly supplied by his thematisation of alcoholism; a condition embedded in a 
complex set of associations and ideologies – both individual and social – regarding 
                                                          
30
 Anna Kavan, ‘The Case of Bill Williams’, Horizon, 9 (1944), 96–99 (p. 97). 
31
 Andrew John Miller, ‘Under the Nation-State: Modernist Deterritorialization in Malcolm Lowry’s Under 
the Volcano’, Twentieth Century Literature, 50 (2004), 1–17 (p. 1); For a further political reading of Lowry, 
see: Hilda Thomas, ‘Praxis as Prophylaxis: A Political Reading of Under the Volcano’, in Swinging the 
Maelstrom: New Perspectives on Malcolm Lowry, ed. by Sherrill Grace (London: McGill-Queen’s 
University Press, 1992), pp. 82–92. 
32
 José Ortega y Gasset, History as a System, trans. by Helene Weyl (New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Co., 
1962), p. 117. 
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freedom and the will. This association is made more complex if we follow Sharae Deckard 
in her suggestion that ‘[alcohol] functions in the novel as an escape from the 
homogenizing categories of identity which the Consul finds oppressive.’34 Vladimir 
Nabokov’s Pale Fire (1962) was published during the Cold War and aspects of the novel 
have been seen to bear the trace of communist political events.
35
 This context is in 
interaction with the focus of the novel, in which localised relationships, and the behaviour 
of individuals within those relationships, carry significant burdens of influence and 
responsibility. Like Pale Fire, Beckett’s How It Is (1961) also focuses intently on 
interpersonal relationships. In Beckett’s dramatic monologue, however, the setting is a 
loosely defined, mud-filled world, in which the creaturely protagonists move and interact 
according to a sparse and sadistic set of encoded norms. How it Is has been loosely 
associated with Beckett’s experiences during World War II,36 offering additional historical 
context to the experimentalism of the text, which dialogues with psychology as both a 
theoretical and literary practice. 
 IV  
So far, I have painted a broad picture of a social and intellectual context in the twentieth 
century in which the self was theorised extensively. As I have suggested, this trend had 
multiple manifestations and inflected debates across the arts, sciences and humanities. The 
novels under scrutiny in this thesis emerged and engaged with a culture that was 
preoccupied with questions of agency. The agent, as a theoretical entity, is historically 
formulated through two poles of thought; one which assumes that there is freedom, and 
that free choice and self-determination are accessible and constitutive aspects of the 
individual. This idea has several extreme manifestations, which theorise self-determination 
as a hermetic and transcendental right. This concept of freedom is often brought into 
conflict with the sense that free will can come under threat from myriad conformist and 
determinist forces. The wide discourse is one in which the agent appears in turn as free, 
conflicted, fallible, irrational, rational, self-directing, and socially embedded. In order to 
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disentangle some of the complexities of this picture, I turn now to a more specific 
literature review which traces some aspects of the idea of agency which I will be using in 
this thesis. This is a partial summary, but through it builds an idea of how different 
concepts of agency interact, how they are used now in a variety of disciplines, and how 
they developed. This review brings concepts of agency up to date to frame the theoretical 
underpinnings of my literary readings in subsequent chapters. The state of the art in current 
conceptions of agency is not an isolated discourse, but one which has a long intellectual 
history which overlaps with much of the context-specific content in the earlier sections of 
this introduction.  
Contemporary cognitive science and the philosophy of mind are, implicitly or explicitly, 
founded on their responses to two entwined positions that emerge from Cartesian dualism. 
The first is metaphysical control, which suggests that the mind is nonphysical, but has 
conscious, executive control over the body. As Stephen Stich and Shaun Nichols suggest, 
this is based on the premise that ‘there are two quite different sorts of substance in the 
universe: physical substance, which is located in space and time, and mental substance, 
which is located in time but not in space’.37 Although Descartes sought to resolve the 
interaction between these substances by proposing ‘two-way causal interaction between 
the mental and physical’,38 these causal happenings are hard to justify logically: ‘how’, 
asks Jerry Fodor, ‘can the nonphysical give rise to the physical without violating the laws 
of the conservation of mass, of energy and of momentum?’39 The second Cartesian 
problem leads from this ‘homunculus’ version of mental causation. If we have absolute 
control over our actions, then it holds that we know what we are doing and why we are 
doing it, thus: ‘introspection gives rise to infallible knowledge about our own mental 
states’.40 These are two sides of a specific image of the mind-body interaction that is itself 
part of a wider popular view of the human consciousness as somehow separate from the 
world, uncomplicated by the world, and transparently in control of its own processes. 
Responses to these problems in the cognitive sciences and disciplines influenced by the 
cognitive sciences have sought to recast the relationship between mind, body and world. 
This has largely been attempted through an empirical paradigm, with theoretical 
                                                          
37
 Shaun Nichols and Stephen P. Stich, ‘Folk Psychology: Simulation or Tacit Theory?’, Mind and 
Language, 7 (1992), 35–71 (p. 235). 
38
 Nichols and Stich, ‘Folk Psychology: Simulation or Tacit Theory?’, p. 236. 
39
 Jerry A. Fodor, ‘The Mind-Body Problem’, in The Mind-Body Problem: A Guide to the Current Debate, 
ed. by Richard Warner and Tadeusz Szubka (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), pp. 24–40 (p. 25). 
40
 Stephen P. Stich, Deconstructing the Mind (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 120. 
15 
 
description emerging in shared exchange with experimental approaches and findings. The 
study of action and perception, framed as the major ways in which we interact with the 
environment, is central to these studies.
41
  
The history of psychology has frequently, and famously, contended with common-sense 
notions of action. The empirical and experimental obligations of the discipline provide a 
structure which is hard to align with the casual explanatory use of terms such as purpose, 
reason, want, intention, goal and volition, which are repeatedly called upon in the everyday 
comprehension of other people’s actions and our own. Behaviourism was one of the 
earliest, and most influential, psychological schools which sought to bring an empirically 
verifiable mode of enquiry to the study of action. As I suggest in the earlier parts of this 
introduction, there were specific political and social ramifications entangled in the 
behaviourist agenda. Here, I want to concentrate on the way the behaviourist methodology 
interlinks with other discourses of the mind.  
The behaviourist paradigm was based on the eschewal of mentalistic concepts in 
psychological explanation. The scientific programme which behaviourism brought to 
psychology pared down the number of admissible conceptual mechanisms involved in the 
explanation of behaviour in order to structure a mode of research which was capable of 
yielding observable, externally validated, data. This was in contrast to preceding 
psychological methods in which introspection and conscious attention to one’s own states 
played a primary investigative role. The behaviourist agenda can be seen as a rejection of 
the Cartesian problems noted above. It rejects ‘homunculus’ control through a 
thoroughgoing physicalism and, both theoretically and methodologically, dismisses the 
reliability of introspection. The mechanistic approach of behaviourism is clearly stated by 
one of the movement’s founders, J.B. Watson: 
In his first efforts to get uniformity in subject matter and in methods the 
behaviourist began his own formulation of the problem of psychology by sweeping 
aside all mediaeval conceptions. He dropped from his scientific vocabulary all 
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subjective terms such as sensation, perception, image, desire, purpose, and even 
thinking and emotion as they were subjectively defined.
42
 
This approach is echoed in the work of the later behaviourist, B.F. Skinner: 
We can follow the path taken by physics and biology by turning directly to the 
relation between behaviour and the environment and neglecting supposed 
mediating states of mind. Physics did not advance by looking more closely at the 
jubilance of a falling body, or biology by looking at the nature of vital spirits, and 
we do not need to try to discover what personalities, states of mind, feelings, traits 
of character, plans, purposes, intentions, or the other perquisites of autonomous 
man really are in order to get on with a scientific analysis of behaviour.
43
 
Skinner argues here against the adherence to folk modes of behavioural explanation. In 
doing so, he rejects ‘mediating states of mind’, those states by which the agent consciously 
interprets environmental and bodily cues. By removing these mentalistic concepts, Skinner 
assumes a direct line of processing between environmental stimuli and behavioural 
response. In this model, the agent’s consciousness of action and the reasons for action are 
epiphenomena.  
Watson and Skinner take a hard line on the explanatory use of mediating mental states. 
However, others from within the behaviourist movement were more reluctant to do away 
with mentalistic language altogether. To distinguish between the two levels of explanation 
given by mentalistic language and physiological process, Edward Tolman introduced the 
terms ‘molecular’ and ‘molar’. As discussed above, Watson championed a model of 
behaviour which used the term ‘stimulus in psychology as it is used in physiology’.44 
According to this model, ‘movements of the muscles and activity in the glands themselves 
serve as stimuli by acting upon the afferent nerve endings in the moving muscles’.45 This 
is the ‘molecular’ approach. In contrast, Tolman produced his ‘molar’ behaviourism, 
which regards observable features of action as worthy of observation in their own right: 
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An act qua “behaviour” has distinctive properties all its own. These are to be 
identified and described irrespective of whatever muscular, glandular, or neural 
processes underlie them. These new properties, thus distinctive of molar behaviour, 
are presumably strictly correlated with, and, if you will, dependent upon, 
physiological motions. But descriptively and per se they are other than those 
motions.
46
  
Tolman’s suggestion is that behaviourism has to give way to molar description because 
‘initially and as a matter of first identification, behaviour as behaviour reeks of purpose 
and of cognition’.47 Despite Tolman’s introduction of the molar approach – the observation 
of action, and the admittance of ‘purpose and cognition’ into the behaviourist agenda – his 
theories received criticism for remaining at the ‘purposive, intelligent level’ and so being 
incapable of ‘explaining purpose or intelligence’.48 He had no way of explaining purpose 
itself, and so left a gap between the description of molecular, synaptic, happenings, on the 
one hand, and purposive action description on the other.  
After Tolman, attempts to bridge this gap came across logical problems. Chief among 
these were slippages into teleological reasoning; arguments which imply ‘a cause 
subsequent in time to a given effect’.49 In action description, the teleological error occurs 
when it is implied that the goal somehow causes the goal-directed behaviour. This 
reasoning defies the deterministic necessity that causes precede effects. An explanation of 
purpose driving action is misleadingly teleological without a description of how a folk-
understanding of ‘purpose’ can be explained causally. One explanation of this came in the 
1940s with cybernetics. Arturo Rosenblueth and his collaborators followed Tolman in 
prioritising the molar, over the molecular, unit in behavioural interpretation: 
[T]he purpose of voluntary acts is not a matter of arbitrary interpretation but a 
physiological fact. When we perform a voluntary action what we select voluntarily 
is a specific purpose, not a specific movement. Thus, if we decide to take a glass 
containing water and carry it to our mouth we do not command certain muscles to 
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contract to a certain degree and in a certain sequence; we merely trip the purpose 
and the reaction follows automatically.
50
 
Rosenblueth et al. then redefine teleology using a mechanistic schema to account for how 
‘purpose’ can be given some form of controlling role, without slipping into the 
metaphysical claim that purpose causes action. This is done using the model of ‘feedback’ 
to reframe teleology as a question, not of ends causing means, but of ‘purposeful reactions 
which are controlled by the error of the reaction’.51 This form of teleology is applicable to 
action because it allows feedback to modify action, by positing ‘the difference between the 
state of the behaving object at any time and the final state interpreted as the purpose’.52 In 
this way, cybernetics came up with a mechanistic schema for how behaviour can be 
controlled by an envisioned ‘final state’ without resorting to metaphysical slips in 
causality. Cybernetics, in its use of ‘system’ and ‘information’ terminology, was a 
forerunner of later – specifically cognitive – approaches to psychological investigation. In 
1967 Ulric Neisser defined the cognitive psychologist ‘trying to understand human 
cognition’ as ‘analogous to that of a man trying to discover how a computer has been 
programmed’, insofar as he is attempting to understand how information is being 
processed.
53
      
The development of a distinct psychological field of action theory received more 
systematic attention with the cognitive shift. As noted above, feedback moved 
psychological emphasis away from an overly mechanistic paradigm. With this, modelling 
shifted toward organismic models, in which the agent was conceived of as dynamically 
embedded in its environment: 
[Like] every other aspect of the universe, man will possess an inherent organization 
and activity and should be considered the source of acts. This source is complex 
and will consist of all kinds of psychological function […]. These processes, which 
are subject to developmental changes because of physical and psychological 
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maturation, growth, and development, will lead to changes in the psychological 
functions.
54
 
This kind of theoretical shift moves the focus away from an agent-centred perspective to 
and towards more complex contextualist models in which the act is set within 
developmental or social frameworks. For Louis Oppenheimer, the contextualist approach 
seems to court a level of complexity which makes it very hard to conceptualise action in 
the same terms as scientific study.
55
  
Despite reservations such as these, cognitive psychology has significantly developed the 
way in which we conceptualise action and the conscious control of action. One major 
contribution to this has been the study and isolation of unconscious cognitive processes. 
Work, largely conducted following John Kihlstrom’s definition of the ‘cognitive 
unconscious’ in the 1980s, has provided a massive body of evidence which suggests that ‘a 
great deal of complex cognitive activity can be devoted to stimuli that are themselves 
outside of phenomenal awareness’.56 A large research paradigm in the cognitive sciences 
has developed around the discovery of the unconscious underpinnings of everyday thought 
and action. The validity of this model is enmeshed with the cognitive bias of the inquiry. 
As James Uleman notes, the computer model that historically underpins the cognitive 
approach ‘legitimized complex theories about unobservable processes while apparently 
avoiding the sins of anthropomorphizing and using homunculi as causes’.57 Early work on 
the cognitive unconscious was largely limited to the study of automatic memory and 
cognition, but this quickly broadened to include evidence of automaticity at work in 
affective and motivational processes as well, including goal-directed behaviour.
58
 What 
exists now is a large body of evidence which suggests that many higher-order functions 
which were once thought to be dependent on conscious control are now proven to be 
undertaken by non-conscious processes. In many ways, this builds on long held insights on 
automaticity developed through the nineteenth century and given quasi-scientific 
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articulation through Freudian psychoanalysis. The contemporary experimental exploration 
of the cognitive unconscious has resulted in an increased complexity in our understanding, 
and in some cases a recategorisation, of our concepts of mental processes. Particularly, this 
concerns the interaction between non-conscious and conscious elements. 
Although the development of cognitive psychology – and its relation to previous 
psychological schools – is complex and contested,59 work on the cognitive unconscious 
has revealed some continuity in historico-theoretical emphasis. As outlined above, the 
behaviourist dogma was a ‘refusal to consider mediating internal constructs and processes 
[…] in explanations of human behaviour’.60 This contrasts with cognitive psychology, 
which is founded on the study of such mediating processes. Despite this methodological 
and ideological difference, John Bargh and Melissa Ferguson note a shared commitment to 
the materialist, determinist explanation of action. Determinism in this case is ‘the position 
that for every psychological effect (e.g., behaviour, emotion, judgment, memory, 
perception), there exists a set of causes, or antecedent conditions, that uniquely lead to that 
effect’.61 In cognitive psychology, the deterministic schema is especially evident in the 
experimental work on automatic processing. Automatic processing theories produce a 
model that is easily aligned with determinism because it demonstrates that mental 
structures are formed to a significant extent by ‘processes that can proceed without the 
intervention of conscious deliberation and choice’.62 The evidence for automatic 
motivation allows for an explanatory cognitive model which shows nonconscious 
processes interacting ‘in a flexible manner with ongoing environmental events’ in constant 
and dynamic feedback according to determinants of information and internal goal-
structure.
63
 
 V 
If certain strands of contemporary psychology have sought to show how our common-
sense ways of thinking about our own actions are flawed, then they contrast directly with 
the philosophical approach known as folk psychology (FP). FP, in its academic guise, is a 
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way of grouping and systematising the everyday language of mental description. FP grew 
out of contemporary, cognitively-oriented philosophy. In its early inceptions, the debate 
around FP sought to understand the relation between our lay-understanding of the mind 
and the scientific theories which sought to reject mental language entirely. Following on 
from the work in cognitive science, FP debates sought to establish whether terms like 
desire, volition, plan, goal and belief are useful in the conceptualisation of cognitive 
procedures, or whether they are simply epiphenomena that should, and will, be supplanted 
by a more rigorous scientific understanding of biological fact. The philosophical position 
which holds that the folk-language of mental description is defunct is known as 
Eliminativism.
64
 Despite these contentions, the folk psychological model is still a major 
area of dispute, though the contours of the debate have shifted slightly from its original 
inception.  
As with cognitive psychology, FP can be seen as an anti-Cartesian movement. For Stephen 
Stich, this shift is more methodological than theoretical. He suggests that the growth of 
behaviourism ushered in a different kind of questioning that moved away from ‘Descartes, 
Locke, or Berkeley’, who asked ontological questions: ‘What sort of thing (or stuff, or 
process, or substance) is the mind?’, and began interrogating the very ‘concept of mind: 
What is the meaning of our mental terms? What is the correct analysis of our mental 
terms?'
65
 Folk psychology, as a descendent of this stance, positions itself as an empirical 
theory. Where Cartesianism is a metaphysical proposition that relies on positing and 
defending the existence of immaterial substance, folk psychology does not describe what 
the mind is made of, but only proposes to function as a low-level theory that maps the 
‘regularities among stimuli and responses’.66 Insofar as it is a theory, Stich claims that the 
role of folk psychology is to ‘give ordinary mental state terms their meaning’; it is the 
concretisation of the way in which we commonly understand conative states as 
reciprocally linked to action and the world.
67
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One major trend in FP concerns the way in which we use mental language to understand 
the actions of others. One distinct feature of social life is that we are remarkably accurate 
in our ability to predict the actions of other agents. In philosophical terminology, this 
ability is broadly known as ‘mindreading’. Mindreading seems to involve mental concepts; 
if we describe the actions of others by using the language of intention and desire, then we 
may well understand the actions of others using these same concepts.  The ability to 
mindread is taken by some commentators to be innate.
68
 It is also highly adaptable to a 
wide variety of environmental and circumstantial changes. This adaptability demands a 
theoretical explanation that can account for dynamic change as part of the enormous 
capacities of the mind. As a result, a number of contesting sub-groups emerged through the 
history of the FP project. The traditional poles of this debate were occupied by, on the one 
hand, ‘tacit theory’ theory (more commonly referred to as ‘theory theory’) and ‘simulation 
theory’. Theory theory posits the existence of a ‘largely tacit psychological theory that 
underlies [mindreading and interpretive] abilities’.69 In contrast, simulation theory posits ‘a 
special sort of mental simulation in which we use ourselves as a model for the person we 
are describing or predicting’.70 This is the special ability to imaginatively project ourselves 
into another’s position. From this position, the theory suggests, we can infer the 
motivations that underlie their actions. The opposition between theory and simulation 
models has not only concerned the interpretation of the underlying mechanisms of 
mindreading abilities. An accompanying difference in theoretical projection has also 
shaded the debate, with theory theorists not only positing, but also modelling, the tacit 
theory. In this way, they have attempted to map a specific structure of the mind. This 
contrasts with simulation theorists, who have largely limited themselves to a description of 
underlying cognitive capacities without attempting to link these capacities to a specific 
model of the mind.    
The unifying feature of both theory and simulation theories is that they frame action 
interpretation as the ability to infer desires and beliefs into an agent’s actions. It is the 
comprehension of these desires and beliefs as motivating causes which explains the action. 
It is this point which has been targeted in recent years by a theoretical turn in the FP 
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debate. This has been accompanied by a return to the phenomenology of second-person 
interaction, which deemphasises the primacy of desire/belief inference in mindreading. 
Instead, theorists attempt to explain basic mindreading skills, not as a specific 
interpretative activity, but as a contextualised and pragmatic stance; contextualised 
because we often understand actions immediately because we have seen them before and 
know them as basic action scripts; pragmatic because we do not need to understand the 
actions of everybody we see, we just need to know enough to frame our own action. 
Neither point involves recourse to the desire/belief framework because they move the 
emphasis away from interpretation, and attempt instead to characterise the immediacy of 
second-person comprehension. For example, Matthew Ratcliffe rejects traditional 
conceptions of folk psychological interpretation in favour of a strongly situated second-
person mode of action comprehension which is context specific, and driven by in-the-
moment body-language.
71
  
Although some theorists have used apparent phenomenological evidence to move away 
from desire/belief schemas, others have appealed to similar arguments to support directly 
contradictory theses. Karsten Stueber, for example, appeals strongly to a first-person 
experience of agency in order to root his argument for simulative mindreading abilities. 
While these might take place in the second- or third-person, he claims that they are 
fundamentally rooted in the interpreter’s experience of themselves:72 
[Agents] in experiencing their agenthood have to view themselves in folk-
psychological terms and […] use the same terminology to explain and predict the 
behaviour of other human beings whom they conceive of as agents like 
themselves.
73
  
He develops this to signal the remaining uncertainties that are involved in mindreading. 
These revolve around the use and limitations of both first- and third-person knowledge in 
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folk-reasoning, which are developed to augment and complicate the minimal desire/belief 
schema:   
Agents should be understood as acting not only because of their beliefs and desires; 
agents act in a full sense only because they are also able to recognize their 
individual perspective on the world as their reason for their actions.
74
 
Here Stueber covertly articulates the two points which structure so much of the FP debate. 
On one hand, he is attempting to articulate a folk psychology which characterises the ease 
and immediacy of action comprehension. However, at the same time, he attempts to 
reconcile this with the first-person perspective which is unique to agenthood. This 
‘individual perspective on the world’ cannot be fully accessed by other agents. Because of 
this, there is a sense in which action-comprehension is not an exhaustive or even a 
particularly accurate pursuit because mindreading, though apparently accurate much of the 
time, can only be an inference and an approximation.  
It is this problem which leads some theorists to sidestep the issue of mindreading as a 
universal practice, and root it more decisively as a communicatory tool. This is a 
pragmatic stance insofar as absolute transparency is not integral to communication. 
Theorists who move away from designating the mechanisms which underlie folk 
psychological ability have tended instead to emphasise the reciprocal structures of 
psychology and society in which that ability is situated. For example, Jerome Bruner 
suggests that we ‘learn our culture’s folk psychology early, learn it as we learn to use the 
very language we acquire and to conduct the interpersonal transaction required in 
communal life’.75 As this point suggests, the communicative function of mindreading is 
paramount. Simon Baron Cohen also takes up this point, suggesting that our innate ability 
to ascribe mental states is not an isolated practice, but is tied up with the efficiency of 
speech communication:  
The notion is that not only do we pay attention to the actual words a speaker uses; 
we also focus on what we think was the gist of what he or she wanted to say or 
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wanted us to understand […] the listener assumes that the meaning of an utterance 
will be relevant to the speaker’s current intentions.76 
This would also hold for gestural communication, and for a whole range of intentional 
ascriptions that might be employed to comprehend body-language. The range of our 
mindreading skills is massive, and our skills are constantly open to change. As Bruner 
suggests, the intentional stance is uniquely adaptable and inclusive:  
It focuses on the expectable and/or the usual in the human condition. It endows 
these with legitimacy or authority. Yet it has powerful means that are purpose-built 
for rendering the exceptional and the unusual into comprehensible form.
77
 
Here, the pragmatism of FP is clear. It can render the exceptional intelligible, but in doing 
so it may actively shape exceptional action according to norms of comprehension. These 
norms work both ways. An individual interprets action according to what actions they 
think are permissible in the context. In addition, agents attempt to make themselves 
understood according to these norms by narrating or explaining actions which are not 
immediately transparent. The normative element of folk psychological understanding 
allows for a plastic and inclusive mode of understanding. However, this is shaped by the 
strong connection between FP and rationality; we interpret actions by inferring intentions, 
and this inference is framed by an assumption of rationality. This connection has been 
disputed, but is strong enough to assume without detour.
78
 Daniel Dennett makes the link 
as follows:  
 One fact so obvious that it is easily overlooked is that our “common-sense” 
explanations and predictions of the behaviour of men and animals are intentional. 
We start by assuming rationality […] The presumption of rationality is so strongly 
entrenched in our inference habits that when our predictions prove false, we at first 
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cast about for adjustments in the information-possession conditions […] or goal 
weightings, before questioning the rationality of the system as a whole.
79
 
 In his early writings, Stich makes a softer argument for this link: 
For a person’s cognitive states to be intentionally characterizable, the states, the 
interactions among them, and their interactions with the environment must all be 
similar to our own. The minimal rationality condition follows from this, if we add 
the assumption that we ourselves are passingly rational in our inferences.
80
 
Stueber narrows the focus of the rationality-clause by suggesting that the notion of 
rationality that is most important to mindreading is an objective, rather than subjective use. 
Objective rationality concerns judging action ‘in terms of its ability to objectively achieve 
the intended goal of the agent’. Subjective rationality examines ‘merely from the point of 
the cognitive and conative perspective of the agent’.81  
The rationality-clause and the normative power of folk psychology offer a strong model 
which is remarkably accurate in the explanation of a very broad range of actions. 
However, a criticism remains. The comprehensive sweep of FP does not stretch to cases in 
which the norms of interpretation are broken to a radical degree. In these situations, the 
theory must either shape the aberrant behaviour to make it comprehensible, or reject it as 
irrational and beyond understanding. Katherine Wilkes offers a charitable characterisation 
of this:  
[Folk psychology] cannot handle irrational, abnormal, aberrant behaviour. It has 
never been able to. But the reason is simple; it succeeds as it does because it aims 
to show how the behaviour to be explained is, given the background, the 
circumstances, the rest of the agent’s holistic web of psychological states, 
rationally intelligible after all.
82
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What is left, then, is a way of framing and understanding the ease of second-person 
comprehension as based on regularities of action and interpretation. This ability has been 
characterised in a number of ways by contesting theories, but there is basic assent on the 
incontestable pervasiveness of the ability in everyday life. The impulse to characterise folk 
psychology as a distinct theory might be contrasted both with theories which emphasise 
the non-conscious aspects of everyday psychology, and harder materialist approaches 
which propose the elimination of folk-mentalising through the discovery of the brain 
science behind behaviour. This distinction, between intuitive psychology (or rather 
psychologising rooted in the phenomenology of everyday life) and scientific materialism, 
is a debate which repeats in a number of other areas in the cognitive sciences.  
 VI 
Despite the unwittingly complicated theoretical involutions of folk psychology, its growth 
points to a strong intuition in action theory. Many believe that the attempt to describe the 
way in which the mind works should connect to our common-sense experiences of our 
own minds, and use the language through which we usually understand mental processes. 
An underlying intuition of FP is the idea that the first-person experience of agency is 
commensurate with how conscious processes and actions actually occur. The harder 
materialist stance, as maintained by some of the psychologists discussed above, disregards 
this position. There are two levels of description at work. The folk model suggests the 
operative importance of conscious processes, while the materialist model suggests a deep 
level of subpersonal process. For the materialist, this subpersonal level gives real insight 
into action. This position suggests that folk description might be the way in which we 
understand our actions, but it has no link to what is actually happening.  
In mainstream debates, this split has found clearest expression in the responses to Daniel 
Wegner’s Illusion of Conscious Will. In this book, Wegner puts forward the idea, based 
partly on Benjamin Libet’s experimental findings, that conscious will is epiphenomenal.83 
Although we think we are exercising executive control over our actions, Wegner argues 
that we are not. Instead, he suggests that actions arise from neurophysiological happenings, 
and the will is a mind-game through which we retrospectively attribute intentions to our 
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actions.  Wegner’s polemic can be seen in dialogue with a distinct return among 
philosophers to the importance of first-person awareness, introspection and 
phenomenology. This approach is tied up with folk-notions of experience, though it tends 
to emphasise specific aspects of first-person experience – rather than the entire framework 
of folk psychology – in order to make claims about distinct philosophical and 
methodological problems. Tim Bayne, for example, bases his position on the widespread 
success of folk-functions in the world: 
As folk, we appear to be deeply wedded to a conception of mental states according 
to which they not only rationalize our actions but also cause them, and their causal 
efficacy is dependent on their content. This conception of folk-psychology is not 
uncontested, but it is widely endorsed. Is it also a component of agentive 
experience?
84
 
The key emphasis comes at the end of this excerpt, where Bayne shifts focus to the 
‘agentive experience’, which he later develops into an argument for the place of first-
person experience in theories of consciousness. This work should be broadly construed as 
part of a recent experimental philosophical movement, in which findings and techniques 
from experimental psychology have been brought to bear on philosophical problems. 
Seminal in this regard is Bertram Malle and Joshua Knobe’s work in the 1990s, which has 
spawned a number of disciplinary foci.
85
 Those of key interest include work on free will, 
which seek to reconfigure the question of free action by posing arguments based on 
experimental, rather than metaphysical, premises.
86
 The experimental focus of this 
movement is largely based around the systematisation of folk concepts, including the 
contextual and social variance in the use and understanding of everyday mental terms. As 
such, the discipline provides a crucial bridge between folk psychology and analytic 
philosophy.   
Wegner’s position does not just reject first-person agency, it rejects conscious will. His 
sensational dismissal of the will is a rhetorical choice, but it also ties into the close 
historical association between our feeling of causing our own actions, and the sense that 
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we are free agents. In the analytic Anglo-American approach to action theory, the question 
of agency has almost always been structured by the free will debate. Here, as I described in 
the earlier parts of this introduction, the dialectic of selfhood receives its clearest 
articulation. The opposition and reconciliation between free will and determinism takes 
three clear positions in contemporary analytic philosophy. These are libertarianism, 
compatibilism (or soft determinism), and hard determinism. Libertarian theories are 
incompatibilist insofar as they regard physical determinism to be incompatible with free 
will. However, they posit free will based on an agent-causation model. Libertarians have 
been few in the twentieth century debates, though a cluster of recent studies have sought to 
resurrect agent-causation theories with more nuance. All libertarian theories are 
characterised by their convergence on two central tenets, as noted here by Shaun Nichols: 
1. An agent is a causal factor in the production of an action. 
2. For a given action of an agent, the agent could not have caused it. Roughly, the 
agent could have done otherwise.
87
 
The other species of incompatibilism is hard determinism. This doctrine seeks to deny the 
possibility of free will based on the idea that physical determinism prevails, that humans 
are therefore automata, and that the feeling of volitional influence is an illusion. 
Compatibilism attempts to resolve these positions by striking a balance between the 
scientific worldview and the phenomenological sense that we are free. Because the 
compatibilist project concedes the possibility of physical determinism, its main task has 
traditionally been to explain the extra factors of human thought that are present in free 
action, but which are not captured by the notion of determinism. The compatibilist 
problem is: If thoughts and desires arise in our bodies because of chemical signals and 
other elements of the determinist universe, what additional mechanisms are there for us to 
endorse these thoughts and desires to make them ours? David Velleman outlines the 
intuition as follows:  
What makes us agents rather than mere subjects of behaviour – in our conception 
of ourselves, at least, if not in reality – is our perceived capacity to interpose 
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ourselves into the course of events in such a way that the behavioural outcome is 
traceable directly to us.
88
 
The philosophical challenge is to distinguish exactly what conditions and mechanisms 
make actions traceable to an agent. This approach has typically been answered with a kind 
of internalism which has placed the burden of freedom on the introspective awareness of 
one’s psychological states. Like folk-concepts of action, this conceptualises free agency 
through a causal link between choice, intention, volition and action. 
Key contemporary figures in this tradition include Harry Frankfurt, Gary Watson, 
Christine Korsgaard and Michael Bratman. These approaches can be roughly grouped 
because of their conceptual reliance on the idea of action endorsement. This is based on 
the idea that: 
What distinguishes action from mere behaviour and other physical movements is 
that it is authored – it is in a quite special way attributable to the person who does 
it, by which I mean, the whole person.
89
 
The philosophical challenge is to characterise this action authorship; the addition which 
reinforces a reason, passion or motive as an act of agency. The distinctions between the 
approaches in question are largely determined by the different ways in which they 
characterise this endorsement. Frankfurt introduced the concept of volitional hierarchy to 
characterise the way in which an agent, when faced with two choices, might appeal to 
higher levels of volition in order to endorse one or other of the choices as truly their own.
90
 
Frankfurt’s models are strictly compatibilist because they suggest that action endorsement 
can impose authorship on a determinist structure; a model which Frankfurt attempted to 
prove in a series of influential thought experiments.
91
 Bratman’s work also tried to 
characterise this specific kind of endorsement. However, rather than appealing to an 
entirely internal, hierarchical structure of reasoning, Bratman suggests that individual 
actions are integrated into the everyday structures of personal and social organisation, such 
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as plans and goals. These cross-temporal structures have a normative role; plans provide a 
specific type of commitment to coherence which in turn endorses the actions which 
constitute them.
92
 Watson appeals to ethical values to provide the normative structure for 
action endorsement.
93
 Korsgaard takes a similar, though broader, approach by appealing to 
the categorical imperative as a distinctive feature of the work of ‘self-constitution’, the 
normative standard which is both an ethical and self-legislative aspiration to ‘psychic 
unity, the work that we experience as necessitation’.94     
The concept of action authorship in the internalist tradition is closely related to questions 
of moral responsibility. Free will has often been conceived as integral to ethics insofar as 
an action has to be attributable to a specific agent, and in some way represent that agent, 
for the agent to be held responsible for it. Determinism poses a metaphysical challenge to 
the idea of responsibility because it seems to offer no space for the agent as distinct from 
the blind chain of cause and effect. The internalist model is one challenge to determinism. 
However, there are challenges to this model which complicate the strict attribution of 
actions, and moral responsibility, to an agent alone. One attempt to sever this strict 
association is the concept of moral luck as addressed in separate essays by Bernard 
Williams and Thomas Nagel. This examination opens the acting agent, and our moral 
assessment of that agent, to a complex system of external and internal influences. 
Separating control from loss of control, in Nagel’s conclusion, becomes a kind of 
balancing act that we perform which is based on our understanding of ourselves, the social 
dynamics of moral judgement, and a workable folk psychological framework that implies 
agent-causation: 
There is a close connexion between our feelings about ourselves and our feelings 
about others. Guilt and indignation, shame and contempt, pride and admiration and 
internal and external sides of the same moral attitudes. We are unable to view 
ourselves simply as portions of the world, and from inside we have a rough idea of 
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the boundary between what is us and what is not, what we do and what happens to 
us […]. We apply the same essentially internal conception of the self to others.95      
Nagel’s essay reasserts a common-sense position, but in doing so affirms the folk-
intuitions about control that are halting mechanisms for an overly specific theory of the 
will. The environmental and social aspects of moral luck can be seen as a socio-ethical 
corollary to the mechanistic debates around the will and epiphenomenalism outlined 
above. Each approach attempts to disrupt the standard definition of action, in which the 
environment is malleable to the will of the agent, whose actions are constituted by ‘a 
particular psychological state causing a relevant bodily movement’.96 It is also worth 
noting that, just as moral luck trades on common-sense features of everyday ethics that are 
marginalised by the internalist model of responsibility, evidence for the epiphenomenal 
will argument has come, not just from neuroscientific evidence, but from everyday slips in 
conscious control. Daniel Wegner especially trades on this evidence. His theory chimes 
with the experience of non-conscious actions,
97
 as well as more unusual forms of 
structured automatisms such as hypnotism and automatic writing.
98
  
For Wegner, the widespread occurrence of, and fascination with, automatic and non-
conscious action should encourage us to be more sceptical of the concept and feeling of 
control. More moderate theorists than Wegner are currently reformulating ideas of free 
will and control which take into account the evidence from the sciences, as well as a more 
balanced phenomenology which evidences shades, rather than absolutes, of authorship. 
One reformulated free will argument comes from Shaun Gallagher, who attempts to 
augment traditional compatibilist arguments with new evidence from cognitive science and 
experimental philosophy. His conception of free will moves away from addressing the 
determinist bias – the ‘billiard ball’ conception – which he sees as ‘[limiting] the notion of 
causality to the determined mechanics of motor control’.99 Taking a cognitively-oriented 
stance, he seeks to reconceive free will as an open controlling state that is a kind of 
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‘embedded or situated reflection [which] is neither introspective nor focused on my 
body’.100 Gallagher’s model is representative of a shift in theoretical focus, which frees up 
the minutiae of logical intentional motor control, and moves the debate higher up the chain 
to more expansive discussions of how we can conceptualise a relation between 
consciousness and action that also takes in all that we know of the non-conscious 
underpinnings of everyday life.
101
 
 VII 
The above outline describes a number of intersecting fields in the theory of action. Over 
the past fifty years, occasional movements in literary criticism and aesthetics have 
attempted to use elements of action theory as a way of bringing light to the description of 
character action in prose. In recent years, this field has gained momentum thanks to the 
efforts of Cognitive Poetics, a literary critical discipline which brings research from the 
cognitive sciences to bear on the reading of texts. Although the approach that I take in this 
thesis is not a cognitive approach, the terminology and philosophical orientation of this 
field is similar to my research. Cognitive poetics is a broad approach, united by an 
embodied, anti-Cartesian, idea of the mind. Peter Stockwell defines these foundations:  
[T]he foundations of cognitive poetics obviously lie most directly in cognitive 
linguistics and cognitive psychology, together forming a large part of […] 
cognitive science. We need to understand the basic premise that behind these 
innovative disciplines all forms of expression and forms of conscious perception 
are bound, more closely than was previously realised, in our biological 
circumstances.
102
 
The textual artefact, then, becomes the product of an embodied mind, and the concepts 
which structure a reading of the text are also features of an embodied mind. What this 
means in practice is that findings in cognitive science about perception, action 
comprehension, memory, attention, and myriad other structures, can be utilised as extra 
empirical material to be used in conjunction with traditional skills of literary interpretation. 
Ambitious readings aim to uncover the cognitive underpinnings of literary technique, as 
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well as the cognitive structures at play in text comprehension; broadly, the description and 
explanation of ‘the effects of literary texts on the mind of the reader,’103 and a critical re-
emphasis which regards ‘narrative as a strategy for creating mental representations of the 
world.’104  
Cognitive poetics approaches the text as the product of both the writer’s and reader’s 
cognitive faculties. From this point of view, there is clear cross-over between the functions 
of everyday abilities, such as action and perception, and the transfer or modification of 
those functions in the production or consumption of art. Earlier groups of philosophers or 
narratologists perhaps did not articulate this link as part of such a broad methodological 
outlook, but came to similar conclusions – at least about the application of action-
comprehension – through an emphasis on the mimetic function of literature. Both Noël 
Carroll and Paisley Livingston note that the intentional stance toward characters is a 
useful, if partial, method of understanding literary interpretation. Noël Carroll suggests 
that narrative is, for the most part, made up of indicative representations, but that the 
situations that are represented inevitably provoke questions:   
We ask these questions in virtue of certain background beliefs and presuppositions 
we already hold about the nature of [events] – that they involve agents – and about 
agents – that they have motives.105 
Paisley Livingston also adheres to this in his claim that ‘understanding narrative discourses 
invariably requires readers to apply background beliefs concerning not only intentional 
attitudes, but subjective schemata of practical reasoning,’ and through this, reads fictional 
action by relating it to ‘the depicted agent’s possible beliefs, desires, and intentions.’106 
Making a more specific point about our psychological involvement with fictional 
characters, Kendall Walton notes the use of first-person reflective attitudes in aesthetic 
experience. Walton seems to come close to transposing folk psychological simulation into 
an aesthetic context:  
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[As] in the case of participants in children’s games, it is in a first-person manner 
that appreciators are to, and do, imagine about themselves; they imagine from the 
inside, doing things and undergoing experiences.
107
 
Gregory Currie has recognised this link more explicitly in his use of simulation theory to 
describe the paradox of literary emotion. The paradox of literary emotion comes from the 
oddity of our ability to be moved by what we know to be untrue. Currie suggests that the 
paradox can occur because readers operate through simulation at a remove. He posits a 
‘hypothetical reader’ who directly simulates the beliefs and desires of fictional characters, 
and experiences some of the ‘disappointment and turmoil’ or exuberance and joy that the 
reader believes the character to be feeling. Rather than directly simulating the desires and 
beliefs of the character, the reader simulates the desires and beliefs of the hypothetical 
reader: ‘I do that by having exactly those I-states [the imaginative states that emerge from 
simulation] myself.’108 At this remove, Currie claims to escape the paradox of fictional 
emotion because we are not emoting with the character, but through the hypothetical 
reader. It is worth recognising the intuition at the heart of this analytic conceit, namely the 
simulatability of fictional characters, and the companionate comprehension that is worked 
out through the language and structures of folk psychology.      
Currie’s approach is one that has since been adopted in narratology and poetics, where it 
has steadily gained popularity as a way of writing about both literary action, and the 
reader’s interaction with the literary text. Of the recent work in this field, the two 
significant contributions are Alan Palmer’s Fictional Minds and Lisa Zunshine’s Why We 
Read Fiction: Theory of Mind and the Novel.
109
 The main point to be established by 
Palmer is how real life influences our understanding of fiction, and fictional minds in 
particular. Fictional understanding is shown to ‘utilize fundamental aspects of our real-
world knowledge of the mental functioning both of ourselves and of others’. 110 Palmer 
elucidates this observation through the use of models and theories of the mind. From this 
starting point, Palmer’s task is largely taxonomical, insofar as he uses the depth of theories 
of cognition to reflect on the nuance of literary depictions of action, and categorise them 
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accordingly. The insight that ‘a functional perspective on real minds is the basis of a 
teleological perspective on fictional minds’ leads Palmer to explores various features of 
experience that make up a teleological world view.
111
 These include language, non-verbal 
consciousness, non-consciousness, dispositions, emotions, intentions, and intersubjectivity. 
These categories are not entirely discrete, but are constantly interacting. Palmer’s 
overriding point is that recognition of these features and close attention to how they relate 
to one another, are vital for a nuanced reading of literary action. This is the case both for 
our direct understanding of character action, and for the recognition of specific structural 
devices, such as embedded narrative.  
Palmer spends some time on action theory, but offers little insight into the way that the 
structural tools given by analytic tradition in this field could actually be set to work in the 
interpretation of narrative. In this regard, he follows a disparate group of narratologists 
who have also recognised the apparent potential of action theory for narrative study, but 
have not pushed these insights or tested them out across close readings. Teun van Dijk 
pioneered this area with tentative claims about the mutually beneficial differences between 
action theory and literature. There is, he suggests, an ‘intuitive idea […] that narrative 
discourse may be conceived of as a form of natural action description, whereas a 
philosophy or, more specifically, a logic of action attempts to provide formal action 
descriptions’.112 David Herman describes a similar intuition when he suggests that, while 
philosophers ‘create taxonomies of act-types […] mapping the structures and supports of 
human action’, storytellers make worlds through which readers can ‘better appreciate 
exemplary as well as exceptional varieties and modes of action’.113 If stories ‘rely 
implicitly on the same conceptual systems that action theorists strive to make explicit’, 
then action theory can potentially be used to elucidate the processes of understanding what 
we are reacting to when we read, as well as sketching the viable parameters for 
verisimilitude in fictional action.
114
  
Lubomír Doležel recognises the cross-over between action theory and narratology, but 
rejects what he sees as the heavy emphasis that philosophy places on intentionality. 
Although the notion of intention might be useful in characterising the mental portion of an 
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action, intentionality per se appears too dogmatic for Doležel. While ‘the needs of 
narrative semantics will be satisfied if ‘intention’ is accepted as a primitive notion, 
irreducible to other mental factors of acting, such as desires, reasons, or beliefs’, the 
concept of intention cannot provide further insight. Doležel argues that the concept of 
intention is necessarily restricted in its inability to describe a whole range of non-
intentional and non-conscious actions, as well as the range of motivational factors, such as 
environmental and intersubjective factors, that are not properly captured by the term. With 
these criticisms, he argues for a broader approach to character action: ‘[whereas] intention 
delimits the domain of acting from nonactional events, motivation is the key to 
understanding the diversity of acting, the why and how of actions’.115 Although Doležel is 
correct to champion a wide understanding of action and agency, his assumption that 
philosophical action theory has been preoccupied with intention gives a slightly 
imbalanced picture, which I will address in Chapter One.   
My own position, following the traditions outlined here, is based upon the intuition that, 
because narratives are made up of character actions, then models of real world action and 
how we understand it might help to elucidate prose. This cannot be a wholesale application 
of action theory, as interdisciplinary work is curtailed to some extent by the competing 
conventions of each discipline. While literary action certainly deals with a diverse range 
and depth of psychological and motivational states, it does not necessarily describe these 
states in a way which allows for a clear application of theory. However, the theory of 
action – in many of its guises – provides a wealth of explanatory and terminological tools 
which are eminently useful to the literary-critical project. Literature has an incredibly 
broad scope, and needs models which are flexible enough to fit a wide range of textual 
features. For this reason, a diverse range of action-theoretical approaches is favourable. 
This point notwithstanding, literature does seem to draw upon clear intuitions about action. 
Because fictional action needs to be intelligible, it generally draws upon folk models of 
behavioural explanation. This suggests an implicit theoretical bias toward descriptions of 
action which use common-sense concepts and tally with first-person experience. This 
harmonises with a recurring attempt in some strands of theory, to focus models of agency 
on the experience of action. Although this approach has a strong intuitive claim, it does not 
fit all aspects of action. Experimental disciplines show that action is not just made up of 
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what we experience, but is spread across conscious and non-conscious control. The ways 
in which these disciplines model the slippage in first-person experience offer ways of 
broadening the concepts of action theory. My primary texts often focus on the questionable 
stability of agency and the experience of agency. As such, these wider models of action 
provide fruitful approaches for the interpretation of these texts.    
A broad approach to action theory allows a range of interpretive approaches, which 
together minimise the failings of a single approach. Character action can be more fully 
explored by adopting elements of the folk psychological theory of mind and pushing them 
into dialogue with other elements of the identity cluster: morality, self-understanding, 
reason, and autonomy. Contemporary free will theory overtly describes the plastic 
interactions between conscious control and subpersonal, or non-conscious motivation, as 
well as how we interpret this in ourselves and others. Such focus is necessary to counteract 
the rationalist shortcomings of solely folk psychological readings of literary texts. In this 
way, the cross-over into literary studies should also be seen as a continuation of more 
traditional literary-theoretical models that have adopted psychoanalytic models as a way of 
describing the unconscious, irrational, or societal factors that demand expression in the 
explanation of character development and plot dynamics. A major benefit of the current 
scholarship is the focus it gives to the specific interactions between elements of the 
identity cluster. Empirical and phenomenological scrutiny in this area has given rise to a 
number of new models, the literary applications of which I hope to develop in the 
following chapters.     
Chapter One focuses on Anna Kavan’s writing. I explore the concept of character 
intention, and how readers understand fictional action. Folk psychology in the 
philosophical literature has attempted to describe the norms of interaction which allow 
agents to understand the actions of other agents without explicit description. As already 
described, this process is called mindreading, and appears to be an automatic ability which 
underpins social action. Traditional models of FP suggest that agents understand the 
actions of others through the inference of desire/belief structures; when we see someone 
acting in a particular way, we imagine the desires and beliefs which might underpin that 
action. In recent research, this idea has been applied to fiction, with the aim of describing 
how readers understand the actions of characters through the inference of motivational 
states. I use more recent explorations of folk psychology to counter the ease of 
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transmission between real-world mentalising, and fictional mentalising. Recent FP models 
have distinct similarities to other intentional frameworks, and I trace the idea of goal- or 
plan-based inference as it appears in folk psychology, action theory, and literary 
pragmatics. My theoretical explorations use examples from Kavan’s short fiction. I then 
move to a close analysis of Kavan’s novel Ice, with a specific focus on the use of 
intentional structures within that text.  
In Chapter One, I suggest that there are common ways in which we understand character 
actions. In some respects, these seem similar to the ways in which we understand real-
world action, insofar as we understand that action and agency are closely aligned, and that 
agency has attendant structures – such as coherence between plan and action – which 
define it. In Chapter Two, I explore the idea that these agency-centred norms are not only 
implicit in the way in which we understand fiction, but that they inform the very structure 
of fictional work. To present intelligible action, fiction seems bound to abide by some of 
these norms in the construction of action. How It Is is a highly experimental novel. In this 
chapter, I suggest that Samuel Beckett creates his experimentalism by disrupting the 
practice of rendering agency intelligible. He does this by avoiding and transgressing norms 
of expression which ordinarily structure the description of action within fictional 
discourse. I frame the agential questions that Beckett raises in his writing and his own 
philosophical explorations by bringing it into contact with contemporary research which 
explores the place of introspection in action and self-understanding. 
While Chapters One and Two focus directly on the way that character action is understood, 
and the ways that authors subvert this understanding, Chapter Three shifts focus slightly to 
consider the entanglement of morality and intentionality. Because actions are the means 
through which we interpret others, we depend on them to give us insight into the intentions 
of the agent. It is the combination of action and the intention that it represents that allows 
us to make a moral judgment. A moral judgment is not only the praise or blame associated 
with a particular action, but a reaction to a person; a response to an action is generally a 
response to the agent as if the action were representative of them. This returns to the link 
between agency, autonomy and action, and the underlying assumption that an agent acts 
according to tacit endorsement of particular expressions which they have deemed in some 
way to constitute their self. According to this proposition, action is to some extent a self-
expression of character. This chapter explores how Vladimir Nabokov’s Pale Fire is 
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closely involved with this set of assumptions. The character of Kinbote appears to be 
morally suspect, but there is no distinct evidence in the book which would allow a strong 
or conclusive moral judgment to take place. Rather than attempting this, I explore how the 
structural play of Kinbote’s narrative invites certain philosophical interpretations. Insofar 
as these interpretations are ways of characterising morality, the reading primarily reveals 
how the structures of morality are tested and manipulated by the narrative. Morality is a 
facet of intention and agency, and Kinbote’s use of judgment and action-structures can be 
seen interacting with other ideas of agency within Pale Fire. Particularly, I draw them into 
comparison with the characterisations of Gradus and John Shade, and explore how 
Nabokov’s formal innovations are closely related to the representation of agency within 
the novel.     
Theories of intentionality are important for helping us to understand which structures 
underpin our understanding of ourselves and others. The effort to describe what intention 
consists of has often meant that some motivational process, whether subpersonal, 
automatic, or apparently compulsive, have been left out of models of action. This trend is 
particularly clear in the literature on addiction, where the range of approaches and 
conclusions suggests the difficulty of reconciling an idea of addictive compulsion with 
agency. The variety of approaches to addictive action gives a shifting picture of 
intentionality. This is also reflected in the way that freedom and responsibility are 
conceptualised in therapeutic approaches to addiction. Malcolm Lowry’s novel Under the 
Volcano is deeply concerned with questions of addiction. This is borne out through a 
shifting, often character-focalized, perspective on alcoholism and craving which is 
bolstered by allusions to specific models of addiction. In this fourth and final chapter, I 
trace these allusions and develop them in line with contemporary approaches to the 
question of addiction and intention in an attempt to reposition alcoholism within the 
critical appraisal of Under the Volcano. This focussed analysis also brings other thematic 
questions into play, which my discussion roots in the agency-centred approach that 
addiction establishes.   
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Chapter One 
Character Intention: Anna Kavan 
Replying to Philip Inman’s charges that the first draft of Ice lacked ‘internal logic’ and 
needed ‘more pronounced’ action, Anna Kavan stated a case for the novel’s psychological 
anti-rationalism:  
When I started writing, I saw the story as one of those recurring dreams (hence the 
repetitive voyages etc.) which at times become nightmare. This dreamlike 
atmosphere is the essence of the whole concept. […] It is meant to be a fantasy or a 
dream, and dreams are not logical; that’s what makes them strange and fascinating 
(frightening too). 
This exchange, precursory to Peter Owen’s publication of Ice in 1967, is the clearest 
articulation of Kavan’s late style. Here, the balance that sustains the effect of this ‘present 
day fable’ is achieved, she suggests, by moving away from ‘detailed characterisation’, and 
focussing instead on the relationship between the protagonist and ‘the girl’; two of three 
main agents in the book. It is through this relationship that the entirety of the ‘pursuit’ 
structure is justified:   
The girl’s importance as a victim should be enough to justify the pursuing. I mean 
that peculiar attraction between victim and victimiser, drawing two opposite poles 
together until finally they are almost identified with one another. This should 
become clear through all she says and does, as well as what happens to her, 
inferred rather than stated directly. 
Although the structure of the novel may not be logical, Kavan is still appealing to a broad 
narrative arc – the ongoing pursuit –and the characters who sustain this arc through their 
actions. This arc is experimental in its pointed underdevelopment and repetitious episodes, 
but the main object of focus around which this structure turns is the characterisation. In her 
reply, Kavan subordinates the structural play of the novel to the importance of character, 
emphasising her removal from a covert literary norm by exercising inference, based on ‘all 
[the girl] says and does, as well as what happens to her’ over a direct explanation of action 
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and motivation. Wryly avoiding Inman’s criticisms, she promotes the adventure-story 
credentials of the novel:   
When you say that you hope for some dramatic incident I am puzzled. I thought the 
book was full of dramatic incidents with all those fights, shootings, escapes and so 
on. How could I make the action more pronounced? The book consists of actions, 
doesn’t it?1 
This is incontrovertible. However, taken with her other insights into the novel, the implied 
focus is on the way in which the causal relationship between motivation and action is 
treated. If the action itself is ‘pronounced’, then it must be the way in which the action is 
linked to the agent which is obscured. If the link between character and action is obscured, 
then we are led to explanatory models of behaviour. It appears from her letter that part of 
the anti-logical progression that Kavan tries to achieve in the novel is rooted in the 
treatment of the relation between action and agent. Although the mentalising attitude that 
Kavan is promoting – one that focuses on the psychological states of characters – does not 
necessitate a correlate theory of the relation between mind and body, it appears, at least in 
her earlier writing, that she erred towards a mind-body split. Describing a collection of 
Victorian mysteries, she characterises the writers in this way:  
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Afraid of the vast indifferent world, they cling to the familiar safety of everyday 
domestic objects; houses, chairs, beds; things which comfort the mind as they 
support the body. To the child, body and mind are one.
2
 
Other examples of Kavan’s occasional writings also give some idea of her particular stance 
on what a novel should consist of. In a review for the journal Horizon in 1944, a dogma is 
laid out: 
A writer must speak, as it were, the language of the subconscious before he can 
produce his best work. And this is true, not only of such writers as Kafka and 
James Joyce, who communicate by means of a dream or fantasy medium, but also 
of those who describe the external happenings of the outer world. Even in stories of 
action employing a realistic technique, the source of genuine interest springs from 
an understanding of the fundamentals of personality. It is the interpretation of 
complexes, together with their sequence of inevitable events, which gives to any 
book the truly satisfactory rhythmic progression of music.
3
 
Kavan’s emphasis here is on the primacy of the subconscious in determining action. Her 
explanation offers an interesting counterpoint to her defence of Ice above, in which she 
seemed to be cultivating the obscuration of motive and intention. At this point, far from 
offering a clear distinction between motivation and action, she suggests that ‘complexes’ – 
which are motivational states – give rise to a ‘sequence of inevitable events’. The 
‘interpretation of complexes’ happens in conjunction with action events, and it is through 
the manipulation of this interaction that the author can create a ‘rhythmic progression’ 
from an understanding of how ‘complexes’ lead to events. A similar conception of the 
literary task is implied in another Horizon review from 1945 in which the stories of the 
Woodrow Wyatt edited anthology, English Story, are attacked for their unviable 
psychological attitudes: 
Many of them are incompletely worked out from the subconscious angle, the 
motivating complexes unexplained, the characterization negligible, the general 
pattern confused. […] The individuals whom they describe remain nebulous; one 
does not know whether the personality traits which govern their actions are 
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dominantly normal or paranoid or obsessional or depressive or manic; one does not 
see their movements or hear them speak.
4
  
This passage, taken with the above review from 1944, offers a schematic description of 
psychological literature. Here, the ‘motivating complexes’ appear to be the same 
subconscious forces that appear in the earlier review. Far from offering a non-logical 
description of actions, Kavan’s concept of the psychological, at this point, seems to imply 
that there are clear and established links between complexes and actions. The ideal that she 
promotes here is one in which the speech and movements of characters give some insight 
into their personality traits as conceived as psychoanalytic paradigms. Her demand for 
recognisable ‘personality traits’ is not so different from the ‘conventional psychological 
patterns’ that she rejects in her 1946 review, ‘Back to Victoria’.5 More charitably, we can 
see Kavan taking a broad approach to character action by adopting a strict psychologising 
discourse. As appears to be the case in her exchange with Inman regarding Ice, her mature 
characterisation does not rely upon clear causal relationships between motivational 
complexes and actions, but gains its psychological interest by partially obscuring these 
causal relationships. I will discuss this more fully in my reading of Ice later in this chapter.  
 The Concept of Intention in Theory 
As I suggest above, Kavan is deeply interested in the ways in which motivation leads to 
action. In this, she predominantly focuses on the psychological and unconscious 
mechanisms that bias behaviour towards certain ends. Kavan’s focus on this topic is 
particularly prominent in her fiction which follows her first major experimental texts, the 
short prose pieces which make up the 1940 collection, Asylum Piece. Kavan’s 
psychological style, by concentrating on the link between motivation and action, is broadly 
focussed on the idea of intention, insofar as the idea of intentionality is central to our 
concept of action, whether that action is unconscious or not. Before moving onto an 
exploration of the way that intention is written and read in Kavan’s fiction, it is first 
necessary to establish a picture of the intellectual questions which have grown up around 
the concept of intention in recent years. This has largely emerged through the discourse of 
Anglo-American analytic philosophy, which, in the last fifty years, has strongly 
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emphasised the concept of intention within the theory of action. As I will suggest, the 
philosophical concept of intention provides a fruitful theoretical base for the exploration of 
the way in which intentionality occurs in the plotting of narrative.  
In my introduction, I suggested that literary interpretation should not be seen as entirely 
separate from second-person interaction. Rather, there are processes and assumptions 
involved in the creation and comprehension of fictional characters which are congruent 
with real-world structures. The real-world structures at play here are those terms and 
concepts through which we describe and understand our own actions and the actions of 
others. As Marcia Cavell suggests, this often takes the form of ‘a mentalistic or 
intentionalist language’. The terms that might be utilised in this context are ‘wish, belief, 
desire, fear, emotion, feeling, motive, reason, intention’, and so on, which all give ways of 
describing actions which suggest an underlying mental framework for those actions.
6
 It is 
clear from Kavan’s comments above that she had an abiding interest in psychological, and 
particularly, unconscious forms of motivation. This use of mentalising language might 
assume an affinity with conscious, rather than unconscious, action. However, Cavell 
suggests that mentalising language often has to respond to actions which have mixed 
unconscious and conscious motivations, with those states interacting. As such, the 
province of reason-giving has to be flexible enough to assume the descriptive validity of 
both unconscious and conscious reasons. 
Cavell is writing in the Anglo-American analytic philosophical tradition, and follows 
philosophers like Donald Davidson in prioritising the link between reasons and actions. A 
reason seems to tie an action to a particular agent, and an expanded province of reasons – 
both conscious and unconscious – would provide a combined model of motivation. 
Cavell’s combined model strays from the orthodox association between agency and 
conscious action. However, it broadly continues a Wittegensteinian approach to 
unconscious action. Wittgenstein suggested that there is a ‘muddle […] between a cause 
and a reason’ in the method of psychoanalysis.7 While psychoanalysis appears to be 
proposing causes for action, Wittgenstein rejects this: ‘A cause is not seen from within or 
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from without. It is found by experiment’.8 Instead, he suggests that psychoanalysis 
proposes reasons. A reason is not found by experimentation, but ‘entails as an essential 
part one’s agreement with it’; it is a method of explanation which might broaden, but does 
not break out from, our common ways of interpreting behaviour.
9
 Cavell continues this 
approach by suggesting the interaction between unconscious and conscious motivational 
states. This is opposed to models in which the unconscious is seen as an independently 
motivating causal apparatus.
10
  
The combinatory model broadens, but does not reject, the common analytic assumption 
that action is intelligible when it is associated with an agent. Authorship ties consciousness 
to intention and action insofar as being conscious of action ‘is inseparable from action […] 
in the sense that we are always able to answer the question – ‘What are you doing now?’’11 
If the unconscious is a way of positing intentions that instigate action without the 
knowledge of the agent then the notion of ‘intention’ becomes untethered from its specific 
explanatory role. As Stuart Hampshire suggests: ‘If my intentions are […] unknown to me, 
then I have no fixed and formed intentions’.12 For Hampshire, the idea of intention as part 
of agency is crucial because it ties the action to a notion of endorsement which validates 
the centrality of action authorship. On this point, Peter Hacker explains that: 
[First-person] authority with regard to my beliefs and intentions stems not from 
privileged, introspective ‘access’ to one’s mind, which yields […] indubitable and 
infallible knowledge, but stems rather from the fact that I am their author. I form 
some of my intentions and beliefs through deliberation and decision, and others, 
though not the upshot of deliberation, are endorsed by me in their expression.
13
 
This provides a brief explanation of the analytic model of action that I will be exploring 
for much of this chapter. As Hacker suggests, actions are inextricable from the person who 
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acts. Much of the time, this relationship is expressed through intention and endorsement, 
which give an agent ownership of that action.  
This model of agency is central to this chapter, because my task here is not to defend or 
develop a specific view of the unconscious within literature, but to present some more 
general readings of intention. The models that I draw upon, following the tradition within 
which Cavell is placed, are largely taken from Anglo-American action theory. The 
majority of this tradition is implicitly concerned with conscious and rational intention. 
Assuming – as Cavell does – that unconscious and conscious structures interact, the 
language of reasons and intentions should also help to elucidate actions which include 
unconscious elements. This might take the form of standard, or negative, description. In 
the form of negative description, the language of consciousness and rationality might help 
to frame an action which is not contained by those terms. Other readings of unconscious 
action might simply provide additional reasons for action which contribute to, but do not 
necessarily contradict, a conventional understanding of conscious action. In this case, an 
intentionalist framework which is expanded to include both conscious and unconscious 
reasons for action is not theoretically problematic. This offers a flexible model for the 
literary application of intentionalist language. If, as Katherine Wheeler suggests, Kavan 
attempted to write in a ‘language expressive of the richness of the world of the 
unconscious saturating every conscious thought or feeling we experience’, then the 
conscious thoughts and feelings also have a primary role; interacting with, rather than 
trumped by, the unconscious.
14
  
In order to expand a reading of action which might contribute both to how conscious and 
unconscious motives come into play, the first step is to get a firmer grasp on what is meant 
when we talk about character action. As evidenced above, Kavan placed a very strong 
emphasis on the importance of a psychologised form of storytelling. As part of this, she 
practised a method through which characters are created by inference ‘rather than stated 
directly’.15 This claim seems to rely on a missing stage of the argument. Characterising 
through inference relies upon describing through how the character acts, rather than 
offering direct explanation of their personality. If characterisation is shaped by actions, 
then an account of how action is read in fiction becomes necessary in order to suggest how 
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inference can lead from action to characterisation. For this to happen, actions cannot just 
represent unconscious referents, but must be related to a general mentalisation of character 
action, which ties character action to conscious states associated with action authorship. 
Chief among these is intention. To elaborate on the role of intention in action, I turn first to 
a discussion of intention in the analytic philosophical tradition. From here, I move to a 
description of the recent cross-over work in literary criticism and Theory of Mind which 
has sought to explain the folk psychological structures that underlie the interpretation of 
character action in relation to a mentalising framework. In order to elucidate my position 
in this section, I draw extensively on examples from Kavan’s short fiction. Finally, I 
analyse Kavan’s novel Ice with an emphasis on how the author manipulates ideas of 
intention and action in relation to broader structural features of the narrative.  
Philosophical theories of action in the analytic tradition are largely concerned with 
intentional action; that is, the conditions needed for an action to be considered the product 
of an agent. Traditionally, this is articulated in the cases of free will theories and theories 
of morality and jurisprudence, where the intentionality of an action is tied to a moral 
assessment of the agent. Although frequently involved in these larger questions, the 
philosophy of action as a discipline in itself began by separating intention off as a specific 
object of enquiry. This has been attributed to G.E.M. Anscombe’s Intention which isolated 
the question of intention to be: ‘What distinguishes actions which are intentional from 
those which are not?’; to which she answers: ‘they are the actions to which a certain sense 
of the question ‘Why?’ is given application; the sense is of course that in which the 
answer, if positive, gives a reason for acting’.16 The question of whether an action is 
intentional is not necessarily the same as the question of whether an action is conscious. 
Rather, as Alvarez points out, Anscombe’s definition – which aligns intention with reasons 
for action (without conceding that reasons and intentions cause actions) – came to 
structure the debate around three main points: ‘the nature of actions, the nature of reasons, 
and the relation between the two’.17   
Since Anscombe, the notion of intention has been central to the investigation of action. Its 
centrality to the debate is because intention appears to capture a sense of the connection 
between an agent and their action, and how ownership of action is conceived. As such, 
intention has come under close scrutiny, which has split the concept into a number of sub-
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problems, the details of which are discussed by Alvarez in her history of the discipline.
18
 
One main point to draw from the literature is the way in which the conditions for an 
intentional action have been theorised in different ways over the course of the debate. As 
Michael Bratman notes, a central problem in characterising the notion of intention comes 
from the fact that we commonly use the term to refer both to mental and physical states; 
one can intend to do something (a future-directed mental state), and one can intentionally 
do something (a description which notes the agent’s commitment to the action). In order to 
bridge the gap between the mental and physical concepts of intention, Donald Davidson 
and Alvin Goldman among others, minimally defined intentional action to be constituted 
by a background combination of beliefs and desires.
19
 Bertram Malle and Joshua Knobe 
state the position as follows: ‘to act intentionally one needs to have a desire (for an 
outcome) and appropriate beliefs (about how the act would lead to that outcome)’.20 Later 
models, such as Bratman’s, modified the belief/desire model by defining intention as a 
specific capacity in itself, rather than a composite of beliefs and desires.
21
 In Bratman’s 
model, intention has a specific role as a planning function. Other approaches have 
identified links between intentions and the ability or skill to perform an action. 
Some recent theories of intention have strayed from the lines defined in the early years of 
research. One of the more significant movements has been an experimental turn which has 
sought to define intention according to how the term is understood in folk usage. A folk 
theory, as used in philosophy, refers to a set of concepts and platitudes held by common 
people. Malle and Knobe’s 1997 article was seminal in its use of folk evidence in this 
context. The results of Malle and Knobe’s experiments distinguished a structured 
theoretical model. One of the main insights of this was a distinction between the terms 
intention and intentionally: 
People […] apply the term intention to persons (who intend to do something) and 
the term intentional to actions (which are performed intentionally). When we speak 
of intentionality, then, we should speak of actions that were performed 
intentionally. In contrast, when we speak of an action that was intended (i.e., 
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preceded by an intention), we should not automatically infer that such an action 
was performed intentionally; for if awareness or skill were missing, the action 
would be intended but not performed intentionally.
22
 
This use of terms allows Malle and Knobe to develop a systematic model of conditions for 
both intention and intentionality: 
[People’s] folk concept of intentionality consists of five components (belief, desire, 
intention, awareness, and skill) that are hierarchically arranged, such that belief and 
desire are necessary conditions for attributions of intention and, given an intention, 
skill and awareness are necessary conditions for attributions of intentionality.
23
 
The experimental turn in philosophy is useful for the utilisation of theoretical action terms 
in literary scholarship because it points to the common ways in which these terms are used 
and understood. The schematics of action philosophy might find a more natural fit with 
literary criticism if both draw on a common folk understanding of terms. Literary usage 
must draw upon common understandings of actions, motivations and causes in order for its 
narratives to be intelligible without constant explicit commentary. It is also worth noting 
that, although Malle and Knobe’s model is useful as both empirical and clarifying, the 
model that emerges has several commonalities with previous concepts. As such, it seems 
to legitimise the intuitive power of the previous models to some extent. In addition, the 
distinction allows a clearer view of what it might mean for unconscious reasons to enter 
into the explanation of intention. Malle and Knobe only identify ‘belief and desire’ as 
preconditions for intention. This can be seen as congruent with unconscious reasons. 
Because intentionality demands awareness at the time of action, it bars unconscious 
explanation, unless those processes are interacting with conscious processes. 
Although folk psychology (FP) follows the schematic modes of action definition, and 
especially intention definition, the key difference at play is that FP reverses these 
definitions to a different descriptive end. Rather than describing the mental states that are 
needed for an action, FP describes the way in which we interpret behaviour and in so 
doing, infers the mental states behind that behaviour. As I discussed in the introduction, 
folk psychological schematics have traditionally been divided between two competing 
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ideas; Theory and Simulation conceptions of how interpretation works. These, as Malle 
puts is, are designated as ‘domain-specific’ cognitive processes.24 In the specific 
comprehension of intentions, it is not entirely clear how much of a role these cognitive 
processes have, and the models are still largely contested. As above, Malle notes a number 
of factors involved in the explanation of an intentional action. The four broad categories he 
isolates are ‘causal history’, ‘reasons’, ‘intention’ and ‘enabling factor’. These are 
arranged in a hierarchical model, with ‘causal history’ and ‘reasons’ contributing to 
‘intention’, and ‘enabling factor’ bypassing these stages to answer a parallel question about 
what additional factors – skills or abilities – enable an intentional action to take place.  
Malle’s comments on the explanatory power of Simulation and Theory theories suggest 
that our use of different interpretive models is context specific. According to this, these 
cognitive processes might be involved in both conscious and unconscious action, both 
when an intention is ascribed, and when it is not. Because of this, actions might be 
explained by any of the points in the hierarchical structure, though a specific intention has 
to be ascribed for intentional action (see above). Simulation cannot account for a number 
of factors involved in action-comprehension. These include ‘enabling factor explanations’ 
– the specific skill- or ability-oriented explanations which might answer a ‘How Possible?’ 
query
25
 and ‘cause explanations of physical or biological behaviour’ – such as sweating.26 
However, other causal factors involved in action-comprehension, such as unintentional 
behaviour related to psychological or emotional factors, Malle marks as dominantly 
simulative. The term simulation refers to the empathetic responses that facilitate second-
person comprehension; to some extent, we understand the actions of other agents through 
the simulation of their thoughts and feelings. Malle’s comments outline the broad 
explanatory remit of folk psychology, and the basic mechanisms that might be at play 
when we offer mentalising descriptions of other persons.  
 Fiction and Folk Psychology 
Extra complications condition the interpretation of fictional characters with the same folk 
psychological methods with which we interpret persons. This section explores these 
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complications through examples taken from Kavan’s Asylum Piece. This collection of 
short stories is largely focussed on the experiences of individual patients in a continental 
clinic. The stories seem particularly pertinent to an examination of how we read mental 
states because they are focussed on closely studied mentalised descriptions of patients as 
individual agents, as well as in relation to other characters and the broader forces at work 
in the medical and legislative world of the clinic. These stories, following Anaïs Nin’s 
description of Asylum Piece, might be analysed as studies of ‘the world of the divided 
self.’27 As a clarification of her terms, Nin offers a passage from R.D. Laing: 
It can be readily understood why the schizoid individual so abhors action. The act 
is simple, determinate, universal. But his self wishes to be complex, indeterminate, 
and unique. He, his ‘self’ is endless possibility, capacity, intention. The act is 
always a product of a false self.
28
  
Although Kavan’s characters are not necessarily diagnosable as ‘schizoid’, she does 
scrutinize the way in which deliberation might be disconnected from action. In this way, 
her characterisations are overtly mentalising. As such, the stories provide an ideal foil for 
discussion about how character action is interpreted as expressive of mental capacities.  
Before moving to a more complex discussion of the relation between folk psychology and 
fiction, some clarification of basic FP terms is needed, and their basic role in reason 
attribution. In reason attribution, Malle suggests that the action-specificity of inference 
mechanisms means that a mix of Theory and Simulation is likely to provide the cognitive 
background of interpretation, with clear reservations about the specificity of Theory. As a 
general rule to infer intentionality, it might be able to signal where and when to rationalize 
action but this does not necessarily mean that Theory alone will be able to rationalize the 
action correctly: ‘Inferring on the basis of a rationality rule that the agent had some beliefs 
and desires is one thing; inferring the specific ones in this context is quite another’.29 
However, he also suggests that some element of Theory needs to be present in order to 
report the need for inference in the first place: 
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[Simulations] would be hard to get started without general rules that guide the 
search for possible explanations – rules such as “If the behaviour looks intentional, 
search for beliefs and desires and plug them into the deliberation mechanism.”30 
Here, Malle seems to drift into harder developmental questions about Theory of Mind 
which he does not resolve. Despite this, his emphasis on balancing Theory and Simulation 
according to a case-by-case basis seems sensible, and one that might be useful in a literary-
critical context. Although the following is a slightly misleading use of the theory, it is 
helpful to use a literary example to show how Theory or Simulation might be used in the 
comprehension of fiction. Consider this excerpt from Kavan’s short story, ‘Asylum Piece 
IV’: 
 ‘My mother and father? They haven’t been here.’ She looks at him blankly, 
yet with distrust, out of her sparkless eyes. 
 ‘Oh, yes, indeed – they were here this morning. I was in the corridor when 
they came out of the doctor’s study […].’ The Italian boy seems to be only 
interested in his food, but really he is all attention, all on the alert. 
 Zélie takes a mouthful of veal from her plate. Suddenly she grasps the 
meaning of what has just been said to her; the implication of the words dawns upon 
her. She lets her knife and fork fall. ‘My mother has been here…and she went 
away…without seeing me!’31 
Artificially approaching an excerpt like this with only the models of Theory and 
Simulation, one is drawn to distinguish between points in the narrative which seem to 
demand explanation, either by logical or emotional means. Zélie’s distrust of the boy we 
infer from the dramatic-ironic context in which her distrust takes place. Because of the 
situational demands, a Theoretical approach seems fitting, as her distrust implies a 
background of unsatisfactory interactions with the Italian. Here, the partial access to 
Zélie’s mental states draws us to infer related beliefs, desires, and past attitudes which we 
relate to the situation of distrust. In addition, this is related to the fact that we know the 
Italian to be telling the truth based on the previous dramatic context of the story. This 
situational demand in addition to the Italian boy’s interest in Zélie’s reaction might lead us 
to infer that the boy is attempting to intentionally upset her. The emotional content of 
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Zélie’s position within the story might also suggest that we use elements of Simulation to 
uncover the meaning behind the actions of the characters. Simulation involves mimicking 
the thought-states of another individual in order to try and recreate, and discover, their 
reasoning processes. The interplay between Zélie taking ‘a mouthful of veal’ and then 
suddenly ‘[grasping] the meaning’ of the Italian’s words provides a physical and emotional 
combination of events, the comprehension of which might involve our mental simulation 
of the building contrast between the act of eating and the emotional impact of the 
revelation as she understands it. ‘[Letting] her knife and fork fall’ suggests that she is no 
longer interested in eating; a demonstrative act which suggests that the combination of 
desire and belief which led her to eat has now been overridden by a competing set of 
desires and beliefs which related to uncovering the truth and ramifications of the Italian’s 
claims: ‘My mother has been here…and she went away…without seeing me!’.  
A description like this seems to overemphasise the mechanisms of reading, derailing the 
subtlety of the interaction between characters by overtly claiming access to belief and 
desire structures which, in traditional folk models, underpin action. Daniel Hutto takes a 
different line on folk psychology, which distances reason explanations from the in situ 
demands of either Theory or Simulation models. His criticism is two-fold with both points 
relating distinctly to any literary application of FP that might be attempted. The traditional 
theoretical approaches to FP emphasised the ways in which reason explanations are at the 
heart of behaviour explanation, and these explanations are reached through active 
cognitive effort; either by accessing a tacit theory which would explain an action according 
to a rationalising matrix or by simulating the thought-states of the other person to try and 
mimic their reasoning processes. Hutto cuts through much of this by suggesting that, in the 
majority of cases, we do not understand actions according to beliefs and desires. Rather, 
much behavioural understanding is better characterised as embedded in the world, and as 
such, comprehensible simply through normative processes of social interaction. Victoria 
McGeer describes these everyday situations evocatively:  
[I]f we make ourselves more readable to one another by conforming to shared 
norms of readability, it follows that much of the work of understanding one another 
in day-to-day interactions is not really done by us at all, explicitly or implicitly. 
55 
 
The work is done and carried by the world, embedded in the norms and routines 
that structure such interactions.
32
 
Returning to Kavan’s ‘Asylum Piece IV’, and transposing McVeer’s insights into a literary 
context, we might read Zélie ‘[letting] her knife and fork fall’, not as an action which 
needs the input of desires and beliefs, but as a cultural, norm-laden, way of exhibiting 
shock. The attribution of a desire/belief framework behind the action is not necessary, 
because the action is simply understood, and is used by Kavan specifically because it has a 
received meaning.  
Comprehension of this kind is not strictly folk psychology; because there is often no need 
for any recourse to a belief/desire schema, or any question about why a person acted as 
they did. This then narrows the definition of what is meant by folk psychology. For Hutto, 
FP stricto sensu ‘incorporates the practice of making sense of a person’s actions using 
belief/desire propositional attitude psychology’.33 It is not therefore a term which can be 
used to describe every instance in which one human understands another. In this sharper 
definitional usage I distance myself from Lisa Zunshine. Zunshine defines the phrase 
‘Theory of Mind’ (ToM) in broadly similar terms, as ‘our ability to explain people’s 
behaviour in terms of their thoughts, feelings, beliefs, and desires’.34 However, she does 
not constrain the situations in which this kind of explanation might be used. For Zunshine, 
‘[attributing] states of mind is the default way by which we construct and navigate our 
social environment’.35 Zunshine’s ToM is the underlying mechanism of all social 
interaction whereas Hutto strictly delimits the situations in which belief/desire models are 
needed. 
Zunshine’s broad definition of ToM becomes the basis for a wholesale application to the 
literary situation. Zunshine makes great claims for this transference, suggesting that 
‘[literature] pervasively capitalises on and stimulates Theory of Mind Mechanisms’, that 
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‘ToM […] makes literature as we know it possible’, and that ‘as a sustained representation 
of numerous interacting minds, the novel feeds the powerful, representation-hungry 
complex of cognitive adaptations’ that are normally socially stimulated.36 Attention to 
Hutto’s reconsideration of FP has clear consequences for the application of FP to 
literature. He reduces emphasis on belief/desire inferences and focuses instead on our 
reliance on other factors, such as social norms and behavioural cues, to understand action. 
Because such cues often rely upon seeing another agent acting, this adds further weight 
against the easy symmetry that Zunshine maintains between literary and social interaction. 
A clear distinction needs to be drawn regarding the modes of behavioural understanding 
that Zunshine and Hutto engage in. Zunshine seems to be perpetuating a largely third-
personal view of ToM, while Hutto emphasises the second-personal situation of the 
majority of our social behaviour. In these everyday events, we do not need to engage in 
‘spectatorial’, external, ‘mentalistic predictions or explanations’.37 Instead, as suggested 
above, we engage in more basic ‘embodied expectations’: 
Like most creatures, our basic dealings with others are more visceral; we get by 
with scriptlike patterns of recognition-response, some of which can be quite 
sophisticated and complex. Typically, these are initiated and guided by indexical 
signs that take the form of the expressive behaviour of others.
38
   
This mode of comprehension does not necessarily involve mentalising behaviour; it is 
immediate understanding based on norms of action and interaction. Matthew Ratcliffe 
suggests that ‘[rather] than attributing mental states to an observed third party, we 
understand each other through structured interaction’.39 This characterisation of social 
behaviour is a clear departure from Zunshine’s claims about the omnipresence of 
belief/desire mindreading.  
Hutto makes a further departure from the FP-primacy argument, which is again rooted in 
his emphasis on the second-person character of most interaction. Although some events 
may elicit some recourse to a theoretical heuristic, these instances are rare and generally 
only occur when we witness behaviour that is particularly perplexing. Even among these 
cases, it is not clear that an attempt to decipher a person’s behaviour by projecting beliefs 
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and desires onto them is always successful. A large amount of background knowledge is 
needed about an individual’s character to come close to an accurate belief/desire model 
made spectatorially. Instead, folk psychology is better conceived as a narrative process 
which is largely conducted through dialogue: 
[The] greatest chance of obtaining a successful explanation – of deciding for which 
reason an action was performed – depends on the authors of actions identifying and 
explicating their reasons for themselves. […] it is only in second-person contexts 
that we confidently obtain true folk psychological explanations (to the extent that 
we do at all), as opposed to merely speculating about possible ones.
40
 
This limiting of folk psychological usage and accuracy has significant repercussions for 
the way in which the link between mindreading and literary comprehension should be 
theorised. Above, I tried to isolate points of explanation in a Kavan’s ‘Asylum Piece IV’, 
and used FP terminology to describe the character interactions at these points of interest. If 
the explanations feel slightly artificial, this is because I used a post-hoc heuristic to try and 
explain action which does not need distinct explanation through desire/belief terminology. 
Perhaps, in a similar way to Hutto’s explanation, an FP heuristic is not constantly needed 
to scaffold a narrative.
41
 Instead, it might be better understood as an interpretive tool 
occasionally used at points of extreme narrative opacity, or a readerly attitude that is only 
brought about by specific narratorial devices.  
Folk psychology stricto sensu, is also limited in its literary application by the difference 
between fictional and real-world comprehension. In everyday life, as Hutto emphasises, 
the second-person is the primary mode of every interaction and address. Literary 
interaction might be better characterised as a mixture of quasi-first-person, quasi-second-
person and third-person attitudes, as encapsulated in the broad distinction between 
narratorial and non-narratorial personalities. However, this is in flux and dependent upon 
the amount of information, including access to mental states, given in the narrative. If 
narratorial self-explanation or mentalised discourse is prioritised in a narrative, then it 
seems clear that folk psychology is not needed to decipher character attitudes, because 
these are often explicit. In addition, a narration might fluctuate between different levels of 
mentalised discourse; some of which might be more plausibly or transparently linked to 
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the self-knowledge of the character in question. ‘Psycho-narration’ makes FP application 
problematic by disrupting the point of engagement of the reader.
42
 These points, among 
other structural modes of information management found in narrative fiction, produce 
blending through which the story is managed largely without the need for recourse to 
specific mindreading exercises by the reader. As Matthew Belmonte suggests: ‘a great deal 
of narrative understanding, including the appreciation of characters’ perspectives and 
desires, can be accomplished without a ToM in its narrowest, psychological sense’.43 The 
‘narrowest, psychological sense’ of Theory of Mind that Belmonte refers to is congruent 
with Hutto’s stricto sensu definition of the term folk psychology. This is a mentalising 
description of action which is reliant upon the projection of desires and beliefs.  
These are distinct limitations of the application of folk psychology to literary 
understanding. This is predominantly because the majority of interpretive positions do not 
necessitate an understanding of character action through a projection of their desires and 
beliefs. Another Kavan story from her Asylum Piece collection illustrates the limitations of 
folk psychology well. ‘Asylum Piece III’ follows an inmate of a sanatorium through third-
person psycho-narration. The story is a good example of a story in which folk psychology 
might be expected to take a role in interpretation. Because the psycho-narrative remains on 
the level of articulable (i.e. not sub-verbal or sub-intentional) mental activity, it often 
touches on the beliefs and desires which structure the action of the protagonist, Hans. 
Movements into sub-intentional states are brief and generally support statements which are 
describable at a higher level. In addition, the narration deals with Hans in the process of 
interpreting the actions of others while exercising his own mindreading capabilities. For 
my reading, I have isolated points in the narrative which present Hans interpreting the 
actions of other agents.  
The story is structured around a particular discrepancy between the way in which events 
usually take place in the sanatorium and the way in which they unfold on the day of the 
action. This discrepancy forces the protagonist into an interpretive position as he attempts 
to decipher the reasons for the change of routine:  
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Hans glances round uneasily. It is part of his routine, too, to work in the atelier at 
this hour. Until a few days ago someone would certainly have come to investigate 
his absence: but now nobody comes near him; nobody seems to care how he 
occupies his time.
44
     
Here there are two points of interpretation; the reader’s interpretation of Hans’s actions 
and Hans’s embedded interpretation of events in the storyworld through free indirect 
discourse. Hans glancing ‘uneasily’ is an initial candidate for the consultation of FP 
matrices as we might ask why he behaves in that way. However, his unease is immediately 
explained by his embedded interpretative stance; he is uneasy because his routine is 
disrupted. Even the embedded stance does not directly relate to a belief/desire network of 
the kind utilised in folk psychology. We do not jump to interpret the hospital’s lack of 
interest in Hans as the result of a coordinated set of desires, individual interests, or even 
specific intentional states. The lack of interest is framed against a normal routinized 
pattern of work in the atelier – as set up and monitored by the institution – and so deviation 
from this norm is assumed to also be an institutional decision. Hans’s interpretation of 
events takes this structural line: 
My brother must have written to say that he can’t afford to keep me here much 
longer. Soon I shall be sent away from the clinic – and then what will become of 
me?
45
 
In this case Hans’s explanation does utilise folk psychology because it gives a reason for 
his brother’s action (writing a withdrawal letter to the sanatorium because of lack of 
funds), which scaffolds the actions of the hospital that Hans experiences. Although the 
narration embeds FP, the reason explanation given for his brother’s action does not 
demand the use of the reader’s FP resources because the belief/desire set is given by the 
narration.  
In direct communication with other agents, the narration is controlled to produce a 
disparity between what we know of Hans’s mental states, and what we know (via Hans) of 
the mental states of those he interacts with. The interaction with the gymnastics teacher 
‘with whom, up to a few days ago, Hans has been indulging in a mild flirtation’, produces 
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this result. The main play of the scene is the disparity between Hans’s explicit set of 
desires which are dependent on the involvement of the gymnastic teacher, and the 
dismissal of these desires which occurs in the immediacy of the interpersonal 
communication:  
 She carries a black swimming suit over the handlebars of her cycle. 
 ‘How I wish she would ask me to go swimming with her!’ he thinks to 
himself, as a smile of eager anticipation appears on his face. It is not that he really 
wants to swim in the lake; but what he longs for above everything at this moment is 
laughter, companionship and a friendly voice. 
 The girl is abreast of him now; […] there is a greeting, a flash of teeth and a 
whirring noise. She has gone.
46
  
The narration is structured toward emphasising Hans’s feeling of disconnection, which it 
achieves through loading the style with his mental states at the expense of conjecture about 
her motivations. This episode is still not relevantly describable using FP because Hans’s 
beliefs and desires are explicitly evidenced through the narration, and the gym mistress’s 
actions are explainable based on conventions of interpretation; the swimsuit over her 
handlebars explains her actions as far as Hans is concerned, and, as far as the reader is 
concerned, it is not any more likely that she would stop to speak with Hans than she would 
pass – the ‘greeting’ fulfils the expectations of the interaction, these simply happen not to 
meet Hans’s particular desired outcome.  
Further interactions are devoid of necessary FP involvement. The structured routine of the 
clinic is evidenced by a number of working patients Hans comes across. Two of these are 
‘hoeing the parched earth’, while another tends a blackberry bush, ‘carefully picking out 
the berries and putting them into a basket’. The first two men ‘do not speak to each other, 
nor do they look happy’, and there is no attempt to model their metal states beyond this. 
Rather, it is the lack of a mentalised description which gives the episode its narrative 
charge. This is based on a discrepancy between what Hans wants and what actually occurs. 
Hans ‘would like to speak’ with the berry picker. However, he is deterred by the 
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‘unresponsive look of the man’s back’.47 Here, the standard conversational route for 
understanding the other agent is barred, and we are left with the pragmatic action 
description of his job. The only deviation from this style of description, in which a 
character’s actions are accounted for by their specific function within the storyworld, is 
Hans’s meeting with another inmate who is painting a picture: 
He stops and leans against the stone wall of the veranda. He would like to see what 
she is painting, but the effort required to mount the steps is too great, and he stays 
where he is, looking up at her wistfully.
48
 
Here, Hans’s attention is focused on finding out what is absorbing the other patient’s 
attention. This becomes more demanding following a brief exchange, during which Hans’s 
interest in the propositional states of his interlocutor become explicitly folk psychological, 
as Hans starts to think of possible mental states which might explain the girl’s non-
involvement in the conversation. This, like the previous encounter with the gym mistress, 
is focussed on the slippage which arises from a disparity in attentional expectation in 
conversation; Hans reacts to the girl not noticing his mental states as he believes they are 
manifest through his expressions: 
The girl doesn’t say any more. She doesn’t see his forlorn expression. Perhaps she 
is not interested; perhaps her painting absorbs her just then; or perhaps she has 
simply fallen into a dream.
49
 
These interactions are made strange by the focalisation, as Hans is apparently very 
demanding of his conversational interactions. This focus becomes the closing turn of the 
narrative as the sensitivity to behaviour-explanation, though largely normalised in the rest 
of the story, here becomes justified: 
 Carefully, with much thought, Hans writes out his message and hands the 
telegraph form over the counter. 
 After the young man has gone, the postmaster stands for a time holding the 
telegram against his huge belly, and watching the door as if he half expects the 
sender to come back. Then, in a methodical way, he sets about tearing the form into 
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small pieces, until nothing is left but a handful of shreds which he negligently 
tosses out of the open window.
50
  
Hans’s careful actions, which are explicitly motivated by his desire to send the telegram to 
his business partner, are defied by the equally methodical, though non-interpretable 
behaviour of the postmaster. The narratorial emphasis on Hans’s motivations and hopes 
throughout the story becomes the means of expressing the postmaster’s behaviour as 
deliberately explanation poor. FP is largely useless in this instance, because there is not the 
narrative background which would allow an interpretation of the postmaster’s behaviour 
based on previous form or known motivations. Instead, the action is read in line with 
Hans’s nervousness about his uncertain position with the hospital, and the unknown forces 
that seem to be determining his life outside his operational control. The narrative turns on 
the discrepancy between the amount of information that we have about Hans’s inner-life, 
and the lack of information that we have about the characters and institutions with which 
he interacts. Neither of these positions is explicable by the reader using FP as the 
information is either explicit in the narrative, or blocked to the extent that FP has no 
conjectural tools to work with.  
 Alternative Models of Action Interpretation   
Although folk psychology has its interpretive uses, the above example shows that these 
can be limited by their reliance on belief/desire pairings. What seems clear from the recent 
work on FP by Hutto and others is that beliefs and desires should not be overly prioritised 
as the sole means of interpreting action. Behaviour, Hutto claims, can be interpreted 
according to numerous macrostructural features, such as action scripts and norms of object 
use, which do not need the attendant scaffolding of mentalising desire/belief structures to 
give them sense. These developments, which have occurred in tandem with a reinvestment 
in the possible role that narrative plays in folk psychological interpretation, echo earlier 
movements in discourse analysis and pragmatics. In the analysis of narrative, schematics 
both broke down narratives into constitutive thematic units and described the interaction 
between these themes. A common description indexes the textworld on ‘five situational 
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dimensions: time, space, causality, intentionality, and agents.’51 The way in which these 
dimensions are manipulated, and the coherence or lack of coherence between them gives 
basic structural features to the narrative, which carry interpretative load. The next level of 
analysis regards the way in which these features are understood, and what cognitive 
features subserve narrative comprehension. For example, the above claim that ‘causality, 
intentionality, and agents’ are all indexed as separate dimensions in a narrative seems to be 
underwritten by everyday understanding of how motivational states work to bring about 
specific ends. This is a case in which real world knowledge transfers to the context of 
literary interpretation:  
The knowledge about the world that is necessary to understand narratives seems 
closely tied to the idea of action sequences and their motivations. Narratives consist 
of a series of actions and events which are related by their function in a sequence 
and are tied together by overarching motivations and themes.
52
 
Although the emphasis on ‘motivations’ might point to pro-states, such as desires, or 
unconscious motives, these are not necessarily emphasised by the reader as interpretive 
tools, because one does not always need to infer them in narrative comprehension. Rather, 
comprehension seems to operate, at least in part, according to scripts or norms of action:  
These pragmatic inferences all involve forming a connection between propositions 
and knowledge already in memory. The connections are based on schematic 
structures in memory which cluster knowledge about prototypical situations. The 
schemas provide “default” information to be inferred when no explicit information 
is given, and consequently are normative but not necessarily true in any particular 
situation.
53
 
The inference of information seems to be minimal, and on that basis we might assume that 
it operates at the highest pragmatic level appropriate to the need of the episode. Again, this 
is a structure from real world action descriptions which passes over into the literary 
context. The ‘highest pragmatic level’, refers to a way of describing actions by describing 
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the goal of that action, rather than the particular movements involved in achieving that 
goal. This is a common-sense way of attributing reasons which often bypasses belief/desire 
frameworks entirely. Shaun Gallagher gives a full description of the phenomenon: 
 [Quite] naturally, we understand our own actions on the highest pragmatic level 
possible […] For example, if, as I reach for a cup, someone asks me what I am 
doing, I do not say, ordinarily, ‘I am reaching for a cup’; rather I say, ‘I’m taking a 
drink’. I tend to understand my actions just at that pragmatic, intentional (goal-
oriented) level, ignoring possible sub-personal or lower-level descriptions, and also 
ignoring ideational or mentalistic interpretations, e.g. ‘What are you doing?’ ‘I’m 
acting on a belief (desire) that I am thirsty’. Likewise, the interpretation of the 
actions of others occurs at that same pragmatic (intentional) level.
54
 
Gallagher’s point here is that intention to fulfil a goal is often understood in its own right 
as a description of an action. In this way, intention seems to be separable from the low-
level descriptions which earlier theories posited as necessary scaffolding for the notion of 
intention itself. This idea seems to suit a theory of action in which intention is prioritised 
as a motivating factor in its own right. While Anscombe notes that the ‘primitive sign of 
wanting is trying to get’,55 Michael Bratman suggests that a modified statement is better 
suited to intention: ‘the “primitive sign” of an intention to A is trying to A’.56 The latter 
description seems, in line with Gallagher above, to favour the idea that an automatic part 
of action comprehension involves the inference of motivational states, and that this is 
inextricable from the idea of intentionality.  
Without belief/desire pairings playing a strong role, we are left with a notion of intention 
but without a description of what intentional action actually consists of. As described 
above, this is the very problem that action theory approached from its earliest 
manifestations. Another way in which intentions have been characterised as independent 
from desires and beliefs is in Bratman’s planning theory. For Bratman, intentions have a 
particular role to play as planning functions, or as ‘elements of plans’.57 It is the way in 
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which plans are formed and aligned with other plans that is the key to Bratman’s notion of 
the interaction between plans and intentions: 
[Plans] are not merely executed. They are formed, retained, combined, constrained 
by other plans, filled in, modified, reconsidered, and so on. Such processes and 
activities are central to our understanding of plans, and so to our understanding of 
intentions.
58
 
Intentions involve a ‘characteristic kind of commitment’ which both allows them to play a 
unique volitional role in action, and to act as a functional unit of a plan.
59
 It is this 
commitment which sets intentions apart from desires. Whereas ‘ordinary desires’ are only 
‘potential infuencers of action’, ‘the volitional dimension of the commitment involved in 
future-directed intention derives from the fact that intentions are conduct controllers’.60 As 
parts of plans, intentions have a cohesive role: ‘associated with our tendency to adjust in 
the direction of jointly consistent intentions is a norm enjoining such consistency’.61 
Because we plan, we make networks of intentions that have to work together in order to 
make future-directed actions happen. Thus we adjust our intentions toward consistency, 
and interpret the actions of others based on the same consistency principle.  
The consistency principle is a norm which constrains and promotes planning, both as a 
function of the individual, and of the individual as part of a group; an agent’s actions need 
to be both comprehensible and functionally binding in order to effectively organise group 
behaviour. Further, the planning impulse is closely aligned with a general conception of 
rational personhood. Following Thomas Nagel, Peter Singer defines personhood as 
entangled with the first-person view of oneself over time: 
[N]ot to take one’s own future desires into account in one’s practical deliberations 
– irrespective of whether one now happens to desire the satisfaction of those future 
desires – would indicate a failure to see oneself as a person existing over time, the 
present being merely one time among others in one’s life. So it is my conception of 
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myself as a person that makes it rational for me to consider my long-term 
interests.
62
 
Neil Levy elaborates on this to define a person as ‘centrally a being who conceives of 
themselves as a single being across time with plans and projects that they pursue’.63 In the 
case of Anna Kavan’s fiction, it is clear that she is not directly interested in representing 
rational and coherent characters. However, as with the general model of intention, it is 
worth exploring how the concept interacts with other assumptions that we make about 
what makes an agent. Movements away from these norms are meaningful, in life and in 
literature, only if we establish what constitutes the norm in the first instance. The idea of 
coherence is important to models of action theory, because it provides a way of accounting 
for behaviour which is not necessarily willed through direct attention, but which is 
consistent with an agent’s other patterns of action. In this way, it can account for 
unconscious or automatic behaviours which might nonetheless fit in with a general pattern 
of action. In this way, although a coherence model cannot account for actions which stray 
too far from common reason attribution, it can invest non-conscious actions with intention. 
This is consistent with a general trend in analytic action theory, which has conceived of 
agency as involving the endorsement of action, and of actions representing the goals and 
values of an individual. Tim Bayne and Neil Levy illustrate this position according to a 
rather stark distinction between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ actions: 
On this view, failures to appreciate reasons or to conform our actions to reasons are 
exculpatory to the extent that the resulting actions do not reflect our character. 
Character is a reflection of the totality of our reasons and plans, and actions that do 
not derive from our plans do not (fully) reflect our characters. On this view, bad 
actions are bad because they reflect and stem from a bad character.
64
 
Although this picture tends to override the variety of actions that might be performed by an 
agent, the basic idea is that agents seek coherence and reason in their behaviour. Again, 
this might not seem immediately applicable to a novelist like Kavan, whose characters are 
often psychologically atypical, but it helps to build an idea of what features a coherent 
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agent might have. What emerges is a cluster of qualities that place planning as a central 
aspect of intentionality, personhood, agency, and action interpretation. As such, it appears 
to span both the first-person phenomenology of agency and the heuristics of action 
explanation.  However, even within this view, a distinction can be drawn between two 
modes of intention; those future directed intentions which are plans to act, and the kind of 
intention-in-action which might not need any prior intention to instigate them. As Searle 
notes, ‘[the] intention in action just is the Intentional content of the action; the action and 
the intention are inseparable’.65 This might be the case both of spontaneous actions and of 
actions which are subordinated within a higher-level description, such as the specific acts 
which make up the higher-level intention to ‘drive to work’. Across these levels of 
intention, Searle suggests that continuity is given by the phenomenal and logical 
conditions of action: ‘for every intentional action there is the experience of performing that 
action, and that experience has an Intentional content’, which is tied to the satisfaction 
conditions of an action.
66
 In relation to this phenomenal experience, Searle also aligns the 
ability to self-describe action. This ability, as I have suggested above, is subject to minimal 
norms of rationality and coherence.    
 Intention in Fiction 
This link between intentions and plans holds potential for understanding and interpreting 
the role of intention within literary works. In part, this approach has been pre-empted by 
psychological work on narrative comprehension which has emphasised the role of 
storyworld goals in narrative comprehension. Like the work on narrative scripts and 
schema noted above, psychological findings have emphasised the way in which readers 
rely on goal structures to scaffold narrative action. There is experimental evidence that 
suggests that readers infer goals where they are non-explicit.
67
 In addition, ‘[knowledge] of 
a character’s goal or motivation will often radically alter our experience of a text’.68 There 
is further relevant work on the projection of emotional states onto characters. Although 
emotional states are inferred, it seems that these largely take place within the context of 
known goals. It might be the case that ‘just as in real life, we make inferences about 
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people’s emotions when we comprehend stories’,69 and experimental work that proves this 
has closely aligned this capacity with goal-oriented tests.
70
 These suggest that a narrative 
situation in which we know the goals of characters might allow us to infer emotional states 
when those goals are fulfilled or denied. Goals, like desires and beliefs, are propositional 
attitudes. A plan is a way of structuring goals across time, interpersonally, and in accord 
with other goals. Because planning structures are in a feedback relationship with these 
propositional attitudes, they should not be seen as entirely separate from FP scaffolding, 
but my use of them here shows a slight shift of emphasis from the claim that FP stricto 
sensu is heuristically valuable, to the moderated claim that planning structures, as 
themselves indicative of intentions, give an interpretive framework which enriches the 
basic concepts of desire and belief.  
By placing intentions within larger structures of agency, which span structural, 
interpretative, and phenomenal concerns, the term has broad valance in the description of 
character action. This wide application is in direct opposition to narratologist Lubomír 
Doležel’s rejection of an intentional focus in literary exegesis. Doležel argues that the 
concept of intention is necessarily restricted in its inability to describe a whole range of 
non-intentional and non-conscious actions, as well as the range of motivational factors, 
such as environmental and intersubjective factors, that are not properly captured by the 
term. With these criticisms, he argues for a less focussed approach to character action: 
‘[whereas] intention delimits the domain of acting from nonactional events, motivation is 
the key to understanding the diversity of acting, the why and how of actions’.71 In line with 
this, he only accepts the term ‘intention’ within a limited semantic usage, which regards it 
as ‘a primitive notion, irreducible to other mental factors of acting, such as desires, 
reasons, or beliefs’.72 As I have explained above, intention is not a discrete mechanism, but 
is implicated in a number of other fundamental functions of agency, including planning 
and goal structures. Use of this broader concept of intention can characterise specific 
dynamics within a description of motivations. Contrary to Doležel’s main claim, 
intentional language can describe non-conscious acts if those acts are contained within 
larger models of coherence. A caveat remains regarding those actions – transgressively 
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irrational or non-coherent – which are not contained within the normative structures of 
agency. Here, the general structure of action theory provides a way of describing exactly 
what norms are being transgressed in the description of radically different motivational 
states. If characterisation – like those characters in Kavan’s ‘Asylum Piece IV’ – attempts 
to build a picture of an atypical mental state, then this must occur against a background of 
assumptions about how an agent does generally act. The norms above provide a model for 
these background assumptions.   
I will attempt throughout this chapter to make clear an interpretation which largely 
promotes an enriched model of intentionality which uses script-based and planning 
structures, rather than the desire/belief structures of FP, as the basic interpretive approach 
to character action. Before I move onto my structured exegesis of Kavan’s Ice, I wish to 
deal with a criticism which might arise in the first instance. Script-based understanding, as 
my examples from Hutto have made clear, is most powerful in an everyday second-person 
interpretative context. This means that, although it predominates when we are interpreting 
the actions of fellow agents in the world, it may not simply transfer to the narrative 
context, and an alternative model – perhaps closer aligned to ToM-style active 
interpretation – might better explain complex levels of intentionality in a text. Zunshine’s 
work seems broadly predicated on this, as she foregrounds the cognitive background 
needed for interpreting dynamic, interactive intentionality involving multiple agents; the 
phenomenon known as ‘nested intentionality’. The ability to negotiate multiple levels of 
intentionality is a cognitive faculty explainable by, and indicative of, a Theory of Mind. 
Broadly, the ability to nest intentions is based upon the understanding that others have 
knowledge, thought processes based on this knowledge, and intentions which they 
construct from their own bounded perspective. This allows us to add other minds, with 
their own bounded perspectives, to a multiply nested set of intentions. Zunshine illustrates 
this as follows: 
Although ToM is formally defined as a second-order intentionality – for example, 
“I believe that you desire X,” […] the levels of intentionality can “recurse” further 
back, for example, to the third level […] or to the fourth level, as in “I believe that 
you think that she believes that he thinks that X,” and so forth.73 
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These higher orders of intentionality are of particular interest to imaginative situations that 
stretch beyond second-person interpretation. These include science, religion, counter-
factual reasoning, and, as Robin Dunbar emphasises, literary fiction. All of these 
imaginative situations demand that we imagine the world to be ‘other than we perceive it 
to be’ – basic second-order intentionality – and increased complexity in these areas 
demand extra layers of intentional understanding.
74
 We can, for example, both maintain 
the idea of a fictional world which is different from our own, and understand the 
intersecting actions of several characters within that world who each have separate 
bounded perspectives. Although it seems clear that these capacities have a scaffolding role 
in understanding relations between characters, and the possibility for differing mind-states 
between characters, it is unclear to me that, even in cases of nested intentionality, the ToM 
capacity goes beyond a scaffolding role to become a specific interpretive tool. This 
distinction is blurred in Zunshine’s discussion of the topic. Again, this question leads to a 
case-by-case enquiry into the myriad ways in which narrators control information, and 
how authors use this method of distribution to create different characterisations through 
the reader’s interpretation of differing fictional mental states. However, what is clear is 
that stories can manage multiple levels of intentionality, foreground such nesting within 
the story, and still evade accurate description using ToM terminology. Kavan’s short story 
‘The Summons’, for example, highlights the ineffectualness of using ToM as an 
interpretive tool, though it is clear that it scaffolds our basic understanding of the fictional 
mechanisms at work.  
‘The Summons’ is delivered through first-person narration, and derives its narrative charge 
from the way in which the narrator interprets the behaviour of others: ‘R must have been 
astonished by my disagreeable tone, for he looked sharply at me’75; ‘When I had finished 
speaking I looked at him anxiously to see how he had taken my arguments. He appeared 
impressed’76;‘My friend […] laid his hand on my arm. The affectionate touch, so full of 
sympathy and compassion, demoralized me even more than his words’.77 These represent a 
mentalising discourse; they show the narrator interpreting the underlying mental states of 
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those around her based on the way in which she sees them act. Her emphasis on how she 
should interpret the behaviour of others suggests a strange uncertainty which foregrounds 
the act of interpretation, and the margin for error in judgment. This is played out, as the 
way in which the narrator interprets the actions of others becomes the turning point in the 
story, and the final lines reflect on the moment in which followed the advice of those 
around her: ‘I began to wonder […] whether the good opinion of anybody in the world is 
worth all that I have had to suffer’.78 
The first-person narration in the story is utilised to show a turn, from trust to distrust, in 
the narrator’s dealings with others. In doing so, the narration scrutinises the way in which 
the narrator interprets the actions of others, not to imply that she interprets them 
incorrectly, but that she acts incorrectly in the situation by adhering to their wishes. 
Although the narrator is uncertain about her behavioural interpretations, the way she 
understands her interlocutors is entirely reasonable. Instead, the story hinges on a disparity 
between localised interpersonal interpretation, and structural motivations for behaviour 
which are not accessible through the basic norms of understanding. Although folk 
psychology is central to the way in which the story reveals the act of mentalising 
interpretation between characters, this faculty is negotiated by the narratorial voice. As 
such, the interpretative responsibility is removed from the reader. The turn of the story 
reframes the folk psychological insights of the protagonist within a wider context of 
agency, particularly regarding the intentions of the stranger and the organisation he seems 
to represent. The key change in the story reveals a discontinuity between apparent folk 
psychological transparency, and the opacity of the planning structures into which the 
protagonist’s internment is written. Dissociating folk psychology from the wider faculties 
of agency, then, appears insufficient for an explanation of how behavioural interpretation 
works within this narrative context.  
 Ice and Intention 
Kavan’s novel Ice takes up a similar strategy, using a mentalising discourse to foreground 
the use of folk psychological comprehension at the same time as obfuscating other 
structures of agency which, in a more naturalistic setting, we might assume to occur in 
tandem with FP. The way in which Kavan utilises and disrupts these action structures is 
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central to the narrative play. Although Kavan often has recourse to mentalising character 
descriptions, she operates in different modes within this discourse. At points, the mental is 
stated as bare description. These occasions of blunt assessment – in their obtrusiveness – 
often become part of a vacillating and perplexing picture of action. The following excerpt 
delivers this characteristic style:   
Her face wore the victim’s look, which was of course psychological, the result of 
injuries she had received in childhood; I saw it as the faintest possible hint of 
bruising on the extremely delicate, fine, white skin in the region of eyes and mouth. 
It was madly attractive to me in a certain way. I had barely caught sight of it now 
before the car began moving; I was automatically pressing the starter, not expecting 
it to work in the freezing cold.
79
 
Focalised through the narrator, the text gives partial access to the girl’s mind state which 
seems deliberately oversimplified. The ‘of course psychological’ drama of the girl’s 
victimisation abruptly limits the scope of her action by fixing it with a non-complex 
aetiology. The incongruous tone of this claim becomes a vague farce when, though 
‘madly’ attracted to the girl, the narrator accidentally drifts away in his car. Causal power 
moves from the car, which ‘began moving’, to the man ‘automatically’ accelerating, and is 
finally rationalised as a quasi-intentional state; he was ‘not expecting it work in the 
freezing cold’. The confused action-plans of the narrator become more opaque when, in 
pun, he explains himself as being ‘driven’ to seek out the girl: ‘There was no rational 
explanation, I could not account for it. It was a sort of craving that had to be satisfied’.80 
Similar claims relating to the girl’s victim-status are repeated throughout the novel. When 
the narrator reiterates his claims, these appear to be concertedly overdone: 
I rushed after her as she started to climb some stairs […] The short steep stair led to 
one room only, large, sparsely furnished, its polished floor bare like a dance floor. I 
was immediately struck by an unnatural silence. […] I was puzzled, until it dawned 
on me that the room had been sound-proofed, so that whatever took place there 
would be inaudible beyond its four walls. […] Forced since childhood into a 
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victim’s pattern of thought and behaviour, she was defenceless against his 
aggressive will, which was able to take complete possession of her. I saw it happen. 
He approached the bed with unhurried steps. She did not move until he bent over 
her, when she twisted away abruptly, as if trying to escape, buried her face in the 
pillow.
81
  
Part of the exaggerated effect in this excerpt comes, not just from the reiteration of the 
girl’s purported childhood trauma, but from the bizarre fluidity of the storyworld in which 
this stark statement is set. Although the narrator seems to follow the girl to her room, she 
does not acknowledge his presence. In addition, the narrator is apparently in the room 
when the warden rapes the girl. Despite this, the narration does not include any spatial 
references which would explain his ability to see this without being seen, rendering his 
description incongruous. In addition, the narration occasionally breaks out of its limited 
viewpoint to provide apparent access to other characters’ mental states. In his description 
of the rape, the narrator shifts focus from his spectatorial position to note that ‘[t]o her, this 
silence was one of the most terrifying things about him, in some way associated with his 
power over her’.82 
A similar device occurs at other points in the book. Movement out of first-person report 
retains the same narratorial tone, but occasions insights into mental states of other 
characters, particularly the girl: ‘She shuddered, identifying herself, as a victim, with the 
dead bird. It was she who had been snared by nets of black branches’.83 This is part of a 
larger trend in the novel which blends concrete observations and unobtrusive fictional 
statements (i.e. statements which are not resisted within the storyworld) with points of 
narrative dissonance. Although these slippages occur as part of a number of distorting 
narrative devices, one of the main methods is intention-slippage, which problematizes 
points of communication between characters. These instances are numerous within the 
novel, and are often implicated within other localised strategies of narratorial dissonance. 
An early sequence documents one of the girl’s (several) deaths. Preceding this, the narrator 
meets with the Warden, and the dynamics of their relationship are played out through an 
attention to implicit mindreading. This moves from naturalistic to surreal description very 
                                                          
81
 Ice, pp. 35–6, my emphasis. 
82
 Ice, p. 37. 
83
 Ice, p. 68. 
74 
 
quickly. The scene is invested with the power play between narrator and Warden, which – 
because their ‘real’ intentions are largely implied – is disclosed through their mutual 
mindreadings, as interpreted by, and hence nested within, the intentions of the narrator. 
These start off with basic mindreading based on gaze-following: 
He took his chair at the head, an imposing figure. I was seated beside him. A third 
place was laid opposite. Seeing me glance at it, he said: ‘A young friend from your 
country is staying with me; I thought you might like to meet her.’ He gave me one 
of his piercing looks as I replied calmly that I would be delighted.
84
 
In Kavan’s reported dialogue, the emphasis on the interaction between words and gestures, 
and the way in which these are interpreted by the narrator, create an overlaboured 
emphasis on mindreading that is part of the distinct atmosphere of the novel. The 
following event reveals a similar style: 
His face changed as he read the few words, he ripped the paper across and across, 
reducing it to minute fragments. ‘It appears the young person is indisposed’.85 
The conspicuous emphasis on the non-verbal aspect of the dialogues – the Warden’s 
ripping of the note – parodies the dramatic tension that structures the narrative action. 
There is tension in the scene; the reader knows that the narrator knows who the girl is, and 
wants to see her. The Warden seems to know this, though he obscures the fact, leaving the 
narrator to infer both his knowledge and motives. However, the points that indicate this 
drama are burdened, and in this style, Kavan slows the action down to a lingering focus. 
This focus becomes more complex when the transparency between speech and action, as 
exhibited in the above excerpts, becomes obscured by additional motivations, and an 
introduction of extra foci of intention into the exchanges. The narrator’s wish to exit the 
Warden’s company before he is removed by guards at an allotted time becomes an 
additional motive, which then plays into the exchange through largely non-verbal 
inference. When the narrator requests to see the girl, he interprets the Warden’s reaction as 
follows: 
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He said nothing, but I could feel opposition behind his silence. Evidently there had 
been a change in his attitude since the day when he had proposed to introduce us at 
lunch. Now I felt pretty sure he would not agree to the meeting.
86
 
At this point, the Warden introduces another mind into the bargain by making the narrator 
aware of the girl’s prospective decision to meet him: ‘She’s been unwell, and is nervous 
about meeting people. I shall have to ask if she’ll see you’.87 This merges with a refocus on 
interpretive mindreading, in which the narrator gives an account of the Warden’s 
behaviour which is based on how he believes the Warden to be interpreting his behaviour: 
There was only one minute left. ‘I really must go now. I’ve taken up too much of 
your time already.’ His unexpected laughter took me by surprise; he must have 
known what was going on in my head. His mood seemed to alter suddenly, all at 
once his manner was easy. Once more I was momentarily aware of an obscure 
sense of inner contact with him.
88
  
Here, an attentive scene of second-person comprehension gives way to an ‘obscure sense 
of inner contact’ between the men. This shift appears to be between a description and 
interpretation of conscious motives, and unconscious – and unexplainable – exchange. The 
intersection between the conscious and unconscious becomes particularly important as the 
scene develops, as the transparency of both the narrator’s conscious comprehension of 
events, and his obscure ‘contact’ with the Warden are abruptly ended; the Warden leads 
the narrator to the girl’s room, and then vanishes. The obscuration of events leads the 
narration back to a conscious, interpretation-driven response. The narrator’s uncertainty 
about how to act following this change, or rather, his uncertain predictions about the 
behaviour of the Warden, induce him to leave, ending the chapter on an anti-climax: 
I listened, but could hear nothing through the sound-proofed wall. After some 
moments I went down the stairs and wandered round dark passages until I met a 
servant who showed me the way out. My lucky period certainly seemed to be 
over.
89
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The intensely rendered self-description of mindstates and the narrator’s interpretative 
focus on the Warden’s behaviour creates action descriptions which go between 
transparently linking a mind-state to an action, and attempting an interpretation or 
prediction which jars with the actual action. This experience is also evident in the 
perfunctory relocations of narrative focus, like the one that ends the above chapter. 
Through these vacillations, the reading experience is characterised by both an over- and 
under-determined narrative insight; at once deprived of and overloaded with storyworld 
information.   
Like the girl’s ‘victim’s pattern of thought and behaviour’, the narrator is similarly subject 
to a non-complex motivational structure. In contrast to the girl’s passive state, the narrator 
is described within an overloaded obsessional goal structure, which, we are repeatedly 
told, directs his action:   
Somehow or other I had to find her; the fact remained. I felt the same compulsive 
urge that had driven me straight to the country when I first arrived. There was no 
rational explanation, I could not account for it. It was a sort of craving that had to 
be satisfied.
90
  
Once again the urgency of the search had reclaimed me; I was totally absorbed in 
that obsessional need, as for a lost, essential portion of my own being. Everything 
else in the world seemed immaterial.
91
 
I was too depressed to go on talking. The situation was hopeless. I needed the girl, 
could not live without her.
92
 
Although these motivating points determine the action of the text, they function as part of 
a repetitious structure of acquisition and loss, tied in with the death and regeneration of the 
girl. In these repetitions, the ostensibly structural role of the narrator’s goal loses some of 
its natural narrative cogency. Even as part of the storyworld, this goal structure is not 
necessarily rationalised. As such, the link between intention and planning moves away 
from norms of comprehension. A court scene stages the interrogation of the narrator’s goal 
structures within the setting of the narrative: 
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[S]omebody asked: ‘What was your relationship with her?’ ‘I’ve told you; we were 
old friends.’ More laughter, silenced by an official. ‘You expect us to believe that 
you changed your plans all at once, dropped everything you were doing, in order to 
follow a friend to a foreign country?’ They seemed to know all about me. I said: 
‘That is the truth’.93  
The court seems to be abiding by a regulating point of behavioural interpretation, which, 
within the court room scene, thematises the role of action comprehension. Specifically, the 
scene focuses on the explanatory power of the narrator’s reasons for action as determined 
by their normative, regulative or rationalist cogency.
94
 There is crossover in this aspect of 
the scene insofar as the interpretative stance taken by the inquisitor mimics that taken by 
the reader, with the shared basis of this predicated on the folk psychological standard of 
goal transparency. Here, then, there is clear crossover between goal transparency as a 
normative feature both of the narrative and of the real world. The incredulity of the 
inquisitor is based on the inability to fit the narrator’s actions into a wider scheme of plans 
and motives; the regulative power of his original plans would be expected to have 
maintained his actions because the motivational disruption of the girl’s relocation is hard 
to deem a strong enough factor to explain abandoning those plans in favour a new goal. 
The stretch to account for the new goal structure is made more demanding by the 
narrator’s non-fulfilment of the goal despite its ostensible motivating power: 
I was asked: ‘What happened when you met your friend?’ ‘We did not meet.’ 
Subdued excitement broke out, an official voice had to order silence […] ‘I wish to 
state that the witness is a psychopath, probably schizoid, and therefore not to be 
believed’.95 
The legal setting is vital for this scene, because Kavan uses a jurisprudential model to 
isolate a standard of intention in its social role. Characterising the legal definition of 
‘paradigm intention’, A. P. Simester, following Anthony Duff, notes both that ‘[an] agent 
intends those results which she acts in order to bring about’ and that ‘[an] agent intends a 
result when she acts because she believes that what she does will or might bring that result 
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about’.96 The narrator transgresses both of these conditions by leaving his apparent 
intentions unfulfilled; although his actions suggest that he intends the result of meeting the 
girl insofar as his actions seem designed to bring this about, the plan does not reach the 
final point which would justify the means. Although the dynamics of the scene are partly 
predicated on these norms of behavioural transparency, the narrative does not rest on this 
shared ground for long. The court’s questioning leads from the problem of the narrator’s 
intentions, but redirects this focus to a separate claim about whether he is ‘to be believed’. 
This explanation avoids the immediate coherence problems of the narrator’s testimony by 
positing an alternate set of coherent actions. Invalidating the testimony in this way 
preserves the dominance of intention as manifest in coherent and committed planning 
structures. Further, it suggests that even if the narrator is ‘a psychopath’ and ‘probably 
schizoid’, this is evident in his obfuscation of the truth, but not in a rejection of coherent 
action.    
This assessment points in two different directions. Firstly, the court’s claims might be 
justified within storyworld knowledge structures that are inaccessible to the reader. Slight 
evidence is provided for this by the claim that the prosecutors ‘know all about’ the 
narrator, and that one aspect of this might be knowledge about the narrator’s actions which 
are not relayed in the text. However, there is no investigation of these possible beliefs, nor 
is there any suggestion of how or why the court has acquired this information. Because of 
this, a secondary interpretation moves away from the possibility of inaccessible knowledge 
structures, and toward a more immediate rejection of the possibility of coherence within 
the storyworld. This is compounded by the lack of framework for the intentions of the 
court. Although the normative role of planning coherence seems to be rigidly adhered to, it 
is unmoored from a pattern of action and action explanation which would allow the reader 
to verify the role of plans in the wider context of the narrative. In the directions of the 
court, this is further enmeshed with other normative features associated with agency. The 
court notes the narrator’s ‘utter contempt for the sanctity of family life, and for all decent 
feeling!’, and characterises his attitude as ‘not only abnormal, but depraved, infamous, a 
desecration of all we hold sacred’.97Again, the normative framework that the court are 
appealing to – in this case a value system which would inform agency – is presented as a 
solid base against which to compare what we know of the narrator’s actions. However, like 
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the planning structures, this moral framework fails because it is dissociated from wider 
structures of action such as the claim against the narrator, the way in which this claim fits 
with narrator’s plans, the way in which this claim fits with the narrator’s actions, and the 
way in which this claim articulates the motives of the court.   
The problematic alignment of these elements is intensified when, though making brief 
comment on the obscure intentions of the court, the narrator’s description of this scene is 
notably austere in its lack of examination: 
I was taken away, locked in a cell for seventeen hours. In the early morning they 
released me without explanation. In the meantime, the ship had gone, and with it 
my luggage.
98
 
The scene develops a difficult characterisation of the narrator. The presentation of the 
narrator reporting on the court room and responding to the inquisitor’s questions seems to 
invite the idea that the narrator can recognise and respond to folk psychological 
phenomena and norms of behavioural description. This is also coherent with what we 
know from the narrator’s previous interpretative descriptions of action earlier in the novel. 
This idea is then contraposed with the narrator’s lack of interrogation, both about the 
quality of his own motives and those of the court. The incongruity of the scene comes from 
the narrator’s unwillingness to utilise FP structures which are so heavily emphasised 
elsewhere. Because planning norms are central to the scene, a partial intentional structure 
is adhered to. However, the narrator’s recognition of planning structures does not attempt 
to tie them into more immediate networks of agency concerning his own actions and those 
of the court. This fragments the natural grouping that characterises these faculties and 
gives them their specific interpretative and organisational roles within broader models of 
temporally-extended agency.  
This informational disparity disrupts transparency between separate action sets, and 
between actions and the mentalising description of those actions. This occurs both intra- 
and inter-agentially. As part of the larger structure of the book, localised actions interact 
with goal structures which have clear input into how the characters behave, but which are 
non-explicit. An apocalyptic, global spread of ice and a World War are the major features 
of the Ice storyworld. They moderate and determine the action, not only of the narrator and 
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the Warden, but also of the peripheral characters that populate the storyworld. The events, 
in which control, movement, and loss of the girl are the primary focus, occur against the 
obstacles that war and ice present. However, because these obstacles are largely defined by 
their relation to the main goal structures of the narrator, these larger controlling events 
often appear, not as a coherent backdrop to the focus of the novel, but as rationalising 
evidence brought in to account ad hoc for localised actions. This method of disclosure 
means that the apocalyptic conditions remain sketchy and sparsely described, though 
Kavan tries to shift this away from an issue of narratorial control, to one of obscurity as a 
defining feature of the storyworld: 
Global conditions were worsening. There was no sign of destruction coming to a 
halt, and its inexorable progress induced general demoralization. It was more 
impossible than ever to find out what was really happening, impossible to know 
what to believe. No reliable source of information existed.
99
 
Although the ice seems to play a major role in shaping the events that happen at a supra-
narratorial level, it is not often approached as a topic in its own right, but rather through its 
motivational capacity. Because of this, the ice-plot doesn’t seem to offer a distinct 
structuring role. Instead, it rationalises specific movements, but does this against an 
inchoate system which does little to clarify the actions against norms. The reader is asked 
to accept a minimal concept; that the characters’ actions are rational in response to certain 
conditions which are known to them but not known to us: 
‘Where are we going? Why do we have to go at this time of night?’ She expected 
no answer, doubted whether she heard correctly when he muttered, ‘It’s the one 
chance,’ adding something about the approaching ice.100 
These non-explicit aspects of the storyworld are closely related to the way in which folk 
psychology seems to be used within the text. The reticence around revealing information 
conditions the ways in which the characters interact. Above, the girl ‘expected no answer’ 
from the Warden because their movements within the storyworld interact with strands of 
non-disclosure and information poverty. This is more explicit in the following excerpt, in 
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which the narrator seems to become embroiled in a complex subplot which we assume is 
some kind of subterfuge related to the ongoing war:  
I had not disposed of the carnation. I tried to pull it out of my buttonhole, but the 
stem had been securely pinned by the steward. I turned back my lapel, peered 
down, felt about for the pin. Someone said: ‘Let me do that for you.’ I looked up; 
the flower girl was smiling at me. […] I was on the point of saying I did not want 
it, when something occurred to me and I kept silent. She fixed the fresh flower in 
my buttonhole and continued to stand beside me, though not as if she was merely 
waiting for payment. It looked as if my idea was correct, but I said nothing in case I 
was mistaken.
101
 
Here there is a clear thematisation of the way in which the narrator interprets the situation; 
the way in which he acts in response, not just to the actions of another agent, but to the 
reasons behind the actions of another agent. Here we have a complex example of nested 
intentionality. The scene is predicated on the narrator interpreting the flower girl’s actions, 
not simply as the actions of a flower girl, but as an individual who is also acting on behalf 
of the intentions of an unknown party. The scene is complicated because it deals, not just 
with nested intentionality, but with a truncated form of nested intentionality. I have 
numbered the levels of intention to illustrate their interaction: [1. the reader is interpreting 
the narrator’s actions] [2. based on the suggestion by the narrator that he is interpreting the 
actions of the flower girl], [3. based on the possibility that she is acting for someone else]. 
The intentions of the ‘someone else’ are unknown, or rather, only inferred through the 
actions of their agent, the flower girl. Because of this, the nesting of intentionality is 
truncated by the continued poverty of information available to the reader regarding the 
mysterious organisation which seems to be determining the action of the scene. Although 
the scene exhibits nested intentionality and strongly foregrounds the narrator’s 
interpretative process, the intentional elements that are known (i.e. the narrator’s deduction 
that the flower girl is acting for some reason beyond what is explicit) are outlined by the 
narration, and the remaining points (the actual substance of the intentions which 
underwrite the flower girl’s actions) are unknown. In this way, even though the 
interpretative process is strongly emphasised, the main dilemma of the narrative is still the 
unknown element. The active intentions in the scene are those that are unknown. The plans 
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and goals of the shadowy organisation seem to be determining actions behind the scenes. 
Even as a planning element in the storyworld, the organisation is quickly subordinated in 
the plot to the narrator’s explicit goals when he unwittingly uses the code of the 
organisation to utilise their resources:  
I went straight to the point, there was no object in prevaricating. Naming the town 
from which the warden was operating, I asked if it was possible for me to get 
there.
102
 
[…] 
I kept quiet while she fixed the carnation. It was fatally easy to show my ignorance 
of the organization to which she belonged.
103
  
Even though the delicate mentalising manoeuvers of the narrator are highlighted in this 
scene, they are subordinated to larger planning structures. Here, the utilisation of folk 
psychology within broader agential structures is truncated, both as they pertain to the 
organisation, and to the narrator. The structure of the organisation remains unknown as the 
narratorial focus remains on the protagonist’s actions. Although the narrator’s actions are 
explicit at this point in the narrative, localised actions are incorporated within the recurring 
plot: 
I tried to believe the warden had sent [the girl] to safety, but knew too much about 
him to feel sure of that. It was absolutely essential for me to see him; otherwise I 
would never find out what had happened to her.
104
   
As I have noted, this recurring plan structure is partly justificatory insofar as it appears to 
direct action and lend some coherence to limited action groupings. However, it is also 
information-poor as it fails to mesh with other action. As such, recourse to it is not 
necessarily explanatory, but simply justifies ongoing action within the narrative. Again, 
this is an example of Kavan building an agential structure outwards from an intricate folk 
psychological description, pointing towards the broader intentional structures within which 
these localised actions should fit, and then truncating the description before it plays an 
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explanatory role within the wider scheme of the novel. Instead, the narratorial focus 
relocates to a separate locale and a separate action description, unrelated except for the 
sparse links provided by the girl-plot. By separating inter-character folk psychology from 
more distinct motivational insights, Kavan is presenting a semi-deconstructed model of 
character intention. This is a distinct aspect of the experimental work within the book. 
Action is made strange by being both a product of agency, and untethered from that source 
by a lack of supporting intentional structures. Kavan’s non-logical novel is, at least in part, 
constructed from a studied semi-realisation of agency as a narrative tool.   
As the theoretical literature suggests, intention is inextricable from our understanding of 
agency. Contemporary analytic philosophy has repeatedly attempted to isolate the core 
features of intention, and the broad results testify to the multiple dynamic ways in which 
our uses of the term interact with the structures of agency and action. Because of this, the 
concept is both part of the vocabulary of first-person agency, and central to second-person 
and spectatorial modes of behaviour comprehension. In this folk role, intention is most 
frequently understood at the highest level of pragmatic description, rather than as a 
focused analytic tool. In line with this usage, intention has a strong normative role, both as 
part of the way in which intention-descriptions are used in order to understand actions and 
make actions understood, and as part of social organisational structures such as plans and 
goals. This wide usage of the term brings continuity to the apparent distinction between 
levels of intention; both prior intentions which describe a future plan, and intentions-in-
action. Because of the wide currency of intention discourse and its penetration through 
different aspects of agency, it is explainable in different ways according to context. This 
means, as Hutto notes, that belief/desire structures are not always needed to underpin 
action comprehension. Instead, the action can be subsumed within a script which is 
comprehensible on its own terms. In narrative discourse, this also means that intentional 
action is often implied by, or written into, higher level descriptions of agency, such as 
plans. The operation of intention on multiple, often interdependent, levels allows Kavan to 
describe a dismantled agency. She does this by adhering to, and in some cases 
overemphasising, the language of action comprehension, but dissociates this from other 
agential_structures. 
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Chapter Two 
Action and Introspection: Samuel Beckett 
In the previous chapter I described the models available for the interpretation of character 
action in fiction and explored their suitability. These discussions are underpinned by the 
assumption that there is transfer between the way in which we interpret other agents in real 
life, and the description and interpretation of agency in fiction. I push this idea further here 
by exploring the way in which Samuel Beckett utilises the concept of agency in his short 
novel, How It Is. I sketch some norms of agential understanding by exploring how Beckett 
transgresses these norms in his experimental characterisations. 
Beckett’s readings in philosophy show a distinct taste for introspection. His extensive 
notes on philosophy and aesthetics show him to be working repeatedly through the same 
problems of self-knowledge and epistemology. These appear as coherent notes in his 
Philosophy Notes and his jottings on Geulincx’s Ethics, and are frequently reiterated as 
jargon-filled claims in his letters and occasional reviews. The probing questioning of his 
philosophical reading is often thought to have given rise to his aesthetic statements, which 
rephrase sceptical arguments as models of artistic uncertainty. Whereas once, perhaps, 
events in the world could be discussed unreflectively as known, and taken as objects of 
artistic expression, now, says Beckett, it is ‘awareness of the vanished object’, which has 
become the ‘criterion of worthwhile modern poetry’.1 This narrows the artist’s possible 
field of enquiry; ‘the only terrain accessible’ is ‘the no man’s land that he projects round 
himself, rather as the flame projects its zone of evaporation.
2
 If artistic scepticism rejects 
the world as an object of scrutiny, then it seems to entail an inward turn. This might 
manifest as a broad focus on the self. However, as Beckett’s subsequent letter to Georges 
Duthuit suggests, self-scrutiny can become reflexive insofar as it becomes a focus on the 
mechanism of introspection itself:   
Can one conceive of an expression in the absence of relation, whatever they may 
be, as much between the I and the not-I as within the former? 
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Is it necessary to specify the nature of these relations of self to self?...Let’s say it is 
a matter of the happy knack of existing in several forms, in which each in a sense 
takes turns at certifying the others…3 
Here, Beckett raises a puzzle about first-person awareness which probes the apparent 
incoherence of the self being both the object of scrutiny, and the scrutinising 
consciousness. If there is no particular state which is external to the degree where it can 
validate the ‘self’, then as Beckett suggests, the model seems to become circular, because 
each self needs both to be validating other selves and validated by them. As I will argue 
later in the chapter, the relation of ‘self to self’, which seems to be simultaneously 
exteriorising and introspective, is one aspect of a cluster of problems which position 
identity within a matrix of action, self-awareness, and knowledge of other minds.  
Between 1932 and 1933, Beckett transcribed large volumes of notes on western 
philosophy. These largely derive from Wilhelm Windelband’s History of Philosophy, and 
mostly consist of direct, though edited, quotations from Windelband’s original text.4 This 
period of self-education shows Beckett repeatedly referring to the same cluster of 
philosophical problems, but through the complex interactions and conflicts between 
metaphysical, psychological, and phenomenological approaches. Because these are often 
responses to similar basic puzzles, a criticism on Beckett which utilises the notes should 
not fall on one mode of approach as an exegetical strategy for probing the original 
questions and their place within his texts. Instead, the dynamics of these different 
approaches can be elucidated in order to clarify what the original questions are, how they 
arise, and what can be learned from the questioning attitude itself rather than from the 
answers which might be generated. Ulrika Maude seems to endorse such an approach by 
recruiting phenomenology as a way of elaborating on the logical and metaphysical 
problems that Beckett poses by focusing on the experiential base from which such 
abstractions emerge:  
Beckett turns his focus on the tactile because of the way in which touch collapses 
the boundaries between the active and the passive, the endogenous and the 
                                                          
3
 Samuel Beckett, ‘Letter to Georges Duthuit, 9-10 March 1949’, in Beckett after Beckett, ed. by S. E. 
Gontarski and Anthony. Uhlmann, trans. by Walter Redfern (Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida, 
2006), pp. 15–21 (pp. 18–19). 
4
 For a full discussion of Beckett’s connection with Windelband, see: Matthew Feldman and David 
Addyman, ‘Samuel Beckett, Wilhelm Windelband, and the Interwar “Philosophy Notes”’, 
Modernism/Modernity, 18 (2011), 755–70. 
86 
 
exogenous and the concrete and abstract, hence complicating the preconceived 
categories and binarisms through which we organise our perceptions and thought 
patterns.
5
  
In this way, the body becomes the focus of explanation which attempts to be descriptive 
rather than reductive. The implied secondary effect of Maude’s method is not simply to 
complicate the ‘preconceived categories and binarisms’ of thought and perception, but to 
show how these frameworks develop by linking them to their experiential precursors. In 
this way, Maude is able to operate using a more fluid model for the interaction between 
philosophy and Beckett’s texts. Here, a theoretical reading does not have to reflect back on 
the text as a unitary explanation, but can interact with the content if both philosophy and 
writing are viewed in an interactive relationship, not only with each other, but with a 
common experiential base.  
This kind of response is also evident in Beckett’s notes from philosophical texts. These 
often take a historical view which repeatedly approaches the same experiential questions, 
but does this through a number of sources and responses. Beckett’s notes from Geulincx’s 
Ethics are specifically in the metaphysical vein, but concern with questions of the self is 
evident from the careful selection of passages, which treat agency, freedom, habit, 
obligation, and reason. In Geulincx, a strict rationalism is strangely combined with 
scepticism of the will, which in turn leads to a deism that posits all human action as the 
will of God. The argument, from Beckett’s rendering of it, is inconsistent and convoluted 
in its logical paucity. However, these arguments are developed in response to basic 
philosophical concerns surrounding agency. Beckett’s notes on Geulincx frequently touch 
on the possibility and fallibility of introspective self-knowledge. In a key passage, the 
fallibility of self-knowledge is used by Geulincx to argue against autonomy ad absurdum: 
It is perfectly evident, and nothing can be thought more clearly than that what I do 
not know how to do is not my action. (…I have not claimed that what you do not 
know how to do does not happen, but: what you do not know how to do is not your 
action […]) Nor is there any need for arguments here, only anyone’s 
consciousness…I say…that if you are willing to describe yourself as the doer of 
anything that you do not know how to do, there is no reason why you should not 
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believe that you have done or do anything that happens or has been done. If you do 
not know how motion is made in the organs of your body while being nevertheless 
quite sure that you made it, you could say with equal justification that you are the 
author of Homer’s Iliad, or that you built the walls of Nineveh, or the Pyramids.6 
Subpersonal movements are drawn in to support this claim, with the assumption that, if we 
perform an action, then we must have full knowledge of every part that constitutes it. In 
this, the ease and spontaneity of behaviour is recruited against autonomy:  
With the aid of Physics and Anatomy I may be able to trace this motion for some 
distance, but I still feel sure that in moving my organs I am not directed by that 
knowledge; and that on occasion I have moved them just as promptly, or perhaps 
even more promptly, when nothing could have been further from my mind.
7
 
This argument looks similar to a sceptical argument which Beckett transcribes in his 
Philosophy Notebooks:  
Our faculties cannot furnish us with information concerning essence of the 
relations of phenomena to one another. Suject déteint sur l’objet. Doctrine leads to 
absolute inaction. Pyrrhonism.
8
 
Here, perception is also untrustworthy because of its limited scope. The doctrinal emphasis 
on complete knowledge, such as the kind seen in Geulincx, appears to mean that ‘absolute 
inaction’ is favoured over action which is performed under conditions of epistemological 
incompleteness. The important move in both arguments from Geulincx and Pyrrho seems 
to be the point at which the partiality of knowledge and self-knowledge is deemed to be 
incompatible with the notion of self-willing; because we do not have complete control, we 
do not have control at all. The same concept is at play in the answers of both philosophers, 
as they each turn the argument toward a sceptical conclusion. This move tries to answer 
epistemology by exploding it, shifting from the limited scope of psychological 
interrogation to conclusions which make absolute claims upon the individual. The focus 
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moves from close attention to the individual to a world view which situates the individual 
in relation to overriding metaphysical or dogmatic claims.  
This idea surfaces again in Beckett’s philosophy notes, in a section from Windelband’s 
chapter, ‘The Philosophy of the Middle Ages’. Here, Beckett is transcribing a debate 
which revolved around the dispute in ‘psychic life [whether] the dependence of the will 
upon ideas, or of ideas upon the will [is the greater]’.9 He notes that the ‘[controversy] was 
at first purely psychological’, but moves in to the ‘metaphysical domain’ when it was 
determined that ‘freedom was the point in dispute […] both parties […] defend ‘freedom’ 
in the interests of responsibility’.10 Beckett’s notes pick out the key changes in this 
argument, but Windelband’s original passage from A History of Philosophy is worth 
returning to for the subtleties of the argument. Windelband suggests that the question – of 
whether the will is dependent on ideas or ideas upon the will – was in reality a fruitless 
debate. Rather than focussing on the ‘treatment of psychology that concerned itself 
especially with the history of mental development’, the argument frequently transferred 
from this specific question to ‘the ground of dialectic or to the metaphysical domain’. 
Because of this, the psychological argument was undeveloped and subordinated to the 
distractions of these more abstract debates: 
This latter transfer occurred principally in consequence of the fact that the 
conception of freedom, which always involves ethical and religious questions, was 
looked upon as the point in controversy.
11
 
For Windelband, it is clear that the argument about the primacy of will or idea is secondary 
to an intellectual-historical question about the tensions between the approaches of 
psychological and metaphysical investigation. When the argument widens to include the 
concept of ‘freedom’, it suddenly becomes encumbered with metaphysical baggage which 
prevents the development of a purely psychological line of questioning. This is, broadly, 
about the tensions between phenomenological and metaphysical approaches, insofar as 
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psychological questions are rooted in experience, and metaphysics operates beyond 
experience.   
Cartesian questions that have traditionally burdened readings of Beckett have risked 
reducing the pluralism of the questioning attitude in his work to a single metaphysical 
conceit.
12
 Even when not focussing directly on the question of Cartesianism, claims such 
as Hugh Kenner’s that Beckett’s comedy resides in ‘the process of the brain struggling 
with ideas’; ‘prior to action and more fundamental than language’, reiterate a particular 
mentalised hierarchy of thought feeding into action.
13
 This model prioritises the mental 
over the material. Further, as Ulrika Maude has suggested, dominant poststructuralist 
readings that followed reiterated such mentalese in their emphasis on the ‘discursively 
produced body’.14 A reignited interest in historicising Beckett’s work has attempted to 
move away from rigid metaphysical readings by placing him into an intellectual-historical 
context in which Cartesianism was assaulted on various fronts; whether through 
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psychology, phenomenology, or subjectivist ethics.
15
 Here I aim to focus on agency in 
Beckett’s How It Is as a way of explicating those features of Beckett’s prose which I 
believe to have fuelled the original Cartesian approaches, though through a lens which 
shows the problems to be more complex that a simple mind-body split. Questions of 
agency and introspective knowledge of action play a key role in this as contemporary 
philosophy and psychology have done much to complicate how we conceptualise the 
dynamics of feedback and control between mind and body. 
Current work in the philosophy and psychology of agency can be seen as part of an 
ongoing debate which engages with similar questions – control, introspection, and 
behavioural interpretation – which also arose in the work of the early twentieth century 
which was contemporary to, and known by, Beckett. The broad debate has been inflected 
by Cartesian questions throughout its history, and current theory offers a broad theoretical 
base which can both help to elucidate the Cartesian legacy and also provide a heuristic 
strategy that is more equipped to bring out the nuance of Beckett’s prose. In this latter role, 
it is important to recognise the congruities between current debates and the work that was 
contemporary to Beckett. Agency has a long philosophical history that has ranged through 
myriad disciplines. The theorists I utilise are inheritors and contemporary interpreters of 
this legacy, whose answers respond to the same puzzles, often interacting with Cartesian 
questions through explicit discussion, or implicit philosophical or experimental 
methodological bias.  
In Beckett’s lifetime, philosophical and psychological approaches to mind produced a 
number of arguments which can be read as direct reactions to the Cartesian legacy. In line 
with this, I will read Beckett’s apparent dualism as an explorative part of a complex 
picture of philosophical, psychological, and neurophysiological questioning, rather than a 
distinct metaphysical claim. In the first half of the twentieth century, the mind-body 
problem found a range of attention in burgeoning disciplines. In psychology, a notable 
reaction was behaviourism, which, by focussing on a materialist understanding of mind 
and action, posed a direct challenge to dualism; if ‘the ultimate explanation of behaviour 
[is] physical and chemical’, then the explanatory gap between mind and body can be 
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circumvented.
16
 Although some proponents, like William McDougall, did not reject mental 
language and introspective methods entirely, more radical behaviourism ‘sought to 
expunge every mentalistic concept, whether limited to behavioural description or not, from 
the language of psychology’.17 This meant that ‘explanations of behaviour had to be 
formulated in terms of sensory stimuli and behavioural conditioning (on the input side), 
and overt behavioural response (on the output side)’.18  
Beckett read, and transcribed portions from, R.S. Woodworth’s Contemporary Schools of 
Psychology in the thirties.
19
 As a reaction to earlier structural psychologies, behaviourism 
distinguished itself through an entirely different methodology. Rather than the method of 
trained introspection favoured by earlier schools, the behaviourist:  
 [Wanted] to deal with tangibles, visibles, audible – things or happenings that he 
could point out to a fellow-observer as the chemist points at the contents of a test 
tube. […] Introspectionists have claimed to observe processes of an entirely 
different order, not conceivably observable by any refinement of physical 
instrumentation; but this claim cannot be allowed by the behaviourist.
20
   
Such materialist emphasis found precedent in the neurophysiological, psychological, and 
biological research of the early twentieth century. This work was beginning to recognise 
the complexity of the nervous system, both as ‘integrative’ and ‘inborn’ by pioneers such 
as Charles Scott Sherrington in his The Integrative Action of the Nervous System (1906), 
and as environmentally conditioned, as championed by Ivan Sechenov (1829-1905) and 
Ivan Pavlov (1849-1936).
21
 Pavlovian psychology, in its reliance on a unitary reductionist 
explanation for behaviour, was particularly important to the development of an American 
behaviourist school.
22
 This reductionism is the binary model of stimulation and response. 
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Beckett’s ‘Psychology Notes’ from the 1930s show him engaging, not only with the 
specific content of Woodworth’s primer, but with the methodological questions it poses: 
Imageless Thought Controversy: the parting of the ways in modern psychological 
theory. Existentialism arose out of reaction against it, Behaviousism [sic] reacted 
by rejecting introspection altogether, Gestalt Psychology by objecting to 
introspection as an instrument of analysis & by proposing to abandon mental 
chemistry altogether, sensory elements & thought elements alike.
23
 
Feldman notes that elsewhere in his transcriptions Beckett shows a stronger tendency 
towards the introspective method (‘Introspection is subjective observation’24), which was 
‘certainly closer to [his] heart’ than the aspirational objectivity of behaviourism and 
similar movements.
25
 Although the introspective approach might fit better with Beckett’s 
temperament, the methodological puzzle that behaviourism and the other materialist 
schools pose still holds productive ways of looking at Beckett’s texts. Not only is this 
theoretically relevant to approaching the introspective trends in the writings, but a focus on 
the methodology of introspection also places Beckett in a long, ongoing interdisciplinary 
dialogue. Although Feldman suggests that Beckett’s psychology notes ‘[as] a survey of 
research on unconscious, repressed or otherwise unrecovered events […] evoke the 
Leibnizian inception of psychology as an outgrowth of earlier consciousness 
philosophy’,26 it is also the case that the psychological advances in the early part of the 
twentieth century fed back into philosophy, and created a way of philosophical questioning 
which is influenced by the empirical rigour of psychology. Not least, materialist 
approaches to the study of mind found evidential support in the results of psychology.    
One early philosophical inheritor of the materialist tendency was Gilbert Ryle, who takes 
psychological advances as a jumping-point to demolish the lingering philosophical 
bugbear of Cartesian dualism. In The Concept of Mind, the covertly dogmatic Cartesian 
legacy is labelled ‘The Official Doctrine’. The dualism underpinning The Official Doctrine 
is based on the difference between bodies and minds. Bodies are both ‘in space and are 
subject to the mechanical laws which govern all other bodies in space’, and observable 
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insofar as ‘[bodily] processes and states can be inspected by external observers’. In 
contrast, ‘the workings of one mind are not witnessable by other observers; its career is 
private’. This is tied up with further assumptions about the primacy of the mind; that ‘what 
the mind wills, the legs, arms and the tongue execute’, that ‘a person must be directly and 
authentically seized of the present state and workings of his own mind’, and is ‘also 
generally supposed to be able to exercise from time to time a special kind of perception, 
namely inner perception, or introspection’.27  
Ryle’s clearest, and most cutting, criticism, is reserved for the concepts of volition and the 
will, which he holds up as paradigms of misleading theory: exemplars of ‘the dogma that a 
mind is a secondary field of special causes’. For Ryle, the concept of volition violates both 
the common-sense way in which we describe our actions, and the way in which the mind 
should be described in theory. From a theoretical perspective, the term ‘volition’ suggests 
a ‘para-mechanical theory of the mind’, in which ‘mental-thrusts, which are not 
movements of matter in space, can cause muscles to contract’. Ryle rejects the common 
view of volitions, which he describes thus:   
I think of some state of affairs which I wish to come into existence in the physical 
world, but, as my thinking and wishing are unexecutive, they require the mediation 
of a further executive mental process. So I perform a volition which somehow puts 
my muscles into action. Only when a bodily movement has issued from such a 
volition can I merit praise or blame for what my hand or tongue has done.  
The term ‘volition’ seems to be a post hoc invention, devised to bridge the gap that arises 
when mental processes are distinguished in type from bodily movements. Ryle argues that 
this distinction is false and that volition confuses ready concepts of experiential 
psychology, such as voluntariness, by adding theoretical claims that lack explanatory 
substance.
28
  
Although Ryle was an inheritor as well as a proponent of materialism, the cluster of 
dualistic features that he outlines is still present in academic psychology and philosophy, 
though now entrenched in interdisciplinary complexity. The MIT Encyclopaedia of the 
Cognitive Sciences outlines the mind-body problem as revolving around two poles: the 
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first problem is ‘the apparent causal interaction of mind and body’; the second concerns 
‘the distinctive features of consciousness’.29 The Cartesian form of dualism maintains that 
there is a difference in substance between ‘individual minds and souls’ and the body. Even 
if this is granted, it is unclear how mind and body can be disentangled, as, though our 
‘thought and intentions seem to make our bodies move’, our ‘mental states often seem to 
be caused by events in the world external to our minds’.30 As I have described above, 
materialist views hold that physical actions are produced by physical events in the brain. 
However, this does not seem to tally with a folk experience of mental causation and other 
aspects of particularly mental experience, such as consciousness. What emerges, then, is 
contention over the relative entanglement of mind and body as we recognise it through 
both experimentation and experience.       
Self-knowledge provides a particular manifestation of the mind-body problem, as the 
traditional concept of Cartesian mentalism is closely tied to the privileged status of 
introspective self-knowledge. In this view, as defined, again, by MITECS, Cartesianism 
‘treated the mind as fully transparent and open in all its significant properties to a faculty 
of conscious introspection or reflection’.31 Significant work has been done to dismantle 
this view by supplying evidence of innumerable bodily, as well as mental, forms of 
awareness that feed into our sense of autonomy. Some of this has taken a negative 
direction by identifying distinct non-conscious processes that are unavailable to 
introspection, and the subsequent unreliability of self-reporting. Other approaches have 
utilised the evidence of neurological anomalies, such as Anarchic Hand Syndrome, as a 
way of increasing the taxonomic accuracy of processes involved in agency.
32
 These fine-
grained theoretical distinctions are played out against the default phenomenology of 
autonomous agency which is controlled by and transparent to the agent. As with 
consciousness in general, it is widely thought that the first-person experience of self-
knowledge is not captured by theoretical or mechanistic description. Richard Moran makes 
this point as follows:  
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[T]he object of first-person awareness (on any account of it) is not all of 
psychological life, but primarily the state of mind identified under the categories of 
what is sometimes called ‘folk-psychology’: the hopes and fears, pains and 
experiences we relate to each other in daily life, and not states or processes defined 
either neurologically or computationally.
33
  
Although the object of first-person awareness is somewhat limited, Moran also recognises 
the fundamentally embodied experience that it entails. The first-person experience does 
not simply consist of introspective folk-psychology; ‘there are in fact several aspects of 
one’s relation to oneself as an agent which have been plausibly seen as involving 
awareness that is not based either on behavioural inference or any perceptual 
presentation’.34 These include a person’s common awareness of ‘his own basic movements 
and bodily position’, which he knows ‘without having to observe anything, internally or 
externally’,35 a sense that is termed ‘proprioception’ by psychologists.36 Theorists like 
Moran suggest that it is not simply that psychology has not located the specific processes 
that give us first-person experience, but that there is a sense in which the phenomenology 
of first-person knowledge and agency is a special kind of perception that cannot be 
captured by experimental means.   
These complexities arise because it is apparent that there are diverse ways in which we 
understand ourselves, that involve awareness of both our mental and physical states. 
Furthermore, our actions are not isolated events, but are set within our lives. Naomi Eilan 
and Johannes Roessler describe this problem technically as one of ‘immunity to error 
through misidentification’ according to which special introspective awareness means that 
we cannot misidentify our actions as our own.
37
 This assigns a special quality to 
introspective awareness which distinguishes it from other forms of perception. While we 
may wrongly identify an object, or incorrectly interpret the action of another, the 
‘immunity to error through misidentification’ means that if we understand an action as our 
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own, then that action could not have been the action of another individual. In other words, 
there is a specific phenomenology of acting which is intertwined with the knowledge of 
the production of action. This type of understanding moves away from a perceptual model 
of introspection through which the agent is somehow observing his own actions, a sense 
which is suggested by Beckett’s understanding of introspection in his 1949 to Duthuit. 
Here, introspection is a relation of ‘self to self’, a model in which one ‘self’ is able to 
dissociate itself from another ‘self’ in a perceptual relation.38 This ‘self to self’ model is 
rejected by Sidney Shoemaker when he argues that, when we introspect, we do not 
perceive a self because ‘there can be no such thing as picking out a self and distinguishing 
it from other selves’.39 In addition, ‘there can be no such thing as picking out a self and 
distinguishing it from other perceived things, of any sort whatever, by its perceived 
properties’.40 Further, it seems to follow from this assertion that ‘there is no such thing as 
introspective misidentification of non-selves with selves’.41 This formulation is applicable 
to action, but, as Eilan and Roessler suggest, it also seems to apply ‘equally to knowledge 
of our own experiences, thoughts, plans, memories, and so forth’.42 Even granting the 
specialness of introspective knowledge, there is still a twofold challenge with respect to 
the link between introspection and action; both to characterise this direct knowledge of 
action, and to describe how our knowledge of action relates to other mental states. 
Despite the validity of common-sense phenomenology and its more intricate supporting 
arguments, there is often a sense that challenges to this position emerge from an insecurity 
in our self-experience. At least it is certainly the case that positions such as those outlined 
above, which attempt to maintain the credence of first-person knowledge, are working 
against sceptical refutations which collapse the nuance of experience under the weight of 
absolute claims. Even without going to the extremes of scepticism, philosophical reasoning 
often attempts to intercede in order to make anomalous experiences – like Anarchic Hand 
Syndrome, or even the disparity between introspective knowledge and third-person 
knowledge – cohere with other aspects of our understanding. Slippage creates questions, 
and regarding our relation to our own actions there are four key terms which mark the 
interplay between these questions. These are knowledge, control, description and 
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interpretation. Epistemological problems concerning action run from Greek sceptical 
responses through problems of freedom and determinism as interpreted by Geulincx and 
Descartes. These dovetail with issues of control, as questions of freedom are essentially 
focussed on the level of agential involvement in an action. Experimental work picks up 
this thread, and the psychological expansion of the field of conditioned reflex, as well as 
the description of aberrant neurological conditions, is in dialogue with the same problem. 
Knowledge of action encompasses the interpretation of both our own actions, through 
neurological and introspective means, and the comprehension of the actions of others. 
Here arise additional questions as there is not direct symmetry between self-understanding 
and the understanding of others. As my discussion of folk psychology in Chapter One 
suggests, there is significant disagreement about how much crossover there is between 
introspection and communication. This cluster of problems makes it clear that there is not 
a single approach to ‘action’ as a philosophical concept, but that it is refracted through a 
number of intersecting problems which appear across several disciplines. Because my 
focus is literary action, which necessarily centres upon the interpretive relation between 
reader and text, the communicatory aspect of action, and the mechanisms of action 
interpretation are paramount. What the following analysis aims to show is how Beckett’s 
textual method complicates the communicatory relationship by incorporating a number of 
the interactive problems of action; those which stretch across knowledge, control, 
description and interpretation.  
 Beckett and Abstraction 
Action is not self-contained, but in the world. When we act, we do so in a social structure, 
and our actions are mediated by and directed toward the end of comprehension by other 
agents. They are enmeshed with the actions of others, and subject to norms which regulate 
them. The communicative role of action is central to a comment which Sophie Ratcliffe 
makes in passing. With reference to the literary chess game in Beckett’s early play, 
Eleuthéria, Ratcliffe points to the way in which the ‘intentional tone’ becomes a key point 
of misinterpretation, and consequently becomes a ‘failed transmission of meaning’, 
between characters.
43
 Although she does not pursue the point in this way, it seems that 
Ratcliffe here is alluding to the structures that surround intentional action and give them 
their informational content. When, in Eleuthéria, the ‘Spectator’ steps onto the stage, and 
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attempts to explain his frustration with the action of the play, the miscommunication is 
working in both directions: 
Spectator: […] How can I explain it? Do you play chess? No. Doesn’t matter. It’s 
like when you’re watching a game of chess between two fifth-rate players. For 
three quarters of an hour neither of them has made a move, they’re sitting there like 
a couple of morons, yawning over the chess board, and you’re there too […] rooted 
to the spot, disgusted, bored, tired, marvelling at so much stupidity. Until the 
moment when you can’t stand it any longer. So you tell them, but do this, do this, 
what are you waiting for? […] It’s unforgivable, it’s against all the most 
elementary rules of polite behaviour […] but you can’t help yourself […] Do you 
follow me? 
Glazier:  No. We aren’t playing chess.44  
Here, it is not only that ‘one [character] is speaking of an imaginary game of chess, the 
other, of a real one’, but that under the surface misunderstanding, there is the content of the 
metaphor, the Spectator’s inability to understand the action on stage. This is similar to 
saying that the Spectator is unable to frame the action on stage within any intentional 
model which would make it comprehensible. His allusion to a chess game allows him to 
articulate his frustration at not being able to understand the determinants of the Glazier’s 
actions by supplementing them with an ideal of interpretable action; the moves of a game 
which are subject to the shared rationality condition inherent in explicit rules. When the 
Glazier is unable to understand the quality of the Spectator’s intervention, it is not just an 
inability to grasp the substance of the metaphor, but also an inability to understand the 
reason for the Spectator’s complaint. The Glazier, not unfairly, seems unable to see his 
own actions as inexplicable. Misinterpretation is tied to self-knowledge; with the Glazier, 
introspective knowledge of action is divisible from the communicative intention of action. 
However, the two are also entangled.  
Communicative relations that are based in agency, rather than language, can exist within 
the storyworld between characters. Hence, in Malone Dies, ‘passion’ can mark a face, and 
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‘action too possibly’.45 Here, communication between characters is non-verbal, as it is 
action rather than explanation that carries the message. Similarly, The Unnamable can 
describe the necessary postures for a tortured disposition:  
Let him move, try and move, that’s all they ask, for the moment. No matter where 
he goes, being at the centre, he will go towards them. So he is at the centre, there is 
a clue of the highest interest, it matters little to what. They look, to see if he has 
stirred. He is nothing but a shapeless heap, without a face capable of reflecting the 
niceties of a torment, but the disposition of which, its greater or lesser degree of 
crouch and huddledness, is no doubt expressive, for specialists, and enable them to 
assess the chances of its suddenly making a bound, or dragging its coils faintly 
away, as if stricken to death.
46
 
In the above examples, the relationships are contained within the fiction; the 
communicative action is between two or more agents within the storyworld. Moments like 
this, between storyworld agents, are set within a pervasive focus on the textual medium 
through which the narrator and reader communicate. This relationship poses its own 
distinct set of problems, especially when the texts supplant interactive for introspective 
action.    
The interaction between reader and text is frequently alluded to in Beckett criticism, and 
often through the elusive claims that the texts perform one or several simultaneous types of 
abstraction. Ewa Płonowska Ziarek dismisses readings of How It Is which have focussed 
on the abstraction of the ‘paradigms of self-expression or self-referential language’.47 In 
doing so, she moves away from analyses which foreground the introspective elements of 
Beckett’s later prose. In response, she regards the text as ‘a violent clash between the 
signification of alterity and the rationality inherent in communication, between the shock 
of otherness and absorption of this shock within a discursive community’.48 Ziarek stops 
short of examining the reader’s role in this ‘communication’. Instead, she seems to imply 
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greater significance – apparently a quasi-pedagogical intent – behind the relationship 
between the storyworld figures in the novel:  
We are confronted here with quite a different sense of invention – with the 
invention of the other as a complement of the self. Coextensive with an obliteration 
of alterity, this invention is presented in the text as both a condition and an 
achievement of a dialogue. Beckett’s relentless, almost vicious, emphasis on the 
cruelty of the linguistic exchange dramatizes the fact that what are usually taken as 
the necessary conditions of intersubjective communication – reciprocity, the 
symmetrical relationship between the speakers […] [are] in fact violently produced 
in the course of linguistic exchange. Communicative reason is not divorced from 
the power of invention; on the contrary, it violently produces the necessary 
conditions for its success. Intertwined with the effort to overcome the opacity of 
the other, the violence of dialogue brings the other into the light of 
comprehension.
49
  
Wolfgang Iser remarks on the same features of Beckett’s texts, but moves from an analysis 
of ‘self-referential language’ to claims about the response that this language evokes in the 
reader. Referring to Molloy’s claims against reference, that for all of the ‘figures’ of 
expression, ‘what really happened was quite different’,50 Iser suggests that the text is 
focussed around ‘questions posed by a consciously reflecting mind which seeks to uncover 
the presuppositions that condition a statement’.51 These conditions, he suggests are shown 
to be inadequate as a description, a ‘barely tenable version of the facts it attempts to 
convey’.52 This realisation, Iser suggests, is part of a general sceptical turn which infects 
the narratorial voice, moving from the perception and description of the world to the 
conditions of perception themselves: 
[A] world perceived only in terms of phenomena is just as much a product of the 
conscious mind as one that is deliberately given a specific form. As both perception 
and interpretation of phenomena are qualified equally as offshoots of the conscious 
mind, the reality perceived must in itself clearly be totally devoid of any meaning 
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of its own. Thus the conscious mind turns its attention away from the interpretation 
of things and onto its own actual processes of interpretation.
53
 
From this position, Iser also reveals a pedagogical turn, which moves from the way in 
which Beckett stages ‘interpretation’ as a thematic concern to the effect that this has on the 
reader. If the text operates to ‘resist all attempts at total comprehension’, and ‘once the 
reader becomes conscious’ of the presuppositions which underlie his attempts at 
comprehension, ‘he will find the very foundations of his knowledge beginning to shift 
beneath his feet’.54 It is not clear from Iser’s analysis exactly what the ‘foundations’ of the 
reader’s knowledge are, but he appears to be referring to the assumptions made when 
approaching a literary text. In even more obscure terms, Jay Bernstein remarks on the 
‘cognitive significance’ which emerges from the ‘incomprehensibility’ of Beckett’s work. 
He seems to suggest that misrecognition or comprehensive difficulty at the level of the text 
can give way to a ‘moment of non-discursive cognition’, though he doesn’t describe this 
further.
55
 Pascale Casanova is more explicit about what literary conventions are subverted 
through Beckett’s exercise of textual abstraction: 
Beckett attacks the ‘outdated conventions’ of literature on all fronts. He 
progressively jettisons from his texts all external elements that might still attach 
them to the literary tradition. From The Unnamable, which (as is clear) is a 
founding text for many reasons, he explicitly challenges temporal and spatial 
categories, historically posited as conditions of possibility of literary creation and 
as bases of the ‘reality effect’ […] a way of challenging the habitual preliminaries 
of ordinary literature that are place, time and action embodied by characters […]. 
This elimination will take the form of the progressive disappearance of characters, 
but also of virtually complete abolition of punctuation, setting, narrative time, 
narration itself, and so forth.
56
  
                                                          
53
 Iser, pp. 166–7. 
54
 Iser, pp. 176–7. 
55
 Jay M. Bernstein, The Fate of Art: Aesthetic Alienation from Kant to Derrida and Adorno (University 
Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992), p. 250. 
56
 Pascale Casanova, Samuel Beckett: Anatomy of a Literary Revolution, trans. by Gregory Elliott (London: 
Verso, 2006), p. 90. 
102 
 
It is clear that character lies at the heart of Casanova’s analysis. In this respect, she comes 
close to describing Beckett as enacting what others have called ‘unnatural narrative’.57 The 
‘habitual preliminaries’ which usually condition the reader’s efforts – those of time, 
narrative, action and setting – are clustered around the idea of a character as the agent and 
focus of a text. As part of this project, Casanova suggests that the endpoint of Beckett’s 
abstracting method is a ‘de-psychologization’ of the text:  
[As] Beckett seeks to put an end to the illusion of identification and psychological 
presuppositions that ground literary attachment, these moral categories, which 
readers invest in the text solely on account of the psychologizing habits instilled by 
the usual cult of literature.
58
  
In line with her formalist sympathies, Casanova suggests that ‘moral categories’ only come 
into play when the text allows for a psychologising interpretation. Because Beckett rejects 
psychologising, he also rejects literary ethics. Although Casanova has a methodical 
approach to cataloguing the abstraction of literary expectations, she does not spend time 
describing what constitutes the original readerly impulse beyond suggesting the habitual 
will to ‘psychologise’ texts, and the link between this and characterisation. Beckett 
himself, from his 1937 ‘German Diary’, helps to clarify the link to some extent: 
I am not interested in a ‘unification’ of the historical chaos any more than I am in 
the ‘clarification’ of the individual chaos, and still less in the anthropomorphisation 
of the inhuman necessities that provoke the chaos. What I want is the straws, 
flotsam, etc., names, dates, births and deaths, because that is all I can know […] 
Rationalism is the last form of animism. Whereas the pure incoherence of times 
and men and places is at least amusing.
59
 
 Here, the ‘rationalism’ that Beckett rebels against infects both ‘historical’ and ‘individual’ 
chaos. In ‘anthropomorphisation’, he seems to be referring to the will to impose a structure 
on events beyond the ‘incoherence of times and men and places’. In this respect, the 
rationalisation at work seems to be the imposition of some psychological structure. 
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‘Anthropomorphisation’ in this sense appears to be a humanising of ‘inhuman necessities’; 
apparently the events in which the ‘individual’ participates. To make these ‘inhuman 
necessities’ mean something is to impose a mentalising structure on events, connecting 
times and places through an agent with the aim of making them cohere. In this respect, a 
rationalising impulse appears to be similar to the psychologising habit of reading. In both 
of these structures, the agent – or the imposition of agency – is crucial as a focus of the 
textual action.  
What emerges from these arguments is a concern, more or less explicit, with the way in 
which a reader approaches the text. For Beckett to abstract from literary convention, and 
for this to have an effect on the way in which he is read, the reader must expect certain 
things and harbour particular heuristic strategies when they read. This, as Casanova 
suggests, is particularly enmeshed with the ways in which character is constructed in a 
text. As I suggested in Chapter One, the interpretation of character might be elucidated 
with an emphasis on how we approach intentional action in our everyday lives. At least, 
authors seem to capitalise on folk notions of what it is to act intentionally in the way in 
which they produce characters. The inward turn in Beckett’s writing – what Iser recognises 
as a focus on the ‘processes of interpretation’ – is also a turn towards questions of action 
and agency. This appears paradoxical, but only because of the textual assumptions 
involved in the word ‘interpretation’. Interpretation in this case can also mean self-
interpretation, and the introspective focus of an agent attempting to understand their own 
actions within the phenomenology of their agency. However, as I have highlighted above, 
aberrant neurological processes, unconscious control of higher-order mechanisms, and 
philosophical scepticism all disrupt the close alignment between action and agential 
control. The philosophical treatment of these questions can help to elucidate what 
structures are under discussion in the description of agency. If the everyday construction of 
agency is closely tied to the construction of fictional characters, then it follows that the 
philosophical treatment of self-awareness can illuminate what structures are at work in 
characterisation. As an extra point of contact, the way in which philosophical argument 
deconstructs the concept of agency has uncanny resonance with Beckett’s examinations. In 
turn, this crossover reveals the way in which Beckett abstracts his characters. 
  
 
104 
 
 Self-Knowledge and Scepticism 
The cluster of problems relating to self-knowledge, as outlined above, seem particularly 
pertinent to Beckett’s How It Is. This is not just because Beckett’s readings seem to show a 
direct interest in problems of cognition and action, but because the narrative involutions of 
his text deserve direct analysis as explorations of the explanatory gap between mind and 
body. In How It Is, Beckett seems to be capitalising on a dualistic model. However, this 
does not appear to be a separation that entails transparent self-consciousness, as it does in 
the Cartesian model. Instead, it seems to poise the fallibility of self-knowledge against the 
expectation of introspective access; dualism appears as the default position, and is 
overturned and complicated by the prosaic, epistemic, and psychological machinations of 
the text. How It Is opens as follows: 
how it was I quote before Pim with Pim after Pim how it is three parts I say it as I 
hear it 
voice once without quaqua on all sides then in me when the panting stops tell me 
again finish telling me invocation 
past moments old dreams back again or fresh like those that pass or things things 
always and memories I say them as I hear them murmur them in the mud
60
 
The protagonist’s voice repeatedly self-qualifies, moving from the deferral of ‘I quote’ to 
the mock-defence, ‘I say it as I hear it’. The second passage takes the passage of speech, 
‘voice once’, as first external then internal; ‘in me’. This seems to reverse action and 
cognition, so that the protagonist first speaks and then thinks. However, this is a tentative 
conclusion which is ridiculed by the ‘invocation’, ‘tell me again finish telling me’, which 
pushes this already counterintuitive interpretation to untenability by hyperbolising the 
narrator’s ability to talk to himself. The third passage repeats the reversal of the first 
passage in the refrain ‘I say them as I hear them’, though here the cognitive shift that it 
might signify is less clearly defined. Instead, the narrator’s speech is returned to a 
framework which entangles memory and narration. Although this link appears simpler 
than the oblique, or even arbitrary, distinctions between internal and external ‘voice’ 
above, the alignment of memory and action tentatively distinguishes a cluster of given 
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introspective attitudes that are set apart from the confusions of perception and knowledge. 
Because the idea of ‘old dreams’ returning has a figurative aspect, ‘I say them as I hear 
them’ can be taken less literally in this context, and refer simply to the mental experience 
of recall. The memories surface in the mind and are murmured, both restablishing a 
mental-physical chain of causation, and returning the speaker to apparently safe self-
knowledge. The entanglement of memory in the narration means that when a third-person 
position is adopted, it is not always clear if it refers to a retrospective, and hence 
temporally-external, self-view, or a present-tense exteriorised self-view. The distinction 
here is not arbitrary, but seems to refer implicitly to different modes of self-knowledge; 
‘special’ introspective knowledge, or quasi-exteriorised self-perception, which further 
point to academic vacillations over the materialist or empiricist rewritings of automatic 
self-knowledge.  
Temporal slippages in the narration, which are rooted in the autodiegetic retrospective 
narration, help to merge these two concepts, though an attempt at total disambiguation 
would simplify the cognitive characterisation at play. The text begins by mapping the 
complications of the mental-physical divide through the cyclical action of thought-speech-
sense-thought. Quickly, though, this pattern comes to define the narrator’s relationship to 
his own body on a larger scale. At points, the sensory observation of his own body 
becomes the means for comprehending his own mental processes, establishing a pattern 
that seems either to signal a reverse dualism, a materialist approach to understanding 
himself without special introspection, or a cognitive spectrum between non-conscious and 
conscious action, in which he is distinguishing different types of action based on its level 
of automatism and concurrent distance from his conscious awareness of control. The 
protagonist observes his body for insights into his mental states, making the process of 
description one of interpretation:  
ten yards fifteen yards semi-side left right leg right arm push pull flat on face 
imprecations no sound semi-side right left leg left arm push pull flat on face 
imprecations no sound not an iota to be changed in this description
61
   
The mechanised description of action charts dissociation between the narratorial voice and 
its body. As seems to be implicit in the ‘description’ of action, the narration does not 
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simply chart this sense of estrangement; the reflection that is inherent in narration is itself 
part of this estrangement. The reflective split is also written into a temporal disjunct 
between the passages in which action is narrated in the present tense, and other passages in 
which the tripartite structure of the text, and hence the retrospective character of the 
narration, is directly addressed: 
and if ever mute laugh I wake forthwith catastrophe Pim and end of part one 
leaving only part two leaving only part three and last
62
 
The reflective dissociation between the thinking mind and the acting body is also played 
out in the repetitive structure of the actions. These repetitions are textual, but seem to 
emerge as a way of accurately describing the repetitions of the narrator’s body; ‘not an iota 
to be changed in this description’ is both a claim to accuracy – the claim that the 
description should be believed despite its repetitions – and indicative of the effort that goes 
into describing. Another example of this occurs soon after, though in this instance the 
distinctions between thinking, acting, and describing, are more pronounced: 
I close my eyes the same old two and see me head up rick in the neck hand tense in 
the mud something wrong there breath caught it lasts I last like that a moment until 
the quiver of the lower face signifying I am saying have succeeded in saying 
something to myself
63
  
The description comes after the action. However, in this case, the description is also the 
thought itself, and the narrator is finding out about himself by reading his own actions at a 
remove. The final phrase, ‘I am saying have succeeded in saying something to myself’, 
would look like the start of an intentionality loop, in which the agent comes to understand 
and eventually own his own actions through self-observation. However, this loop is not 
constructive; the ability to say ‘have succeeded in saying something to myself’ is 
predicated on ‘I am saying’, and ‘I am saying’ is equally validated by the retrospective 
intentions that are implied by ‘have succeeded in saying something to myself’. Rather than 
settling with this minimum of logician’s self-knowledge, the text moves on with an 
acknowledgement of reality: ‘what can one say to oneself possibly say at such a time’.64    
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Throughout the text, these studies of agency are intimately connected to questions of 
epistemology. At the close of the text, this connection becomes most explicit, when the 
splitting scepticism that infects the narrator’s self-knowledge expands to the brink of larger 
questions about knowledge per se. The turning point occurs when the text moves from the 
repetitive questioning that characterises the narrator’s relationship to himself and his voice, 
to a disaffirmation of this questioning strategy in general:  
in the familiar form of question I am said to ask myself and answers I am said to 
give myself however unlikely that may appear last scraps very last when the 
panting stops last murmurs very last however unlikely that may appear 
if all that all that yes if all that is not how shall I say no answer if all that is not 
false yes
65
 
This logic is twisted into a negative affirmation that moves from textual certainty to a 
jumble of propositional and conditional claims, through which denial asserts itself with 
wavering certainty, and with unclear reach. ‘All that’ is unspecific enough to refer to the 
whole of the preceding text, the ‘familiar form’ of self-questioning that has been 
throughout the text, or to a hidden, but specific, meaning of the ‘familiar form of question’ 
as it appears just in that preceding passage. Even the weakest of these claims is bolstered 
by more strident statements elsewhere in the text:  
you may say yes and you may say no it depends on what you hear 
it’s no I’m sorry no one here knows anyone either personally or otherwise it’s the 
no that turns up I murmur it 
and no again I’m sorry again no one here knows himself it’s the place without 
knowledge whence no doubt its peerlessness
66
     
Here, the focus is still on wavering self-knowledge, rather than knowledge per se. 
However, the explicit sceptical claim does eventually come:  
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all these calculations yes explanations yes the whole story from beginning to end 
yes completely false yes 
that wasn’t how it was no not at all no how then no answer how was it then no 
answer HOW WAS IT screams good
67
  
Even in these consecutive passages, the view shifts between the rejection of textual 
veracity from an apparent position of textual authority, to a vexed unbalancing of that 
authority. However, there is a basic asymmetry in both of these positions; in the first, the 
narrator has knowledge that we do not have, in the second, the narrator does not have this 
knowledge, but implies his authority to recognise that knowledge if he did have it. From 
the position of the narrator this is an uncertain sceptical claim because he recognises the 
possibility of knowledge.
68
 From the position of the reader, however, this is an absolute 
sceptical possibility insofar as we cannot validate the ability of the narrator to recognise or 
explain the truth, nor can we imagine what would constitute the truth. The distinction, 
then, is one between (the possibility) of introspective self-knowledge, and (the 
impossibility) of knowledge of other minds. When framed as a general problem of the text, 
the narrator’s epistemological complexes regarding his own narrative have to be seen as 
contiguous with his slippery grasp on his own actions and sense of agency. This sceptical 
reflection is a magnification of the previous agential problems encountered in the text; the 
narrator does not just not know his movements, but is also unable to interpret them, or to 
remember how he originally interpreted them.  
Knowledge and agency are not often treated as part of a single problem. Rather, the 
analytic approach has generally rooted epistemology in the perceptive relationship 
between an agent and an object. Conversely, the question of action is usually focussed 
around an analysis of the conditions needed for free action which find coherence between 
metaphysical logic and the agentive experience. The separation of knowledge and action in 
this way has produced two distinct methods of enquiry. Moving away from Beckett for a 
moment, it is worth recognising how the link between the two has been treated by two 
philosophers who have approached the parallel; Arthur C. Danto and Robert Nozick. Both 
of these accounts recognise the similar, though asymmetrical, structures of the problems of 
knowledge and action; one problem appears to reverse the conditions of the other. For 
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Nozick, the issue is one of causality and the relation between the individual and external 
conditions: 
[Where] it does hold, when a belief is caused appropriately by the fact, that 
connection appears desirable and plausibly is held to constitute knowledge. 
In contrast, we strongly feel that the causal determination of action threatens 
responsibility and is undesirable. It is puzzling that what is desirable for belief, 
perhaps even necessary for knowledge, is threatening for action.
69
 
For Danto, the distinction seems to operate under similar assumptions. His distinction 
between knowledge and action takes the form of abstraction, in his stylised and bizarrely 
gendered archetypes of ‘the man of action and the man of thought’.70 Though a 
contrivance, this separation points to an important logical distinction between action as 
that which produces truth, and knowledge as that which interprets truth:   
If the world is a fait accompli, our sole option is to interpret it correctly, to find out 
what is the case. If we can change the world, however, it is not a fait accompli, and 
to attempt merely to interpret it is foredoomed to failure. We can only know the 
truth when it has been made.
71
 
What we might take from Danto’s opposition of knowledge and action is the idea that they 
represent different responses to the world, and that those responses are in balance. 
Retreating from action in order to understand the world is untenable, just as action without 
understanding is self-limiting. These separate claims might be consolidated as a 
representation of the complex balance between knowing and not-knowing in action. If the 
demand was for complete knowledge, we would never act. But, as in the psychological 
literature, this also means that we cannot know completely, and cannot know our actions 
completely. With circularity, though perhaps more clarity, the logical distinction between 
action and knowledge points back to the difficulty of characterising the balance between 
the incompleteness of knowledge and the simultaneous apparent transparency of action.  
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The poles of action and knowledge explicitly distinguish what is already present in How It 
Is in the vacillations between the acting subject and the thinking subject; the collapse of 
both, or the resuscitation of one without the other: 
Did he think did we think just enough to speak enough to hear not even comma a 
mouth an ear sly old pair glued together take away the rest put them in a jar there to 
end if it has an end the monologue
72
  
This passage pursues the progress from thinking, to speaking and hearing. It then voices 
the possibility of removing thought from this loop, and directly linking action and 
sensation with ‘a mouth an ear sly old pair glued together’. The term ‘monologue’ 
ironically reflects on this possibility by reaffirming the common-sense link between 
thought and speech. 
At the close of the text, where these theoretical musings are more explicitly rooted to the 
experience of interpretation, the split between action and knowledge is set up as logical 
choice for the reader. The reflective complication – ‘all these calculations yes explanations 
yes the whole story from beginning to end yes completely false yes’ – is both a sceptical 
challenge to disambiguate the text, and a claim that is rooted in indissoluble ambiguity. 
Insofar as it is a reflective challenge, a reading that attempts logical clarity might return to 
the preceding claims of the text in order to balance the apparently competing demands of 
action and knowledge. One reading might reject the epistemological claims of the 
narrative, and in doing so also reject the dismantlement of action that constitutes such a 
large part of the text. Alternately, the rejection of action might be maintained in parallel 
with faith in the narratorial voice, prioritising memory and word, like Danto’s ‘thinking 
man’.  
Returning to the text (or to life) provides a messier answer: 
before Pim long before with Pim vast tracts of time kinds of thoughts same family 
divers doubts emotions too yes emotions some with tears yes tears motions too and 
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movements both parts and whole as when he sets out to seek out all of him sets out 
to seek out the true home
73
  
Here, from the beginning of Part 3, doubt appears, not as a distinct condition that infects 
the text univocally, but as a flexible element of cognition that alternately shapes and is 
shaped by the demands of embodied action. Knowledge, emotion, action, desire and 
intention, here, might be subject to ‘divers doubts’, but they are also elements of a 
minimum narrative, to ‘seek out the true home’. This is the apparent goal of the 
protagonists, but receives no further explanation. As such, it appears to simply capitalise 
on the readerly assumption that the ‘true home’ is the appropriate goal for a search. When 
this is reflected back against the stronger sceptical claim at the close of the text, it is hard 
to maintain the strong thesis as a distinct and distinctly powerful revisionary demand, as it 
is implicated as part of a text that has continuously demanded practices of revision and 
plastic comprehension from its readers. Viewed as part of the text, rather than as a 
reflection on the truth-value of the text, the final pages are better read as integrated, rather 
than destructive, scepticism. 
It should be emphasised that this position is maintained within the textual format. 
Beckett’s use of philosophical scepticism is not necessarily a way of reflecting on the 
world and the state of knowledge per se, but rather as a tool for abstracting the structures 
of knowledge within fiction that a reader usually relies upon to understand the narrative 
and the storyworld in which it is embedded. Stanley Cavell’s two stage process of 
scepticism seems particularly suited to the form of epistemological uncertainty as it is 
embedded in literature. The first process recognises the value of destructive questioning as 
a way of tying our experience of the world to our self-knowledge:   
[Scepticism] presses the aim of reason itself, to know objectively without stint; to 
penetrate reality itself. It insinuates that there are grounds for doubt that there is no 
good reason – no intellectually respectable reason – we do not ordinarily raise. It 
throws us back upon ourselves, to assess ourselves as knowers.
74
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Although the value of this mode of questioning in the real world has been directly 
contested
75
 the claim transfers neatly to the reader’s experience if the assessment of 
‘ourselves as knowers’ becomes the assessment of our relation to the claims which are put 
forward by a literary text. Texts play on the position of the reader to assess the information 
released through narration. How It Is is an extreme example of this. The second move that 
Cavell makes is also relevant to the literary context. He suggests that the introspective turn 
that scepticism produces also entails recognition that the demands of this position cannot 
be met, that we are incapable of meeting them:  
In the grip of its insight, we should be grateful for whatever consolation can be 
derived from the interpretation of ourselves that skepticism thereupon provides us 
with: we know “for practical purposes”76  
Rather than making claims about the way in which philosophy interacts with the way in 
which we live our lives, Cavell’s second claim can be utilised as a way of thinking about 
the way in which a reader balances the epistemologically unsecure claims of the text with 
the pragmatics of reading. It might be the case that a reading of How It Is can only be 
constructed from a number of abstract scenes, but this occurs as part of a narrative 
approach that moves through the text, attempting to piece together the sense and structure 
of what the book is saying. This latter approach is not entirely blocked, but courted at 
points. This is evident in the balance in the narration between points – like the projected 
journey to ‘seek out the true home’ – which develop graspable narrative concepts, and the 
sceptical refutations, which attempt to undermine these concepts. The two together – 
abstraction and convention – are not simply in conflict, but are part of an experimental 
technique in which abstraction works in relation to specific features of literary writing. In 
the case of the scepticism outlined here, the literary feature at issue is the way in which the 
narrator makes truth claims for the purposes of narrative development.        
The sceptical position in How It Is, then, appears not to be designed as a way of reflecting 
a philosophical problem back onto the world. However, the philosophical models still have 
relevance in relation to Beckett’s text as tools for recognising the performance of 
abstraction. The above claims about scepticism within How It Is emphasise the way in 
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which the narration undermines the truth of its claims; the problem of agency in the text 
collapsed into a reading of narrative truth. However, just as the ‘divers doubts’ of the 
narrator are subordinated to its ‘movements’, the sceptical claims of the narrative should 
be read, not as an autonomous feature of the narration, but as part of the wider context of 
agency. The abstractions of narrative truth are part of the broader abstraction of character. 
Further, the two are often inextricable as the problem of readerly interpretation is not 
confined to the details of retrospective narration, but to the nature of the way in which the 
narrator narrates himself. In this respect, the introspective details of the text that I outlined 
above are not just philosophical problems of introspection filtered through a character, but 
are readerly problems about how to interpret a character constructed from such insights.  
 Agency and Abstraction 
If Beckett is enacting an abstraction of character, then it must be conducted against a norm 
of characterisation which is mirrored by a norm of character interpretation. As I discussed 
in Chapter One, some critics have suggested that the reader’s attitude toward fictional 
characters is folk psychological. In the strong version of this model, which I argued 
against, the folk psychological attitude towards characters consists of understanding 
character intention through the inference of beliefs and desires. I rejected the idea that the 
inference of beliefs and desires was a natural state of narrative comprehension, but 
retained the idea that we read characters according to intentional frameworks. In this, I am 
in accord with Paisley Livingston, who, without making specific folk psychological 
claims, suggests the following: 
There is good reason to believe that in all discourses where there is any form of 
psychological verisimilitude […], making sense of the discourse requires, at the 
very least, that the reader take some fairly long detours through an understanding 
of what the characters are doing qua intentional agents (albeit fictional ones).
77
  
Because the literariness of the text regulates the way in which information is delivered, 
reading the intentions of characters is always subject to technical caveats. However, it 
seems right to suggest that characters, insofar as their construction generally adheres to 
norms of psychological expression, are subject to at least minimal folk psychological 
claims. These might not be claims regarding universal structures through which characters 
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are understood, but rather the softer suggestion that: when we read, we are ready to read 
for motives and intentions. This claim is not necessarily opposed to more expansive claims 
about the reactive,
78
 simulative,
79
 or ‘co-cogniz[ing]’ attitudes which might be involved 
when we encounter ‘trains of thought assigned to dramatis personae’.80 However, as a 
minimal claim, it points to a defendable normative attitude which conditions the 
relationship between reader and character.  
Even if this attitude does not make broad claims about folk psychological textual 
comprehension, some elements of FP theory can be used to elucidate its workings. Even a 
minimal concept of intentional agency works within norms of rationality. This idea of 
rationality doesn’t have to make a strong claim, but can simply refer to a moderated 
holism,
81
 which interprets an action within a network of individual and social norms of 
action. This also implies a coherence principle insofar as the interpretation attempts to 
match the inference with this surrounding framework. Adam Morton describes this as 
follows: 
[A] large part of the gap [of behavioural interpretation] is also filled by restricting 
the choice of possible actions. Given the situation of the person and others they are 
interacting with, you consider only actions that your folk psychology tells you 
someone with that kind of motive in that kind of (social) situation would consider. 
You use normal solutions to contain holism; individual rationality leads to 
predictions only within the social bounds on intelligibility.
82
 
The coherence principle, though this further link is only implied in Morton’s description, 
suggests that a successful interpretation needs the agent under scrutiny to ‘[behave] 
appropriately given [their] needs and purposes, i.e. rationally’.83  
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How It Is works against this framework in a number of ways. Even if parts of the text 
appear to suggest a kind of quest narrative, this information is not developed in a way 
which is suggestive of the agent’s relation to this quest; his motives, and the assumption 
that the quest is fulfilling – in the language of philosophy – his ‘needs and purposes’. This 
has clear echoes of the planning structures explored in Chapter One. Again, it is the goal 
structure of the character which is the intentionalist device. Here though, a clear plan is 
omitted: 
assuming one prefers the order here proposed namely one the journey two the 
couple three the abandon to that to those to be obtained by starting with the 
abandon and ending with the journey by way of the couple or by starting with the 
couple and ending with the 
with the couple 
by way of the abandon 
or of the journey
84
  
Insofar as the motive, in the interpretive schema, is supposed to give meaning about the 
agent’s course of action, it should be embedded within a broader social framework. This, 
of course, is also eroded in How It Is, as the setting, ‘in the dark the mud’,85 does not 
appear to interact with the action in a way which describes the action. In addition, the 
regulative dimension of the character’s action – what apparently endorses the motives of 
the narrator – is not itself transparent: 
a sack no doing without a sack without food when you journey as we have seen 
should have seen part one no doing without them it’s regulated thus we’re 
regulated thus
86
 
Like the projected end, ‘the true home’, here the journeying structure is invoked to justify 
sub-actions which fall under the main goal. Carrying a sack of food is not just a pragmatic 
action, but is parodied in its relation to the overall goal-structure of the text. Rather than 
being a rational or pragmatic choice, the carrying of food is ‘regulated’. Here the social 
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regulations of planning, goals, and transparent action, are parodied in their elevation to 
structured regulations of the storyworld. This textual misdirection suggests structure and 
regulation, and in doing so suggests transparency. Transparency in this context would be 
mimetic clarity or storyworld explanation, which would justify the structures within which 
action takes place, and therefore the actions themselves. This is withheld. The structure of 
rationalisation between goal and action is suggested, and then occluded by the lack of 
substance and explanation behind the ‘regulations’.   
This shifting framework limits the effectiveness of a mentalising reading which might 
attempt to characterise the interpretation of the narrator as distinct from the setting within 
which he operates. In the real world, because mindreading is based on regulative norms of 
behaviour within specific frames of social convention, behaviour which is not explainable 
according to these means might be viewed as irrational: 
We can […] show considerable interpretative ingenuity when called upon to do so; 
and this may require drawing upon fairly generalized knowledge about the 
psychological springs of human behaviour in addition to whatever particular 
knowledge we may have of individual peculiarities. […] [However], if these 
moments become too frequent, we abandon our interpretive efforts altogether, 
adopting an ‘objective’ stance towards those who seem generally unresponsive to 
folk psychological norms. We judge such individuals to be: ‘eccentric’, ‘irrational’, 
‘disordered’, ‘mad’, ‘compelled’, ‘discursively unreachable.87 
This description is not entirely transferable. Because the structure of the storyworld is not 
graspable, the norms which might frame the narrator’s action are not there; the setting is 
not stable enough to characterise the narrator as simply transgressing normative codes of 
action. The narrative borders on irrationality by consistently eluding the comprehension of 
the reader who is constantly attempting to build narrative sense out of discrete actions and 
descriptions. Beckett courts the effort of comprehension by having the action of the text 
support itself through references to structures which are external to the characters. This 
movement is self-referential as it consistently works within the paradigm tension between 
abstraction and readerly interpretation: 
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at the instant Pim leaves me and goes towards the other Bem leaves the other and 
comes towards me I place myself at my point of view migration of slime-worms 
then or tailed latrinal scissiparous frenzy days of great gaiety 
[…] 
or it said in reality now Bem now Bom through carelessness or inadvertence not 
realizing that it varied I personify it it personifies itself
88
 
Here the narrator moves between the self-mentalising ‘point of view’, which is then 
qualified by the descriptive allusion to the abstract (in this context, synonymous with non-
mentalised) ‘slime-worms’, or the bacterial ‘latrinal scissiparous’. The language then turns 
back against these abstractions with the claim, mentalising in both its emotive and 
retrospective character, of ‘frenzy days of great gaiety’. Later on that page, the inability to 
distinguish between ‘Bem now Bom’ points to the structural obliquities of the darkened 
storyworld. However, these are mitigated by the individuating claim that ‘I personify it’. 
‘[I]t personifies itself’, instead of admitting symmetry between the interlocutors, keeps the 
personification of the narrator closed. In doing so, it ironises the reader’s personification of 
the characters, and dialogues with the other points of more explicit introspective 
abstraction, as described above.    
The personification of the narrator’s interlocutors is part of a broader dynamic between 
characters which foregrounds and obscures the communicatory relationship. The sadistic 
dynamic between the narrator and Pim is introduced as a communicatory tool:  
my part who but for me he would never Pim we’re talking of Pim never be but for 
me anything but a dumb limp lump flat for ever in the mud but I’ll quicken him 
you wait and see and how I can efface myself behind my creature when the fit 
takes me now my nails.
89
  
At this point, the communicative intention is clear. The narrator sets to work on Pim with 
his nails because he attempts to enliven him and elicit a bodily response that can be read. 
Without the nails, Pim would be a ‘dumb limp lump’, uncommunicative both in voice and 
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body. Beckett builds on the minimal response elicited by the narrator’s nails to produce the 
sparse conditions needed to invite psycho-narrative readings: 
in the dark the mud my head against his my side glued to his my right arm round 
his shoulders his cries have ceased we lie thus a good moment they are good 
moments 
how long thus without motion or sound of any kind were it but of breath vast 
stretch of time under my arm now and then a deeper breath heaves him lowly up 
leaves him at last sets him slowly down others would say a sigh
90
    
Mentalising and narrative practices seem separable by virtue of narrative lack. 
Psychological reading is invited as a way of filling in the gaps and supplementing the lack 
of action. This seems to be courted by the narration, which interposes language of potential 
emotional significance: ‘good moments’ and an accompanying ‘sigh’. These vague 
communications are recognised by the narrator, who both acknowledges them and deflates 
their significance. The sigh is what ‘others would say a sigh’91 and their dysfunctional 
relationship is set against what the narrator seems to recognise as a norm of meaningful 
body language: 
thus our life in common we begin it thus I do not say it is not said as others at the 
end of theirs clinging almost to each other I never saw any it seems never any such 
but even beasts observe each other I saw some once it seems and they observing 
each other let him understand who has a wish to I have none
92
      
The above excerpts intermittently interact with communicatory processes; these appear as 
direct (though possibly violent) actions, actions which are associated with specific mental 
states (such as sighing), and the act of action interpretation itself (‘even beasts observe 
each other’).  By touching on these mechanisms, the text directly engages with the idea 
that character interpretation is psychologised, and stages this psychologisation through the 
way in which the characters interact. Like the areas of How It Is which stage interpretive 
obstacles through a focus on single character introspection, the communicatory passages 
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are also complicated by an excess of material detail. Here, the narrator is subject to 
familiar problems of self-interpretation: 
then of a sudden like all that starts starts again no knowing set forth forth again ten 
yard fifteen yards right leg right arm push pull a few images patches of blue a few 
words no sound cling to species a few sardines yawn of mud burst the sack drivel 
on drone on in a word the old road
93
 
Set when the (broadly) communicatory relationship has been established with Pim, now 
the narrator’s lack of bodily coherence does not only feed into his self-description, but 
interacts with the way in which communication itself is understood in the text. Abstracting 
the narrator’s understanding of his own movements has corollary effects on the way in 
which we understand his communications with Pim, insofar as there is dissonance between 
the idea that an agent can have communicatory intentions and comprehend the actions of 
others without access to his own mental states. The play between psychologisation and 
abstraction is also paralleled in the journeys, which both go ‘nowhere’ but also need 
‘correction’, and the relationships which are simultaneously symbolic and meaningless. 
When another agent is found, ‘cleave to him give him a name train him up bloody him all 
over with Roman capitals gorge on his fables’.94 Although ‘give him a name train him up’ 
doesn’t necessarily imply a mentalising attitude, it is hard to reconcile an entirely 
schematic image of the interlocutor with the idea that he is able to recount fables. As I 
have emphasised throughout this section, stories tend to be structured and interpreted by 
mentalising attitudes towards characters. If this is the case, then the idea of telling a story 
itself implies some psychologising ability which reflects the psychological capabilities of 
the story-teller himself. Further reflection on the capacities of other characters in the 
storyworld comes from the structural conditions of the narrator’s journeys. The 
communicative situation, though in this case imposed by the narrator upon his victim, is 
revealed elsewhere to be a repeating pattern of ‘unwitting […] justice’ in which couples 
are grouped and disbanded with varying dynamics of control and submission: 
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that he was necessarily that ancient other whom it said I had suffered then forsaken 
to go towards Pim as Pim me suffered then forsaken to go towards his other
95
  
In this way, the narrator’s communications are not individual, but are the implied 
conditions of the storyworld in general. Because of this, the intentional nature of his 
actions becomes particularly important as anecdotal evidence for the mental capacities of 
the other inhabitants of the mud. The attitudes expressed by the narrator through his 
relationship are reflexive insofar as his use of the Roman capitals appears to be symbolic – 
either as capital letters, or in their other symbolic use as numerals – of an underlying code 
which the markings represent. The narrator’s use of this code suggests that he does not 
only act, but because his marks are symbolic, he acts for reasons. The use of symbols 
implies that there are intentions behind the actions. In addition, the very act of narration 
gives the events a specific intentional quality insofar as we assume that the narrator 
recounts his own actions because those actions are largely intentional. It is part of the 
communicatory quality of self-description that the content of action-descriptions relates to 
intentional structures. Without this, action-descriptions would not describe a mental 
framework of reasons, and as such would be largely content-free in relation to a specific 
agent.
96
 Because of the structural ‘justice’ of the storyworld, there is a suggestion that the 
narrator’s mental capabilities are the same as those of his interlocutors, even if this isn’t 
explicit in the events he describes. 
This idea is manifest at points in the narrator’s use of mentalising discourse in his 
descriptions of the other characters. While some passages, as above, suggest a mechanised 
approach, others are distinctly psychologising: 
but this man is no fool he must say to himself I would if I were he what does he 
require of me or better still what is required of me that I am tormented thus and the 
answer sparsim little by vast tracts of time 
not that I should cry that is evident since when I do I am punished instanter 
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sadism pure and simple no since I may not cry
97
   
Here again, the text’s experimentalism appears through the play between behaviour 
described as intentional and claims of meaninglessness. Like the passages analysed above, 
the narrator again seems to be describing his method of training the other agent, as the 
content of this ventriloquizing passage describes a punishment-based learning curve. The 
different quality of this passage, in comparison to the earlier schematic descriptions, is that 
here the method of training is founded upon the premise that the other agent can reason. 
Because of this, the learned behaviour does not come about simply through stimulus and 
response, but is reasoned action in reply to a situation in which he is unable to have an 
active part. The victim cannot respond in a way that interacts with the narrator’s reasons 
because the motives themselves are unclear; it is ‘sadism pure and simple’. At this point, 
the abstracting technique appears through the mentalising discourse refracted through the 
narration. This stages the victim’s interpretive efforts – which emerge from an assumption 
that motives and intentions reinforce actions – against the narrator’s obscuration of his 
actions through the removal of intentional structures.    
Intention in Beckett has been sparsely commented upon in Beckett studies, though Maude 
briefly utilises Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s definition of the concept. Merleau-Ponty suggests 
that action can be ‘purposive without the agent entertaining a purpose’, a definition which 
contrasts with the philosophers used in this and the previous chapter who largely tie 
intention to a kind of mentalising attitude toward action.
98
 Despite this difference, in 
Maude’s application of Merleau-Ponty’s version of intention to Beckett, she seems to 
touch upon similar themes to those addressed above: ‘[in] Beckett […] the concept of 
intentionality is problematized. Things may appeal to the characters, but seldom in their 
expected sense’.99 Rather than adhering to plans, Beckett’s characters apparently do things 
‘for no apparent reason at all’.100 This, Maude suggests, is particularly evident in the 
journeys of Beckett’s characters, which appear to take the form of a quest, but conclude 
with no clear goal: 
The quest, deprived of a reachable goal, becomes devoid of meaning, destructive 
even, ultimately producing only physical deterioration; to go somewhere in these 
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quests is always to end up somewhere else than planned […] Intentionality and 
teleology are interrogated, frustrated and ultimately toyed with.
101
   
In this line of argument, Maude suggests that Beckett writes a kind of ‘negative 
intentionality’ in which character movements are better described as ‘spontaneous 
impulse’ than directional because ‘[instead] of moving towards objects, Beckett’s 
characters as often as not move away from them’.102   
Although Maude correctly notes the textual situations in which intentionality is present, 
her claim of ‘negative intentionality’ moves the discussion away from the important 
textual role that intention and action play in their common-sense link to mental states. 
Psychologising discourse, through reasons, intentions, desires and other descriptive 
motivational states, is vital to the way in which textual action is understood in relation to 
characters. As such, it has a particular role in the construction of character. As I have tried 
to make clear above, Beckett obscures these forms of discourse. It is important to note that 
he does not erase mental description, both in introspection and second-person 
interpretation. Rather, he untethers psychological descriptions from each other, creating 
coherence problems between different pictures of motivation which might be built up by 
the reader. In addition, he obscures the link between character and mental process. This 
occurs most distinctly in episodes in which the descriptions of bodily processes are 
exteriorised, because of the implicit rejection of introspective immediacy that this 
suggests. This has ramifications for the way in which action is understood in the text, 
because (at the points at which it is in play) it effectively severs action from an agent. In 
this way, introspective obscuration becomes an interpretive problem by suggesting that 
actions are not sources of evidential knowledge through which character can be 
constructed in the text. This claim appears again through the second-person interactions of 
the narrator, especially through the sadistic quasi-communications that occur between 
characters. At this point, action is not only subject to self-scrutiny, but becomes a question 
both of second-person interpretation and nested intentionality; how the narrator interprets 
the way in which he suspects his victim to understand his actions.  
Psychologising discourse is both deeply embedded in the structure of the text, and 
disrupted in order to obscure its role in the facilitation of character formation. What 
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emerges from these distinct points of disruption is a broad picture of the way in which 
psychologising discourse is commonly attached to character construction. If Beckett’s 
textual disruptions occur across episodes of self-description, second-person description, 
communication, action, knowledge, planning and goal achievement and attribution, then it 
becomes clear that psychologising discourse – the ‘anthropomorphisation’ that Beckett 
rails against – commonly ties these concepts and anchors them in character and narrative. 
Severing the ties between each concept while maintaining distinct elements of mentalising 
description creates play between interpretive effort and frustration which, I have 
suggested, is crucial to the way in which How It Is produces abstraction. The movements 
of How It Is do not operate as a coherent group of features, but pick up and disrupt broad 
elements of what we understand as agency. By appealing to and subverting a folk sense of 
the connections between action, introspection, communication and intention, Beckett is 
picking up on issues of selfhood which have been the questions of philosophical and 
psychological work through Descartes to contemporary experimentalism. The theoretical 
approach to agency attempts to tie our experience of agency to investigative insights in a 
coherent picture. Beckett capitalises on the same conceptions, but utilises them for a very 
different end.  
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Chapter Three 
Judgment and Agency: Vladimir Nabokov 
In the previous chapter, I described how Beckett’s writing reacts to the construction of 
character psychology in the novel. I suggested that his experimentalism can be seen as a 
specific attack on various forms of agency as they appear in the textual format, disrupting 
norms of coherence that often follow on from establishing characters within transparent 
frameworks of action and communication. Insofar as Beckett obscures the mechanisms of 
agency which build character, his experimentalism can be seen as anti-psychological. 
Alfred Appel took up a similar topic in his 1967 interview with Vladimir Nabokov. When 
asked if he thought that ‘Robbe-Grillet’s novels are as free of “psychology” as he claims’,1 
his interviewee suggested the following:   
Robbe-Grillet’s claims are preposterous. Those manifestos die with the dadas. His 
fiction is magnificently poetical and original, and the shifts of levels, the 
interpenetration of successive impressions and so forth belong of course to 
psychology – psychology at its best.2 
Here, Nabokov seems covertly to maintain a stance in favour of ‘psychology at its best’ 
through his praise of Robbe-Grillet. Through this phrase, he seems to be suggesting that 
impressions and descriptions in literature can give a sense of how minds work. This is 
clearly not opposed to literary experimentation, because the ‘shifts of levels’ and the 
‘interpenetration of successive impressions’ belong both to the poetic features of text and 
to the psychological merits of the work, as Nabokov reports them. Brian Boyd, in his 
characterisation of Nabokov as a psychological author clearly regards the comments on 
Robbe-Grillet’s textual psychologies as self-reflexive. Building the picture of Nabokov’s 
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psychological modes of description, Boyd aligns literary psychology with the imaginative 
construction of fictional minds. These, he suggests, can act both as triggers and exemplars: 
Literature aims to understand human minds only to the degree it seeks to move 
human minds. It may move readers’ minds, in part, by showing with new accuracy 
or vividness, or at least with fresh particulars, how fictional minds move, and by 
showing in new ways how freely readers’ minds can move, given the right 
prompts.
3
 
Boyd’s comments imply a reactive relationship between ‘reader’s minds’ and ‘fictional 
minds’, as if there must be a broad way in which fictional minds are understood, even if 
this process is dynamic enough to be elaborated upon by the ‘new accuracy or vividness’ 
that a particular author might bring to their fictive personalities. In this way, Boyd’s 
comments might be read in line with the idea developed in earlier chapters of the 
normative elements of our interaction with fiction.  
This description notwithstanding, there are still points which qualify the idea of Nabokov’s 
engagement with fictional psychology. For Alfred Appel, for example, the detachment of 
the Nabokovian narrator creates distance between the reader and the characters in the text. 
In this way, Appel suggests that the way in which characters are portrayed, the psychology 
of the characters, is subject to the style of narration. Nabokov’s stylised textual comedy is 
a way of creating this distance:  
By parodying the reader’s complete, self-indulgent identification with a character, 
which in its mindlessness limits consciousness, Nabokov is able to create the 
detachment necessary for a multi-form, spatial view of his novels.
4
 
The qualification that Appel is aiming at does not suggest that Nabokov rejects literary 
psychology. Instead, the rejection of a complete ‘identification’ between reader and 
character suggests a self-aware approach to characterisation which qualifies, rather than 
removes, the psychological access to literary minds. In his dispute with Edmund Wilson 
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over Eugene Onegin, Nabokov can be seen evidencing a position of this kind. Attacking 
Wilson, Nabokov articulates a stance toward character interpretation: 
Had he read my commentary with more attention he would have seen that I do not 
believe in any kind of ‘interpretation’ so that his or my ‘interpretation’ can be 
neither a failure nor a success. In other words, I do not believe in the old-fashioned, 
naïve, and musty method of human-interest criticism championed by Mr. Wilson 
that consists of removing the characters from an author’s imaginary world to the 
imaginary, but generally far less plausible, world of the critic who then proceeds to 
examine these displaced characters as if they were ‘real people.’5 
Here, Nabokov is not disputing characterisation, or even the idea of character psychology. 
Instead, his ire is directed specifically at a kind of criticism which seeks to remove 
characters from the fabric of the literary artifice, and then interpret them as autonomous 
objects, or as objects within a setting determined by the critic. In this, there is a 
qualification of character psychology. Taken with his comments on Robbe-Grillet, 
Nabokov can be seen to recognise the link between characterisation and psychology, but 
only insofar as characterisation per se must take part within the context of a fictional work. 
Character psychology too, then, is deeply embedded in the structure through which it is 
articulated. Layered into these qualifications remains the idea of a ‘psychology’ insofar as 
the character still needs to reflect the norms and experiences through which we experience 
the mind. In his rejection of the ‘real people’ view of the novel, he is not dismissing the 
idea that character construction can reflect insights into the mind, but rather the critic who 
tries to impose these insights after first dissociating the character from their artistic context 
within the text.  
This chapter focuses on Nabokov’s novel Pale Fire, a text with particularly prominent 
formal features. Because of this, the responses to Pale Fire have often avoided fielding 
questions of character psychology through commentary on the overt structural features of 
the novel. Boyd, in his biography of Nabokov, goes to some length to explain how the 
psychological elements of Pale Fire are deeply connected to the structural relations 
between the characters. A refractive characterisation develops Kinbote and John Shade 
through their own textual artefacts – Kinbote’s Introduction and Commentary, and Shade’s 
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poem, ‘Pale Fire’ – and through the anecdotal evidence which emerges in the play between 
them. For Boyd, the deep structural artifice of the novel does not detract from its being a 
picture of character psychology, but builds it up. Boyd’s analysis of the novel draws 
heavily on mentalising language to explain the dichotomy set up between the central 
protagonists, Shade and Kinbote: 
Kinbote’s commentary yields to the lurch of his obsessions, and ranges from comic 
self-satisfaction […] to helpless panic […]. Nabokov contrasts Shade’s self-control 
and Kinbote’s emotional riots, Shade’s love for Sybil and Kinbote’s desperate 
loneliness, Shade’s kindness and sensitivity and Kinbote’s crazy selfishness. Shade 
embodies the imagination at its best […]; Kinbote’s deranged mind represents the 
imagination not as escapee but as jailer, herding everything he sees into the 
dungeon of his own crazy ego.
6
 
The ideas of formalist intricacies and psychological nuance, then, appear to be 
reconcilable. There is a strong critical tradition of viewing Nabokov as a game-playing 
formalist, especially in responses to Pale Fire. Since Mary McCarthy’s ‘Bolt from the 
Blue’, emphasis has been laid on game-like interactions in the structure of the novel; the 
symmetries and doublings which mimic the moves on a chess board:   
Chess is the perfect mirror-game, with the pieces drawn up confronting each other 
as in a looking-glass; moreover, castle, knight, and bishops have their twins as well 
as their opposite numbers.
7
 
The formal intricacies of Nabokov’s writing have often been echoed by a critical response 
with a strong aestheticist leaning. Despite this common approach, there have always been 
readings which have attempted to reconcile the formal elements of Nabokov’s work with 
broadly humanist concerns. Even in McCarthy’s early response, she suggestively picks out 
the ‘moral truth’ that is embedded within the novel’s games. Similarly, Robert Alter 
suggests a trajectory in which Nabokov’s development of formal play, the ‘artful designs 
in words’, is paralleled by an increasingly ‘poignant intensity of life’ in the characters.8 
                                                          
6
 Brian Boyd, Vladimir Nabokov: The American Years (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1991), p. 
435. 
7
 Mary McCarthy, ‘A Bolt from the Blue’, in The Writing on the Wall and other Literary Essays (London: 
Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1970), pp. 15–35 (p. 22). 
8
 Robert Alter, Partial Magic: The Novel as a Self-Conscious Genre (Berkeley, CA: University of California 
Press, 1975), p. 183. 
128 
 
Responding to what she viewed as a critical over-emphasis on Nabokov’s aestheticism, 
Ellen Pifer’s Nabokov and the Novel expands at book-length the vital interaction between 
the formalist structures of his novels and the ethical, humanist, and psychological elements 
which are embedded within those structures.
9
 More recently, Thomas Karshan has adeptly 
shown how Nabokov’s close interpretation of, and allusions to, the history of literary play 
provides layers of moral meaning in the characterisations of John Shade and Charles 
Kinbote in Pale Fire.
10
       
This chapter will explore Nabokov’s engagement with character psychology and its link 
with ethics in Pale Fire. I do this through three sections which explore the characters of 
Kinbote, Jack Grey and John Shade. These analyses have slightly different theoretical foci, 
but are all concerned with the ways in which Nabokov portrays the embedding of agency 
and action within normative structures of morality and judgment. The section on Kinbote 
takes the form of a long exegesis of a specific episode in the novel in which Kinbote puts 
forward the contentious claim that he attempted to block John Shade’s body from the 
bullet that killed him. The actual substance of the claim is not what is contentious, but 
rather the investment and emphasis that Kinbote puts on his act of failed heroism. This act 
has structural significance, because, as I will explore in detail below, the claim of heroism 
directly contradicts Kinbote’s underlying Zembla narrative. In relation to the 
representation of agency, Kinbote’s heroism has two threads of interest. Firstly, Kinbote 
uses the language of moral-value to frame his action. Morality is closely tied to 
intentionality insofar as judgment and responsibility is usually apportioned on condition of 
an agent acting voluntarily. This presents a separate problem of interpretation for 
Kinbote’s narrative because his heroism relies on a reading of his actions as spontaneous, a 
condition which is theoretically problematic in action theory. To explore the different 
factors and complications involved in Kinbote’s claim of heroism, I spend much of this 
section moving between different ways in which the interaction between morality and 
intention has been theorised. This begins with a discussion of the structural condition of 
the Principle of Alternate Possibilities and its role within action theory. From here, I move 
to philosophical attempts to describe intentionality within spontaneous action. These 
structural approaches give way to theories which have attempted to approach intention 
through morality, rather than as a precondition of morality. To illustrate this, I explore P.F. 
                                                          
9
 Ellen Pifer, Nabokov and the Novel (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980). 
10
 Thomas Karshan, ‘Pale Fire and the Genre of the Literary Game’, in Vladimir Nabokov and the Art of 
Play (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 195–232. 
129 
 
Strawson’s notion of reactive attitudes, and Bernard Spencer’s moral luck. It is through 
this systematic approach that I hope to elucidate the processes and structures which are at 
work in Kinbote’s claim. Through this I make clear the deep embedding of Kinbote’s self-
representation in structures of agency. 
The exploration of Kinbote’s heroism is a way of describing the ways in which Nabokov 
evokes an overbearing and subtly transgressive character portrait. This is in strong contrast 
with his portrayal of the assassin Jack Grey, which is the focus of the second part of this 
chapter. Here I build on the idea developed in Chapters One and Two, that readers 
approach fiction attempting to fulfil a set of broad coherence norms in relation to 
characterisation and in particular, the way in which actions are connected to the inference 
of motives. This approach aligns coherence and intention, which means that non-
intentional, sub-agential, or radically transgressive actions require different modes of 
literary portrayal. I explore the formal devices which Nabokov uses to present Jack Grey 
as a kind of non-agent, and its link with his portrayal of Kinbote. The final section of this 
chapter focuses on Nabokov’s portrayal of John Shade. Like Kinbote, Shade adopts the 
structures of morality as a way of positively coding his self-description. Whereas 
Kinbote’s moral agency is focussed around a specific action – a distinct physical event – 
Shade operates within the broader agential concepts of loss and control. These emerge 
through his poem in relation to the death of his daughter, and the idea of poetic control 
becomes a way of reframing his agency. I explore the similarities in structure between 
Shade’s ideas of aesthetic control, and the way in which morality is often framed by 
philosophers. Both of these models rely on the idea that a personal action is validated 
through its congruence with a framework of value. However, while a moral framework 
operates as a set of external conditions, Shade’s personal value system relies upon a 
circular process of self-validation. I explore this difference as a representation of the 
relation between action and autonomy in the book.       
 Kinbote’s Models of Agency 
As I have suggested in earlier chapters, the constitution of agency occurs, in part, through 
an understanding of how behaviour relates to thought structures. Nabokov’s Pale Fire 
brings a different emphasis to this discussion by raising questions of how moral judgment 
relates to agency, both through the ways in which judgment is implicit in some character 
actions, and how Nabokov uses specific characterisations within the novel to explore the 
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idea of morality as an aspect of the way in which actions and agency are understood, 
interpreted and reinterpreted by agents. This is the case both for first- and third-person 
understanding, characters interpreting themselves and characters interpreting each other. 
These broader philosophical problems are also closely entwined with the formal elements 
of the book, and act in tandem with Nabokov’s stylistic demands. Through the relationship 
of Kinbote and John Shade, in particular, Nabokov largely constructs a picture of the 
accretion of minor interpersonal transgressions; not moral issues as such, but social 
misfires and invasions of privacy. However, late in the novel – in the last moments of 
Shade’s life – Nabokov creates an intricacy of characterisation and formal bravura which 
offers a dissection of how agency is related to moral judgment. At this point, there is a 
potentially clear ethical position at stake because, in his recollections, Kinbote claims to 
have attempted, in an act of heroism, to bodily shield John Shade from the bullets that kill 
him.  
This event happens towards the end of Pale Fire, at which point Nabokov presents the 
reader with an unsolvable problem. This riddle does not appear to be just another one of 
the intra-referential games that structure the book, but concerns a specific point at which 
Kinbote’s story seems to break down in his telling of it. Immediately following the 
completion of the poem ‘Pale Fire’, John Shade is invited by Kinbote to share his finished 
work over ‘half a gallon of Tokay’ at the Goldsworth house, which Kinbote rents.11 
Crossing the road between their homes, Shade and Kinbote notice a caller at the 
Goldsworths’ house whom Kinbote first believes to be a door-knocking evangelical, but 
who is actually Gradus, the man that Kinbote (a disguised king, of course) claims has 
come to assassinate him. This case of misidentification provides the first of the 
equivocations which characterize the scene. Kinbote starts towards the caller and is ahead 
of Shade when Gradus opens fire. This spatial positioning leads to the main complication 
in the scene: whether Kinbote shields, or does not shield, John Shade from Gradus’s 
bullets. Kinbote gives a dramatic account:  
His first bullet ripped a sleeve button off my black blazer, another sang past my 
ear. It is piffle to assert that he aimed not at me (whom he had just seen in the 
library – let us be consistent, gentlemen, ours is a rational world after all), but at the 
gray-locked gentleman behind me. […] I instinctively backed, bellowing and 
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spreading my great strong arms […] in an effort to halt the advancing madman and 
shield John, whom I feared he might, quite accidentally, hit 
12
 
Kinbote also includes reports from his gardener and from Sybil Shade. The gardener was a 
witness, but Sybil arrives at the scene after the main events have played out: 
Shade’s widow found herself so deeply affected by the idea of my having “thrown 
myself” between the gunman and his target that during a scene I shall never forget, 
she cried out, stroking my hands: “There are things for which no recompense in 
this world or another is great enough”.13  
We have the distinct sense that Kinbote has misreported Sybil’s words and gestures. There 
is an uncomfortable dissonance in the way the grieving widow apparently cries out and 
strokes Kinbote’s hand, which is compounded by the deeply ambiguous use of the word 
‘recompense’. The positive context in which Kinbote uses the word seems to assume that 
Sybil wants to compensate him for his efforts, but this works against the more common 
usage of recompense as atonement for wrongdoing. In the latter, more likely, usage Sybil 
might be damning either Kinbote or Shade’s killer. However, in the context in which 
Kinbote places Sybil’s statement, she is ostensibly testifying to his goodness, and this 
bolsters his own claim that he spread his arms in order to ‘halt the advancing madman and 
shield John’.14 The question of Kinbote’s heroism seems inconsequential at first, but 
Sybil’s possible contestation places his intentions directly under critical focus.  
The gardener’s report, the only witness account of events, provides the clearest insight into 
the equivocation, as it juxtaposes two vitally related phenomena: 
My good gardener, when enthusiastically relating to everybody what he had seen, 
certainly erred in several respects – not so much perhaps in his exaggerated account 
of my “heroism” as in the assumption that Shade had been deliberately aimed at 15 
Mediated by Kinbote, the uneasy entanglement of his ‘heroism’ and the ‘assumption that 
Shade had been deliberately aimed at’ becomes clear: Kinbote’s heroism is not separate 
from, but actually predicated on the idea that the gunman was aiming at John Shade. 
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Without that, the claim becomes untenable; Kinbote could not have tried to shield Shade 
had he not thought that Shade was under fire. This has larger ramifications for our 
understanding of Kinbote because the will to shield Shade seems entirely at odds with his 
professed claim to Zemblan heritage. Kinbote could only step into the line of fire if he 
thought that Shade was the target, and if Kinbote believed Shade to be the target then he 
could not, in the moment of attack, have thought himself an ex-king worthy of 
assassination.  
This event is just one of many points in Pale Fire at which we see cracks in Kinbote’s 
Zembla-narrative. More interestingly, the scene offers an opportunity to analyse the 
fabrication by focussing on the ways in which Nabokov presents Kinbote’s intentional 
states. The action matrix is incommensurable, which means that both Kinbote’s action, and 
the reasons we might suggest for his action, are suspended and reduced to conjecture. The 
scene is equivocal because there is not a clear trajectory between reasons for action, and 
the action itself. The story that Kinbote presents produces a mismatch between the motives 
that we might expect of the King of Zembla, and the actions of an unexpectedly heroic 
émigré academic. Because of the equivocations between motive, action, and report, the 
scene is amenable to testing against philosophical models, the use of which can clarify the 
relevancy of different readings of Kinbote’s intentional states. More pertinently, it raises 
the question as to how our judgement of Kinbote is related to the way in which we read his 
intentions. 
Kinbote’s action takes the reader to a consideration of choice in the novel; we are led to 
question the distinction between Kinbote’s spontaneous action under Gradus’s fire, and his 
reimagining of these actions in retrospect. The gulf is between what Thomas Nagel terms 
the internal and external standpoints.
16
 The internal view is the phenomenological 
perspective from inside the acting agent, and the external view is the self-reflective gaze 
that weighs the actions of the self and demands control of them. There is a conflict here, 
Nagel notes, between the agent and the ever-questioning external view which destabilizes 
the reasons for action. Kinbote’s re-imagining of the scene in his commentary has a dual 
role. It needs to suggest the element of choice that he felt at the point of choosing to shield 
John Shade. This is vital for the sense that Kinbote was acting out of choice. However, the 
retrospective viewpoint suggests that Kinbote’s narrative is also subject to the doubts and 
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vagaries that emerge through scrutiny of past action; the possible uncertainty about how or 
why he did act as he did. These questions become especially pertinent in relation to 
Kinbote’s heroism, because of the tenuousness of the narrative itself, and the slippery 
nature of the action in question. To try and explain the different processes and questions 
that are at work in Kinbote’s claim, I move to a series of theoretical positions which aim to 
show what factors are at play, both in the self-interpretation and observation of agency.    
The Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP) is a staple of action theory. Its intuitive 
power attempts to capture the feeling of choice that appears to drive our feeling of agency. 
William James summarises the intuition, and problem, involved in the principle:       
[D]ecisions, for him who makes them, are altogether peculiar psychic facts. Self-
luminous and self-justifying at the living moment at which they occur, they appeal 
to no outside moment to put its stamp upon them or make them continuous with the 
rest of nature. Themselves it is rather who seem to make nature continuous; and in 
their strange and intense function of granting consent to one possibility and 
withholding it from another, to transform an equivocal and double future into an 
inalterable and simple past.
17
  
The choice, at the moment of making it, regards a future that is ‘equivocal and double’, but 
once the act is done, what was open becomes a finalized past. At this point, Nagel’s 
external perspective becomes operative. While the internal perspective is content with 
experiencing action ‘as part of the course of events in a world’, the external view aims to 
isolate the distinct feature of autonomy that the agent gave to the action.
18
 According to 
Nagel, the external perspective seeks an impossible ‘explanation […] which is complete in 
itself and renders illegitimate all further requests for explanation of [our] action as an event 
in the world’.19 Even if we base our motives for action on an objective rationale, the 
external view can still reduce our reasons to an infinite regress. The desire of the external 
position, Nagel suggests, is insatiable:  
However much harmony with an objective view we may achieve in action, we can 
always undermine the sense of our own autonomy by reflecting that the chain of 
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explanation or absence of explanation for this harmony can be pursued till it leads 
outside our lives.
20
 
The sense that we have alternate possibilities can be seen as a corollary to Nagel’s 
impossible position. The same external view that might seek reasons for our actions 
appears very similar to the view that probes the choices that were available when acting. 
Attempting to solidify one’s reasons for acting is to assert agential control in a way that 
also regards the roads not taken. PAP is a connective feature between the phenomenology 
of action, and the retrospective questioning which situates any act within a web of possible 
acts.  
The slippage between the action and a retrospective view of the action means that, when 
analyzing Pale Fire, two distinct questions need to be considered: why did Kinbote act in 
the way he did? And, why does he narrate the action in the way he does? The first of these 
questions is impossible to answer, because our information is entirely focalized through 
Kinbote’s narration. However, taking it into account as a question is still necessary, both in 
order to distinguish what is at stake in his narration and in order to measure his actions in 
the death scene against his actions at other moments in an attempt to form a coherent 
storyworld. Noting the position of PAP within the scene gives some sense of how, when 
we read for action we are also reading for choice. This quickly becomes a moral question. 
PAP is not just a way of characterising the feeling of choice. In philosophical arguments, 
PAP has long been established as a necessary condition for moral responsibility.  
Peter van Inwagen suggests that, when we claim that an agent could have done otherwise, 
we are also claiming that ‘a necessary condition for holding an agent responsible for an act 
is believing that the agent could have refrained from performing that act’.21 In addition, 
PAP, as a way of divining moral judgement, is intuitively compelling because it focuses on 
the idea of free action in its difference from restriction and coercion. Although this focus 
makes PAP essential in various approaches to the free will problem, the theory is not 
uncontested.
22
 The idea of alternate possibilities comes to the fore in Shade’s death scene 
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because coercion and choice are combined; Kinbote still seems to make an active choice, 
even under fire in the moment. Because he takes the heroic route, there is a sense that he 
could have done otherwise; the easier route would have been to cower from the bullets, 
and his resistance to this coerced action appears to be an active display of agency. His 
actions strain against the compelling force of Gradus and are heroic for that reason, so the 
account of his behaviour that he sets up – and wishes to be judged by – is intimately 
related to the intuitive moral force of alternate possibilities. PAP, then, helps to broadly 
clarify the positive image of moral agency that Kinbote is attempting to present. 
Although this probing helps with a general characterization of Kinbote, further 
investigation reveals how Nabokov produces the scene to render hunting for intentions 
fruitless. If Kinbote did shield John Shade, his reasons for doing so are unclear, which is 
part of the problem. The scant suggestions of purpose behind Kinbote’s heroism direct us 
not towards his great love for Shade, but towards his fanaticism about the poem. An odd 
atmosphere in the scene arises from the disparity between Kinbote’s love of the poem and 
his offhand treatment of Shade’s corpse. An ‘inward leap of exultation’ accompanies 
Kinbote’s capture of ‘the large envelope’ that holds the finished poem, and in the death 
scene, any short moments of good feeling towards Shade are clouded in metaphysical 
triteness:  
I felt – I still feel – John’s hand fumbling at mine, seeking my fingertips, finding 
them, only to abandon them at once as if passing to me, in a sublime relay race, the 
baton of life.
23
 
Other moments just convey a peculiar callousness: Kinbote ‘dialed 11111 and returned 
with a glass of water to the scene of the carnage’, at a point when Shade was already dead 
on the ground. Reflecting on Shade lying ‘prone on the ground with a red spot on his white 
shirt’, Kinbote writes: ‘I still hoped he had not been killed’.24 This statement is 
incongruously obvious as Kinbote’s friendship with Shade is emphasised in much of his 
commentary. Assuming that friendship involves mutual good feeling, we might safely 
conjecture that Kinbote would never hope that Shade had been killed.  
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If Kinbote did act in the heroic way that he claims, then the motives that might be readily 
inferred, such as his love for Shade, are peculiarly buried by his own narrative of the event. 
Despite this incongruity, the act remains possible, though not automatically plausible, 
because nothing in the novel makes it impossible. The absence of continuity between 
character and action then forces us to read the action as spontaneous, which in turn raises 
further problems in the search for intention. Reading intention into spontaneous actions is 
especially difficult because they are not as closely wedded to extended and end-directed 
intentional structures. The obvious repercussion of such a reading strategy is that we might 
be led to structure an interpretation around inferences that are based on conjecture about 
characters’ sub-intentional states. This approach seems especially open to abuse, and calls 
to mind Michael Wood’s warning that reading Pale Fire by ‘tagging what we think is real 
and using it as an explanation for the rest’ is largely unhelpful.25 The shifting levels of 
truth, the interpenetration of Kinbote’s real- and fantasy-worlds, and their interplay with 
Shade’s poem mean that there simply is not enough evidence available in the text to form a 
stable and coherent ‘real’ world which stands in contrast with a ‘false’ world. Appropriate 
caution notwithstanding, a turn to phenomenological forms of action theory can at least 
help to explore the fringes of agency that Kinbote’s heroism takes us to.  
Spontaneous action provides an interesting counterexample to the philosophical emphasis 
on the structural norms of agency. This is the case both because spontaneous actions are 
often intentional (both in the way they are interpreted by the agent, and in the way other 
agents respond to them), and because they appear to fall outside a clear theoretical model 
of intention. John Searle notes this form of intentionality as occurring ‘in action’; the 
intention occurs through the very action as it is being carried out, which one can 
‘[perform] quite spontaneously without forming consciously or unconsciously any prior 
intention to do those things’.26 Carl Ginet also suggests that ‘a voluntary exertion could 
occur […] quite spontaneously, without being preceded by any distinct state of desiring or 
intending’, and ‘it would still be an action’.27 Here the ‘distinct state’ is an internal sense 
of making a decision to act, and as such, it is a loose experiential measure of agency. 
Similarly, Michael Bratman has an example for this same phenomenon: 
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Are there cases of spontaneous activity that, while plausibly classified as 
intentional, do not involve anything reasonably identifiable as an intention to act? 
If you unexpectedly throw a ball to me I might reach up and catch it. I catch it 
intentionally, but perhaps my catching it involves no intention to do something.
28
 
The problem with these cases is the way in which they interact with the usual way of 
theorising intention within the analytic tradition. If intention is usually thought to precede 
an action, then the idea of an intentional action which can occur without forethought 
proves a challenge to the orthodoxy. There is confusion here as to the quality that a 
spontaneous action should have. Elsewhere, Bratman offers two responses to the problem, 
neither of which seems to capture the sense of intention that we have in mind in the 
characterisation of spontaneous action. Bratman’s first response is to suggest that 
spontaneous action is simply not intentional in the way in which we usually use the term. 
This evades the need to unify a broad definition of intention (in Bratman’s case, intention 
as a function within planning structures), with the immediacy of spontaneous action. 
Bratman’s second response is to suggest that a spontaneous action might find some 
unification with a broad definition of intention if it is thought to represent a ‘long-standing 
personal policy’.29 In this move, Bratman is attempting to suggest that broad planning 
structures can embed intentions in such a way that actions can occur in line with a general 
policy, though not in a way which suggests full conscious intention during a very 
compressed moment of action. 
Bratman’s position can be read in broad congruence with other philosophers who have 
emphasised the possibility of moral action that occurs outside a distinct moment of choice. 
In this, these theorists are rejecting the dominance of PAP models in theories of moral 
attribution. Richard Holton recognises that, although there are situations in which an agent 
quite explicitly needs to make a choice, there are also numerous situations in which ‘agents 
frequently just know what to do; they do not need to make a choice’.30 Daniel Dennett 
makes similar claims. In moral philosophy, he notes, ‘the decisions that “might go either 
way,” are not the only, or even the most frequent, sorts of decisions for which we hold 
people responsible’.31 In many cases the agent has trained themselves to automatically act 
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in certain circumstances. In these cases, they are voluntarily unable to do otherwise. These 
approaches make room for the idea that there are cases that are deeply rooted in habit, 
training, or personal commitment in which action is not a matter of choice, but is still 
representative of the agent; a coherence between a specific (possibly non-conscious) action 
and a general (conscious) commitment to acting in that way. This is germane to the notion 
of spontaneous action, because it represents a type of agency which occurs so quickly that 
there is no distinct moment of choice or intention.  
Different approaches, such as that of Thomas Metzinger, avoid tying the term ‘intention’ 
to the case of spontaneous action. Metzinger avoids this by moving to the less theory-laden 
terminology of ‘agency’. Here, he structures his argument using a broadly 
phenomenological approach: ‘Imagine snatching a child away from a fastly approaching 
car. We have a full-blown experience of agency, but no subjective experience of any 
preceding volitional process’.32 From this, Metzinger suggests that the phenomenology of 
volition and the phenomenology of agency are separate and can operate in isolation. 
Despite this useful separation, the task still remains to characterise what is meant by 
‘agency’ in this context, and how this relates to the way in which this kind of agency is 
interpreted. One important point which Metzinger does emphasise is the phenomenological 
evidence for agency. Here, the theoretical puzzle he extracts concerns the slippage 
between the way in which we feel we have acted, and the theoretical framework that exists 
to characterise this kind of action. The feeling of agency suggests that we feel that 
spontaneous action can be intentional, even if theoretical renderings of this sense are 
problematic. He draws on the phenomenology of agency to suggest that the theory of 
action alone is insufficient on this question. 
Other theorists have responded to this slippage. One seminal response is P.F. Strawson’s 
‘Freedom and Resentment’. Strawson reframes the question of responsibility, moving it 
away from theoretical posturing (in this case metaphysical arguments regarding free will 
and determinism), and toward an ethical viewpoint drawn from what he suggests is a broad 
phenomenology of judgement and agency. Strawson sketches two responses to the 
problem of free will, one ‘optimist’ and the other ‘pessimist’ about the concept of 
determinism. These responses focus on the way in which moral responsibility interacts 
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with determinism; whether (for the optimist), moral responsibility is compatible with 
determinism, or (for the pessimist) the possibility that moral responsibility is not 
compatible with determinism. The response in both of these cases is broadly freedom-
centred, insofar as they begin from the premise of freedom. For the optimist, the ‘facts as 
we know them’ includes the existence of ‘freedom’ as ‘the identification of the will with 
the act’.33 The pessimist might concede this fact, but still suggest that this variety of 
freedom is not compatible, does not provide ‘the right sort of basis’ for the assignment of 
praise and blame as we commonly understand it.
34
 The optimist’s conception of freedom 
might allow an altered conception of responsibility, but not the one that we commonly take 
to be the case, i.e. responsible action is only responsible if it is the product of an agent who 
self-determined that action; not one whose actions have been determined before he plays 
them out. In this debate, the argument begins with the idea of freedom, and attempts to 
develop a model of responsibility that fits the conditions that this idea permits. The 
pessimist suggests that the only model of freedom that would allow for a satisfactory idea 
of responsibility is one that is incompatible with determinism.  
Rather than analysing the structural or logical conditions of freedom, Strawson tries to 
capture what sense of freedom is in use when we talk about the assignment of moral 
judgment. This, he suggests, can be found in our ‘reactive attitudes’.35 These include 
‘resentment and gratitude’ and a ‘whole continuum of reactive attitude and feeling 
stretching on both sides of these’.36 Such attitudes occur in personal response to other 
agents’ actions, but are subject to wide variation and intensity in relation to the way in 
which we understand the link between the action, the agent’s intentions, and general 
external conditions which might mitigate blame. These personal reactive attitudes are also 
the basis for broader, third-person, moral codes insofar as they are ‘generalized or 
vicarious analogues’ of the second-person form.37 In addition, just as the personal reactive 
attitudes can be abstracted to vicarious forms, they can also turn inward as ‘self-reactive 
attitudes associated with demands on oneself for others’.38 Strawson suggests that ‘all 
these types of attitude alike have common roots in our human nature and our membership 
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of human communities’39 and as such develop a framework of what Bratman terms a 
‘naturalistic social psychology’.40 
Because the reactive attitudes, in all forms, ‘involve, or express, a certain sort of demand 
for inter-personal regard’, this creates a norm of interaction which can be transgressed.41 
The general attitude toward other agents is one which recognises their moral 
responsibility; this is the reactive attitude. The opposite of this would be the situation in 
which an individual is judged not to be a full member of the moral community, an agent 
‘whose behaviour, or as part of whose behaviour, is unintelligible to us, perhaps even to 
him, in terms of conscious purposes, and intelligible only in terms of unconscious 
purposes’.42 This kind of agent is better understood, Strawson suggests, not through 
reactive attitudes, but through an objective stance. His concluding position is that attention 
to the ‘range of attitudes’ present in moral talk give some sense of the richness of what we 
speak of when ‘we speak of desert, responsibility, guilt, condemnation, and justice’. These 
attitudes resist the kind of schematisation that is needed in reconciliation with 
determinism, or the rejection which is encountered in the strong determinist position. 
Instead, a ‘surrender of […] metaphysics’ appears the appropriate response to the common 
moral attitudes which resist schematic or rational demands.
43
 
Strawson’s prioritisation of the moral reactive attitude puts the question of spontaneous 
action in a different light. The above theorists all attempt to align the traditional concept of 
intention – referring to the idea that a specific mental state precedes a correlating action – 
with the idea of spontaneous intentional action which is somehow without this special 
mental precedent, or which frames intention differently. A Strawsonian approach might 
move away from attempting to align these within a single description of intention as a 
mental state with a specific relationship to an action. Instead, an intentional action might 
be better characterised by its relation to the reactive attitudes which it produces. This is the 
position of Joshua Knobe and Arudra Burra, whose experimental work attempts to picture 
intentionality through its interactive relationship with attribution of responsibility: 
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Perhaps the concept of acting intentionally is radically unlike the concept of 
intention. We said above that the concept of intention functions to facilitate 
predictions of behaviour. But perhaps the concept of acting intentionally does not 
work like that; perhaps it should be understood primarily as a tool for making 
judgments about whether people deserve moral praise or blame for their 
behaviour.
44
 
Working specifically with the idea of spontaneous action, Bratman touches on similar 
content when he notes that spontaneous actions can be the expression of ‘responsible 
agency’ even if they occur outside the planning frameworks which often embed actions in 
relation to broader goals: 
In a moment of pique I slap you. I do this intentionally but spontaneously. My 
slapping you is not explicitly embedded by me into a larger plan of mine. In 
slapping you I do not exercise any special capacities for planning. Yet you would 
resent me, and I should feel guilty and shamed. This was not, after all, a nervous 
tic, or an epileptic seizure.
45
 
Here, he shifts focus of the problem away from the way in which spontaneous actions 
should be structured within a specific theory of intention, and moves the attention instead 
to the way in which spontaneous actions are recognised as events which are still subject to 
judgments of moral responsibility. Although he does not follow this line of argument, 
Bratman seems to imply that our reactive attitudes (in this example, resentment) to a 
spontaneous action – such as his slap – validate the characterisation of the action as 
intentional, or at least, as he qualifies elsewhere, ‘under the agent’s voluntary control and 
[…] purposive’.46 In addition, the agent themself has a specific reaction toward their own 
action, one of guilt and shame, which also seems to warrant the tie between the agent and 
their action through the language of intentionality.  
This framework points to further conditions to be taken into account when attempting to 
decipher the moral attributions that Nabokov is playing on in this scene. The argument 
drawn from ‘Freedom and Resentment’ suggests that intentionality can be attributed, not 
                                                          
44
 Joshua Knobe and Arudra Burra, ‘The Folk Concepts of Intention and Intentional Action: A Cross-
Cultural Study’, Journal of Cognition and Culture, 6 (2006), 113–32 (p. 114). 
45
 Bratman, ‘Responsibility and Planning’, p. 169. 
46
 Bratman, Intention, p. 126, he adds a sense that the action in this case is ‘not intentional’ though ‘not 
unintentional’. 
142 
 
just based on the theoretical embedding of an action, but from the reactive attitudes that an 
action incites. This seems adequate to characterise a spontaneous action as praise or 
blameworthy because in many cases it seems to be the outcome, rather than the distinct 
state of premeditation, volition, or planning intention, that is taken into account. However, 
in the case of Kinbote, this argument becomes more complex. In the assessment of 
Kinbote’s action, it is clear that the spontaneity of the action and its intentional quality are 
not even the main foci of moral assessment; they are relevant only insofar as Kinbote is 
drawing heavily on the idea of intentionality to position his heroic narrative. For the 
reader, the effectiveness of Kinbote’s action would have been the clearest indication of his 
heroism. However, because he fails to shield John Shade, Kinbote is attempting to promote 
a positive moral assessment of himself, despite the fact that his actions – no matter how 
they were intended – were not causally effective.  
In this, there is recognition that moral assessment involves two separate elements of 
judgment; both the agent’s intentions and the causal efficacy of their actions are taken into 
account. This distinction becomes salient at points at which these separate considerations 
are not aligned. A key strand of moral philosophy that has brought this disjunct to attention 
is the area of moral luck. Moral luck recognises the difference in moral assessment 
between actions which have the same intentional content, but different causal outcomes. 
Fiery Cushman’s example of this is as follows: 
On a snowy January Sunday, Hal and Peter watch football and share beers at a 
local bar. Both drive away intoxicated, and both lose control of their cars on the 
slick roads. Hal collides with a neighbour’s tree, but Peter collides with a young 
girl playing in the snow. In the state of Massachusetts, Hal can expect a $250 fine 
for driving under the influence of alcohol. Peter faces a minimum of 2.5 years in 
prison – and up to 15 years – for vehicular manslaughter.47 
In experimental work which has sought to characterise cases like this, Cushman suggests 
that there is a distinction between the ‘wrongness’ and ‘blameworthiness’ of an action. 
Because the intentional content of both Hal and Peter’s cases appears to be the same, there 
seems to be a tendency to view both actions as equally wrong. However, because they 
have very different causal outcomes, we tend to recognise a difference in blameworthiness 
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between the actions. Because of this, differential punishment is warranted. This despite the 
background intuition – here articulated by Nagel – that intentional content is the key to 
attributing blame: 
Prior to reflection it is intuitively plausible that people cannot be morally assessed 
for what is not their fault, or for what is due to factors beyond their control.
48
 
Bernard Williams, like Strawson, moves toward an assessment of reactive attitudes rather 
than attempting to overly schematise the relationship between intentional and causal 
content. Williams explains that the common-sense way in which we link responsibility and 
voluntary action is not as a tight link, but dependent on circumstance, other causes, and 
effects that exceed the agent’s control. Regret is a fluid concept that negotiates the way in 
which we recognise the extent of our agency, even when the outcome does not align with 
our intentions. When the things we do turn out wrong, regret is no longer the regret of a 
spectator, but an ‘agent’s regret’: 
[Regret] moves back to the moment of deliberation and actions, and you regret 
acting as you did. This still need not imply that you deliberated carelessly; you may 
have deliberated as well as you could, but you still deeply regret that that was how 
the deliberation went, and that this was what you did […] it is the nature of action 
that such regrets cannot be eliminated, that one’s life could not be partitioned into 
some things that one does intentionally and other things that merely happen to 
one.
49
 
Although agent-regret pertains primarily to first-person feeling about one’s own actions, 
Williams expands the notion to cover third-person attribution of blame as well. Again, this 
is another similarity to Strawson’s concept of the three ‘humanly connected’ reactive 
attitudes. As Williams notes, it seems natural that if ‘we have agent-regret about the 
voluntary and would not readily recognize a life without it’, that we also judge others 
according to what we think the ‘degree of such feeling is appropriate’ in particular cases.50 
In this case, then, we have opinions about the correctness of fit between the outcome of an 
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action, the causal and intentional content of the deciding action, and the way in which the 
agent responds to interplay between these factors.  
In the case of Kinbote, several of these complications seem to be in play.
51
 Firstly, as I 
have suggested, there is a strong sense in which Kinbote is capitalising on the notion of 
intentionality in his description of events. The heroic narrative is based upon the idea that 
Kinbote should be praiseworthy based upon what he tried to do, what he intended to do, 
despite the fact that, in the case of shielding John Shade, these intentions were ineffective. 
The case of moral luck has shown that a distinction can be drawn between the intentional 
and the causal content of actions. Although moral responsibility often focuses on the 
intentional content of actions, in cases of moral luck, there is a switch of emphasis to the 
causal factors of an action. In the case of Kinbote this is salient because he is clearly 
pursuing his hero narrative against the prevailing sense that he does not entirely deserve 
praise for his actions because they were ineffective. The theories of agency explored above 
predominantly elucidate the way in which Kinbote frames his heroism within common-
sense networks of action and morality. Both reactive attitudes and moral luck are 
important for the elucidation of these networks insofar as they open up the theoretical 
discussion of agency to include the ways in which moral responses are legitimate clues as 
to the way in which agency works. 
 Although these frameworks help to elucidate the norms that Kinbote is attempting to 
capitalise upon, they are unreliable as direct exegetic tools. Scrutiny of reactive attitudes 
towards Kinbote, for instance, becomes circular because this move throws us back into 
Kinbote’s world, and the very structural impasse at the heart of this excursion. Because all 
of the reported reactions to Shade’s death are mediated by Kinbote, the attempt to locate 
‘true’ reactive attitudes among the involutions of the text is largely inconclusive. There are 
no clear acts in the novel for which Kinbote might come under moral scrutiny. There are 
certainly no points in which he is clearly morally culpable. In terms of moral reaction in 
the interaction between Kinbote and other characters, the main clues are in the reactions of 
the gardener and Sybil Shade, which give oppositional evidence. As far as Kinbote’s agent 
regret might be used as a gauge, again we are drawn to the way in which Kinbote narrates 
his own deeply equivocal responses to John Shade after his death.  
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The failure of these interpretive positions to bring out a clear interpretation turns us 
towards the easy coherence that might be achieved by treating Kinbote, not as a rational 
agent, but as irrational and imbalanced and therefore not subject to the same norms as 
others. By claiming that Kinbote is an ‘imbalanced egoist’ with a mind like a ‘crazy 
carousel’, the moral quality of Kinbote’s responses during the death scene can be elided in 
favour of his dominating textual presence.
52
 This is certainly the response that the text 
tends the reader towards; as Vladimir Alexandrov suggests, any ‘“realistic” reading of 
Kinbote’s story is counterbalanced by the sheer weight of Kinbote’s version’.53 A simple 
interpretation of madness seems directly contradicted by the complexity of the structures 
through which Kinbote asks to judged. Even if there is not a distinct sense in which his 
actions can be explained, Kinbote negotiates intricate levels of judgment and agency in his 
self-projected claims of heroism. The moral complexities of Kinbote’s narrative at this 
point in the novel are on the fringes of how we interpret the link between intentionality and 
judgment. His heroism requires substantial demystification as a claim about the 
effectiveness of intention and agency. The slippage in judgment seems to be what Kinbote 
is capitalising upon to form his tenuous claims, though elaboration on these themes reveals 
an important moral background to Shade’s death scene. Because the scene is positioned 
around a structural conceit that is echoed throughout Kinbote’s narrative, this reading adds 
a distinct sense in which the structural aspects of the novel are deeply interwoven with 
moral attitudes and reactions, even if these cannot be made explicit because of the 
involutions of the text. Kinbote’s hero narrative draws attention, not only to the ways in 
which we are ready to see him as a moral agent, but more directly to the way in which his 
fantasy is in tension with his vision of himself as a moral agent.  
 Jack Grey’s Non-Agency 
Just as Nabokov uses the complexities of Kinbote’s narrative to raise complex questions of 
agency, the commentary is also utilised as a structural device to create differentiated levels 
of agency among other characters. In particular, Jack Grey has a specific agential role 
which is created by the way in which his narrative is revealed through Kinbote’s account 
of Gradus. Jack Grey and Gradus are characters which emerge from the same figure, 
through slightly different narrative accounts. Gradus appears as a figure within Kinbote’s 
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Zembla narrative, an assassin who has been given the task of killing the exiled King 
Charles (Kinbote himself). The counter-narrative that emerges is of Jack Grey, ‘escapee 
from an asylum, who mistook Shade for the man who sent him there’, i.e. Judge 
Goldsworth, the owner of the property that Kinbote rents.
54
 
In Kinbote’s narrative, Gradus appears both as a narrative tool, and as an ideological foil to 
Kinbote’s self-description. In this dual role, the descriptions of Gradus in relation to their 
intentional content are prominent. Kinbote takes pains to emphasise the simplicity of 
Gradus’s character, which he attempts to do by describing him in a range of mechanistic 
guises. Although he admits that Gradus ‘could read, write and reckon’ and was ‘endowed 
with a modicum of self-awareness’, ‘some duration consciousness, and a good memory for 
faces, names, dates and the like’, he disregards him ‘morally’ and ‘spiritually’.55 This latter 
classification becomes prominent as Kinbote slides from isolating Gradus’s moral failings 
to declassifying him entirely and rendering him a ‘clockwork man’ whose ‘inward 
movements’ are produced by ‘mere springs and coils’,56 and an ‘automatic man’, a ‘half-
man who [is] also half mad’.57 This name calling just might, as Boyd suggests, 
‘[minimize] Gradus’s humanity, freedom, and dignity’, but more interestingly, Gradus’s 
automaticity is used to raise some questions about moral responsibility. Kinbote’s 
characterisation of Gradus is flexible insofar as it appears to oscillate between suggestions 
of full (if spiritually impoverished) agency and hyperbolic denial of such personhood. The 
other story of Jack Grey, which underlies Kinbote’s characterisation of Gradus, seems to 
explain this to some extent as Grey’s institutionalised madness appears to allow Kinbote to 
archly describe Gradus as mad with ideology; there is slippage between the two concepts, 
Kinbote’s story seems to imply, because they both show an absence of reflective action.  
Through Gradus’s ideological madness, Kinbote is drawing upon a folk notion of madness 
as somehow removed from a full concept of agency. The folk understanding of this 
imagines agency as consisting of willed actions rather than simply bodily events. These 
bodily events are not decisions, but desires which are unreflectively put into action. A 
recent tradition in action and free will theory has drawn on this conception to suggest that 
willed actions are broadly distinct from simple desires and wants insofar as they exist 
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because of an extra input from the agent; an endorsement which claims ownership over a 
course of action. This category suggests that there are those, including the mad, who are 
more causally determined than those who can rationally assess and act upon their conative 
states. This distinction, between agency and non-agency, has been frequently drawn upon 
in the philosophical literature as a way of attempting to describe the purported conditions 
for autonomy. Frankfurt, among others, formulates his arguments for willed volition 
against the distinct category of ‘wanton’ madness, where the individual has diminished 
rational control over the desires that arise in them. Because these desires appear to be 
rooted within a conception of causal determinism, if the individual follows these desires 
without actively endorsing them, then they are, to a greater extent than a willing agent, 
controlled by mechanistic forces. For Frankfurt, an individual only meets the ‘concept of a 
person’ if they are capable of ‘reflective self-evaluation’; the evaluation of their own 
desires.
58
 In his narratological assessment of fictional action, Lubomír Doležel takes this 
distinction between agency and non-agency to a radical extreme by suggesting that 
‘[insane] behaviour is semantically identical to nature events. When intentionality 
disintegrates, nature force takes over.’59 
By drawing on the language of automaticity to describe Gradus, Kinbote seems to be using 
this line of argument. The construction of Gradus from the ‘criminally insane’ Jack Grey 
adds an extra level of complexity to the issue. Even if a clear distinction between agency 
and non-agency were legitimate, Jack Grey’s actions may qualify as non-autonomous, 
while Gradus’s certainly would not. Kinbote attaches elements of Grey’s story to Gradus 
for rhetorical effect, but it becomes clear that this characterisation is little more than 
superficial. The slippage from Grey to Gradus that Kinbote attempts to effect is 
problematized by the distinction between agency and non-agency. There are further 
theoretical ramifications for the distinction between agency and non-agency as the way in 
which autonomy is conceptualised is linked to the way in which we assign moral 
responsibility.  As Daniel Dennett suggests, ideas of non-autonomy produce recognised 
categories which fall short of the ideal of moral agency, and demand adjusted forms of 
moral judgment. These may be circumstantial facts of ‘diminished responsibility’, more 
distinct models of ‘exculpating pathology’, or simply an assessment of an individual as 
entirely outside normative expectations of autonomy, and as such, ‘not responsible at 
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all’.60 The link between agency and moral judgment gives the reader further clues about 
how to assess agency within Pale Fire as it relates to Grey or Gradus, as he is subject to a 
number of moral judgments from other characters within the text.  
In his creation of Gradus, Kinbote is attempting to create an aetiology that can logically 
conclude in the act of murder. The characterisation of Gradus as an ‘automatic man’ is 
altered slightly to accommodate a distinct moral judgment. Although, as Kinbote notes, 
‘no amount of motive hunting and rational inquiry can ever really explain why anybody is 
capable of destroying a fellow creature’,61 he does attempt to provide a framework which 
attributes clear intention to the killer, both as an individual and as a functioning part of a 
social group:  
Gradus would not have killed anybody had he not derived pleasure not only from 
the imagined act […] but also from having been given an important, responsible 
assignment (which happened to require he should kill) by a group of people sharing 
his notion of justice, but he would not have taken that job if in killing he had not 
found something like that rather disgusting anticomedoist’s little thrill.62 
The creation of Gradus obliges Kinbote, to some extent, to try to explain the actions of a 
murderer through ‘motive hunting and rational enquiry’. In this project, the narrative shifts 
between different models of agency, from non-agential automaticity, to a clear assignment 
of moral responsibility. In the development of Gradus’s narrative, Kinbote is reverting to 
what Noël Carroll describes as a readerly impulse, insofar as he constructs a motivational 
story using the known actions as fixed points of reference. In narrative texts, Carroll 
suggests, action largely occurs through indicative representations which prompt questions 
about why those involved in the acted in the ways that they did: ‘We ask these questions in 
virtue of certain background beliefs and presuppositions we already hold about the nature 
of [events]—that they involve agents—and about agents—that they have motives’.63 
Kinbote’s adoption of this, and the overwhelming nature of his reading, has significant 
structural ramifications for the way in which Nabokov is able to represent Jack Grey. 
Carroll’s assessment suggests that indicative representations automatically invite motive 
hunting, which further implies that character action is automatically assumed to be 
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intentional and subject to norms of intentional action. This has repercussions for the 
representation of actions which are not subject to the same norms; exculpating pathologies 
and other non-autonomous models. By obscuring Jack Grey’s narrative with Kinbote’s 
Gradus, Nabokov seems to overcome this interpretative reflex. Because Grey’s narrative 
emerges only through the cracks in Kinbote’s story, the actions themselves are allowed to 
remain simple, the narrative very sparse, and without specific narratorial comment. 
There are two main sources for Grey’s characterisation. The frame of the sparse revenge 
narrative emerges through slips in Kinbote’s narration, and creates an inferred structure 
which takes Grey from incarceration to the accidental murder of John Shade; Grey 
intended to kill Judge Goldsworth, the man who put him away. This sparse narrative is 
bolstered by the interactions between Grey and the other characters following Shade’s 
death. The gardener disarms Grey by hitting him with a shovel, but afterwards he smokes 
with him and shares a glass of water and the policeman benignly says ‘Come along, Jack, 
we’ll put something on that head of yours’.64 Kinbote himself seems unmoved by the 
killer. He finds him a glass of water, and places it ‘near a flowerpot beside the porch steps’ 
where Grey sits with the gardener.
65
 From his narrativising position Kinbote even feels 
affronted by Grey’s new harmlessness:  
[Grey], either because he was in pain, or because he had decided to play a new role, 
ignored me completely as if I were a stone king on a stone charger.
66
  
These details build a picture of Grey as unthreatening. This suggests that when Shade died, 
Grey’s revenge appeared to be fulfilled and his violence terminated. The suggestion of 
fulfilment suggests behavioural simplicity, and this is corroborated by the way in which 
other characters act toward Grey as if he were harmless. This end-directed narrative is very 
simple and suggests that Grey is rationalised, not as an agent, but as an individual who is 
subject to different, apparently exculpatory, standards of judgment. By building Grey in 
this way, through clues of fact and diegetic reactive attitudes, Nabokov is able to portray a 
type of character whose actions are not specifically intentional, who may not be described 
as entirely autonomous, and who is not subject to norms of moral judgment that are 
associated with self-reflective action. The emergence of Grey through Kinbote’s Gradus 
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makes this kind of characterisation possible by subverting the ‘question formation’ which 
Carroll suggests is a ‘natural thought process’ and which broadly assumes a direct 
association between action and intentionality.
67
 In the previous chapters, I explored the 
idea that readers approach a text with a psychologising attitude. This finds some crossover 
with theories about behavioural interpretation in everyday life, because it seems very 
plausible to suggest that character intentions are understood in part through our 
assumptions about how individuals act in certain situations, a calculation which is 
moderated with our experience of social norms, individual rationality, and circumstantial 
knowledge which limits the number of expected choices that an agent can make. In this 
situation, the norms relate to predictability, and agents which stray too far from the 
expectations of their interpreters are often deemed inexplicable. Grey does not appear to 
act in the way we would expect a fully autonomous agent to act, and in order to portray 
this within the novel, Nabokov utilises the formal features of the text to escape some of the 
narratorial demands that might be provoked by the psychologising reader.  
 John Shade’s Self-Validation 
These examples of judgment within the storyworld of Pale Fire point to the ways in which 
Nabokov utilises the reactive attitudes as clues for the narrative placement and status of 
Kinbote and Gradus. These clues are intimately linked to how agency is conceived in 
relation to these characters because, as explored by Strawson, the reactive attitudes are 
closely tied to how an agent and their actions are viewed, and whether their input into an 
action-event is seen to be sufficient to implicate them morally. A slight change of focus on 
the question of the relation between action and ethics suggests that Nabokov also uses 
broader strokes in his characterisations. Just as Kinbote’s narrative reveals his complex 
reaction to representing his own actions, John Shade’s poem ‘Pale Fire’ also develops 
clear questions surrounding the uncertainty of interpreting one’s own agency at a remove.    
Kinbote’s narrative is related to questions of agency because its retrospective view point 
allows its author to reframe his own actions. This seems to resonate with Nagel’s 
distinction between internal and external view-points, insofar as the retrospective view 
allows Kinbote to implicate himself more generally, both in the text and in his purported 
closeness to John Shade. This seems to be a way of escaping the scepticism of the external 
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view, because he effectively invents a separate storyworld in which his agency and the 
trajectory of his actions are not subject to the same sceptical regressions which damage 
more rooted claims to subjective autonomy. Here, scepticism occurs in Nagel’s use of the 
term in his picture of the ‘external-perspective’, the doubt which he suggests is inherent in 
self-perception which questions the roots and reasons for why one acts. Nagel’s suggestion 
is that the agent wants to endorse his actions, and to know that they were the correct 
actions to have taken. Because there are no reasons internal to the agent which are able to 
verify the correctness of his actions, an objective viewpoint is sought to reframe the action 
in an attempt to verify its origin in the agent. As Nagel suggests, however, the objective 
scrutiny of one’s actions often lead out of the agent, and increasingly embed the action in 
the world. Through the Zembla narrative, Kinbote appears to bypass these concerns by 
creating delusional actions which are separate from the external world, and immune from 
its questions. It is at points of slippage – such as Shade’s death scene – at which Kinbote’s 
story reveals an agency beneath, which is more clearly embedded and determined within 
the external (story)world. This way of reading Kinbote’s agency is particularly pertinent in 
relation to Shade’s poem, in which Shade also appears to be framing his own agency 
according to a distinction between internal and external viewpoints.   
The complexities in Shade’s character arise, as is the case with Kinbote, from the 
retrospective and autobiographical narrative that he puts forward in the poem. Again, the 
autobiographical narrative is used as a way of conveying agency because it is a reflective 
mode. Richard Freadman suggests that because autobiography is introspective and 
retrospective, it is uniquely qualified for representing the will:   
Texts of this kind have the ability to envisage the psyche in certain ways; and that 
these ways represent actual or possible modes of being in the world. Such 
narratives make culturally available for our consideration complex conceptions of 
what it means to have a mind and a self and a will.
68
  
I take this point to be broadly true in Shade’s case, where his poem ‘Pale Fire’ does not 
only offer a way of reflecting on his life and the event of his daughter’s death. My focus is 
the way in which Shade frames the poetic form as an attempt to draw past events into a 
coherent pattern. For Shade, the place of artistic intention is to retrospectively endow 
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meaning on actions and their consequences. The tone and pattern expressed by Shade’s 
poem is elegiac insofar as it stages a reflection of the death of an individual through a 
sequence of mourning. In Peter Sacks’ terminology: ‘the basic passage through grief or 
darkness to consolation and renewal’.69   
Sacks makes the forceful claim that mourning, and particularly the form of mourning 
constructed through elegy, is a kind of action; an active involvement of the mourner with 
both the ‘language of elegy’ and ‘the experience of loss’.70 By adopting Sacks’ broader 
conception of action, clear crossovers appear between Shade’s poetic work and his active 
part in the process of mourning his daughter. At points these are distinct, as Nabokov 
draws frequently on language of agency and the will throughout ‘Pale Fire’ in his 
description of the interaction between versification and mourning. This is generally 
conducted in an attempt to describe the balance between control and loss of control, both 
within the world and in its reflection in the work of poetic process. In this way, the poem 
can be seen to interact with the concept of action as I have been using it elsewhere in this 
thesis; as the product of autonomous agency, subject to self-reflection, and embedded in 
norms of interpretation and moral judgment. The artistic work of John Shade is not 
separate from, but closely entangled with, more prosaic forms of action.      
Much of Canto Two of ‘Pale Fire’ is concerned with Hazel’s suicide, the narrative taking a 
broadly chronological approach which terminates at her death and the immediate reactions 
to it. Describing Hazel’s life, the canto dwells on the ways in which Shade and his wife 
interacted with their child, specifically with regard to the loss of control felt towards the 
circumstantial factors which appeared to impinge on her happiness. First among these is 
Hazel’s appearance, which takes after the ‘uncouth’ John Shade:71 
She might have been you, me, or some quaint blend: 
Nature chose me so as to wrench and rend 
Your heart and mine. At first we’d smile and say: 
‘All little girls are plump’ or ‘Jim McVey 
(The family oculist) will cure that slight 
Squint in no time.’ And later: ‘She’ll be quite 
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Pretty, you know’; and, trying to assuage 
The swelling torment: ‘That’s the awkward age.’ 
‘She should take riding lessons,’ you would say 
(Your eyes and mine not meeting). ‘She should play 
Tennis, or badminton. Less starch, more fruit! 
She may not be a beauty, but she’s cute.’72 
The weak cliché that ends this passage appears as the last resort of a series of failed 
attempts to control the situation. From oculist intervention to the prescription of exercise 
and dietary plans, parental torment is developed through their unhappiness on Hazel’s 
behalf, the impotence of their interventions, and their unsuccessful attempts to assuage the 
growing sense that their daughter’s unattractiveness counts against her. Michael Wood 
suggests that these lines betray the Shades. John and Sibyl ‘cannot keep their pity out of 
their love; keep it, their language suggests, from swamping their love’.73 Hazel is not 
beautiful, and because of this, her parents find it hard to come up with a plausible and 
happy future for her. They find themselves excusing her rather than accepting her: ‘Virgins 
have written some resplendent books./ Lovemaking is not everything. Good looks/ Are not 
that indispensable!’74 In this context, pity is a trope of control; it betrays the Shades’ sense 
that Hazel is defenceless and that her misfortune exceeds their ability to guide her. At the 
point of being told about Hazel’s death, the text restages their parental failings with a rare 
admission of poetic failure: ‘a patrol car on our bumpy road/Came to a crunching stop. 
Retake, retake!’75 The representational ability of the poem collapses under the 
psychological weight of the content, or in Sacks’ terminology, Shade’s call responds to the 
disconnection of feeling between Hazel’s death and the ‘fabric of language’ through which 
he mediates it.
76
 
Hazel’s inherited ungainliness establishes a direct comparison with her father. However, 
while Hazel is portrayed by Shade as somehow embedded in the misfortunes of her 
appearance, he represents himself as directly transcending those same limitations. Shade’s 
physicality is intimately tied to his conceptualisation of the world around him. This 
broadly rests on a close association with the natural world: 
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My God died young. Theolatry I found 
Degrading, and its premises, unsound. 
No free man needs a God; but was I free? 
How fully I felt nature glued to me 
And how my childish palate loved the taste 
Half-fish, half-honey, of that golden paste!
77
 
Even if Shade rejects God, this passage suggests that this does not necessarily grant him 
extra freedom; materially and metaphysically Shade’s claim is still that ‘we are most 
artistically caged’ in the world.78 This is both a general claim, and one which is closely 
tied to his physical shortcomings: 
I walked at my own risk: whipped by bough, 
Tripped by the stump. Asthmatic, lame and fat, 
I never bounced a ball or swung a bat.
79
 
Here, the metaphysical question of freedom within the world becomes acutely material, as 
Shade is physically limited, a ‘cloutish freak’.80 The material and metaphysical remain 
closely aligned through Shade’s emphasis on his observational and poetical abilities as a 
way of circumventing his limitations; his ‘five senses (one unique)’.81 Here he treads a line 
between agency and passivity. Part of the easy bond between Shade and the natural world 
is his photographic memory, an ability which is framed explicitly as intentional action:   
My eyes were such that literally they  
Took photographs. Whenever I’d permit, 
Or, with a silent shiver, order it
82
  
Elsewhere, the content of this poetic sense is less clearly within Shade’s control, though he 
describes it in the language of agency: 
[…] I’d duplicate  
Myself, my lamp, an apple on a plate: 
                                                          
77
 Pale Fire, p. 36. 
78
 Pale Fire, p. 37. 
79
 Pale Fire, p. 37. 
80
 Pale Fire, p. 37. 
81
 Pale Fire, p. 37. 
82
 Pale Fire, p. 34. 
155 
 
Uncurtaining the night, I’d let dark glass 
Hang all the furniture above the grass
83
 
Here, Shade’s gifts uniquely dovetail with the idea that we are ‘most artistically caged’ 
within the universe. The mnemonic and observational delights, though themselves poised 
between intention and intuition, stage an interaction with the world which allows the poet 
some small control within the framework of natural fact. The reflection of ‘all the 
furniture’ is not within Shade’s control, but his imaginative projection seizes the image as 
a token of his artistic intentionality. At these points in the poem, in which Shade is 
describing his own abilities, the heroic couplets have a particular defiance, whether 
through the implicit rejection of his disability in the rhyme between ‘lame and fat’ and 
‘swung a bat’, or the explicit control of the rhyme between ‘I’d permit’ and ‘order it’. This 
defiant tone is less present in the sections which describe Hazel, where, for example, the 
jocular rhyme of ‘more fruit!’ and ‘she’s cute’ adds a slightly mocking inflection to his 
daughter’s teenage woes.  
In his self-description of how he composes poetry, Shade explicitly explores the balance 
between intentional input and passivity. The interconnection of the poet’s ‘[two] methods 
of composing’ illustrate this distinct split between controlled action and non-conscious 
intuition. The methods are described as: ‘A, the kind/Which goes on solely in the poet’s 
mind’ and ‘B,/The other kind, much more decorous, when/He’s in his study writing with a 
pen’.84 There is a split here between intentional and non-intentional action: ‘In method B 
the hand supports the thought,/The abstract battle is concretely fought’.85  However: 
[…] method A is agony! The brain 
Is soon enclosed in a steel cap of pain. 
A muse in overalls directs the drill 
Which grinds and which no effort of the will 
Can interrupt, while the automaton 
Is taking off what he has just put on 
Or walking briskly to the corner store 
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To buy the paper he has read before.
86
  
The distinction is clear between the ‘decorous’, conscious poetic work of method B, and 
the unconscious, intuitive work of method A. The absence of will, and the self-reduction to 
an ‘automaton’, pre-empts Kinbote’s invention of Gradus, the ‘automatic man’. However, 
the clear contextual distinction between these automatisms suggests the importance of how 
freedom is conceived within the narrative. Shade’s automatism is the acceptable 
entrenchment of the will in the intuitions of the artistic process; Gradus’s automatism is 
framed as an ideological flaw which represents an intrusion on Gradus’ will. In both cases, 
the rhetorical use of the automatic trope is distinct. 
In Sack’s schema, the elegy offers a transitional act of mourning. This is partly acted out 
through the mourner’s ‘self-privileging […] motion’, through which they attempt to 
‘[ensure] a sense of progress’ which distances the living from the event of death.87 In the 
case of ‘Pale Fire’, there is a clear transitional stage in which Shade describes how his 
mourning draws him to investigate the idea of an afterlife, as a response both to Hazel’s 
death and to his own relation to death. Shade’s initial response is to move to a more 
oblique metaphysical focus. Canto Three begins with the Shades attending the ‘I.P.H., a 
lay/Institute (I) of Preparation (P)/For the Hereafter (H)’, which we assume follows on 
from grieving Hazel.
88
 This becomes clearer when, in a clarification of form of the 
preparation the I.P.H. practices, Shade rejects the idea of communicating with the dead: 
[…] And when we lost our child 
I knew there would be nothing: no self-styled 
Spirit would touch a keyboard of dry wood 
To rap out her pet name; no phantom would 
Rise gracefully to welcome you and me 
In the dark garden, near the shagbark tree.
89
 
This becomes transitional as time passes. The elegiac mode is clear as Shade explicitly 
connects his mourning to his occupation:  
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It is the writer’s grief. It is the wild 
March wind. It is the father with his child. 
Later came minutes, hours, whole days at last, 
When she’d be absent from our thoughts […]90 
From here, the poem moves away from Hazel and turns inward, at which point Shade’s 
daughter seems to become ancillary to his metaphysical investigations. The key transition 
occurs when he recounts his experience of a heart attack, though this is a continuation of 
an early episode in the poem. For Shade, a sense of the metaphysical emerged as a young 
child. Again, this is closely related to his encumbered physicality, as the divine insight 
emerges through a fit: 
There was a sudden sunburst in my head. 
And then black night. That blackness was sublime. 
I felt distributed through space and time: 
One foot upon a mountaintop, one hand 
Under the pebbles of a panting strand, 
One ear in Italy, one eye in Spain, 
In caves, my blood, and in the stars, my brain. 
There were dull throbs in my Triassic; green 
Optical spots in Upper Pleistocene, 
An icy shiver down my Age of Stone, 
And all tomorrows in my funnybone.
91
 
Although a doctor pronounces the fit ‘growing pains’, Shade admits their formative role in 
his later development: ‘The wonder lingers and the shame remains’ because the intrigues 
of the experience are tainted by the loss of control inherent in them. In a reassertion of the 
automaton theme, the young Shade is watching a ‘clockwork toy’92 when he fits, which 
reflects both the sense that he has lost control, and refracts Kinbote’s description of Gradus 
in the commentary as a ‘clockwork man’.93 Shade’s fit initiates him into mortality, fixing 
‘A thread of subtle pain,/Tugged at by playful death’.94 However, it is clear that the 
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encounter with death provokes a response which aims to distance, rather than invite the 
possibility. This becomes pertinent in the heart attack episode in Canto Three, where there 
is a return to direct metaphysical experience: 
A sun of rubber was convulsed and set; 
And blood-black nothingness began to spin 
A system of cells interlinked within 
Cells interlinked within cells interlinked 
Within one stem. And dreadfully distinct  
Against the dark, a tall white fountain played.
95
 
The ‘white fountain’ is taken as a sign of an afterlife, though its specific meaning as a 
symbol is deliberately obscure. Its meaning ‘Could be grasped only by whoever dwelt/In 
the strange world’ which Shade has witnessed.96 Despite the symbolic obscurity, Shade is 
certain that the vision confirms a particular ‘truth’: ‘It had the tone,/The quiddity and 
quaintness of its own/Reality’.97 
In pursuit of this truth, Shade seeks external, semi-empirical, corroboration by 
interviewing someone else who ‘had seen [a fountain] “beyond the veil”’.98 Her vision of a 
fountain, it turns out, was actually a vision of a mountain, which invites Shade’s 
substitution of his hopes for objective fact for a reinvestment in personal truth. This gives 
rise to what Wood calls Nabokov’s ‘theology for sceptics’; a schema through which the 
coincidence of the fountain/mountain mix-up is given precedence over the earlier hope for 
verification.
99
 In this shift, Shade does not give up the idea of an external view – a 
metaphysical structure which is distinct and separate from himself – but simply removes 
the necessity that this structure be verified by anyone else. In this sense, the shift operates 
a renewed inward turn through which Shade develops the claim that he is able to maintain 
belief in a metaphysical ‘web of sense’ which solely relies on his own artistic instantiation 
of ‘correlated pattern’. This is enough to give him ‘faint hope’ in an external position.100 
This renewed faith moves to the more discreet interplay between control and passivity that 
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is inherent in Shade’s versification, and retreats from the more visceral impotence that his 
encounters with death occasion.  
The elegiac expression of mourning for Hazel is refigured by Shade’s recognition of this 
structured external view. His emphasis on coincidence and its corroboration in his poetry 
establishes a semi-verifiable framework for his actions which take them beyond immediate 
materialism. This framework is subject to the minimal normative demands that Shade 
recognises; the recognition, through his observation, of pattern in the external world, and 
the restatement of this pattern in poetry. This is largely subjective, but also constrained by 
the norms of versification:  
And if my private universe scans right, 
So does the verse of galaxies divine 
Which I suspect is an iambic line. 
I’m reasonably sure that we survive 
And that my darling somewhere is alive
101
  
Shade’s self-manufactured ‘private universe’, as structured by the poetic form, becomes 
the quasi-objective proof for his observations, which then allows him a framework on 
which to structure a consolatory metaphysics of the afterlife. Far from a ‘reluctant 
resubmission to the constraints of language’, it appears that Shade’s work of mourning is 
not stifled by the conventions of his medium, but stabilised by them.
102
 Here, in line with 
Sacks’ assessment of the genre, Shade’s elegiac work becomes prominently consolatory in 
its move from the impotence of Canto Two (‘Retake, retake!’), to a more harmonious 
resolution. It is important that Shade’s resolution is initially a personal one: ‘I feel I 
understand/Existence, or at least a minute part/Of my existence’.103 This security becomes 
a broader universal claim ‘that we survive’, and eventually returns to the specificity of 
Hazel’s case, the original object of mourning: ‘that my darling somewhere is alive’.104 
Sacks notes the ‘veil of words’ that emerges in elegy,105 which serve to distance the poet 
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from death and from the subject of the verse: the ‘consoling construction of a fictional 
identity not only for the dead but for himself as well’.106      
Shade’s ‘faint hope’ is, as Wood points out, full of holes. Firstly, it is a weak position, ‘a 
perspective, a reading, which can scarcely lead either to hope or to despair’.107 It is also a 
position that emptily endorses the coherence of pattern that ignores the possibility of bad 
pattern, in nature and in human activity, observations that are not appealing but unsettling. 
In particular, Shade’s faint hope does not seem to centre directly on Hazel, but is only 
sustained when his daughter’s death is occluded by a more focussed inward turn. Although 
Wood seems correct in finding Shade’s position unconvincing, the way in which the ‘faint 
hope’ is constructed accords with broader discussions of agency which are also present in 
Kinbote’s narrative. If Kinbote’s commentary, which restages his agency within a fantasy, 
is read as a subversion of agent-doubt, it offers a clear corollary to Shade’s self-verifying 
external view. These two responses explore questions about the limits of agency, and the 
ways in which a desire for concrete agency can verge on delusion.  
As I explored above, Nagel describes the experience of agency through the contrast 
between the internal and external perspectives. The internal view is from inside action, 
while the external reflects on the reach, motives and originality of the action, a reflective 
position which, Nagel suggests, can lead to a sceptical regress which disconnects the 
action from the agent and places it on the determinist sequence within which the action is 
embedded. One solution which Nagel offers as a way of stopping the regressive quest for 
antecedent reasons is ethics:  
Values are judgements from a standpoint external to ourselves about how to be and 
how to live. Because they are accepted from an impersonal standpoint, they apply 
not only to the point of view of the particular person I happen to be, but 
generally.
108
 
By aligning ourselves with a value judgement, we align ourselves with something that is 
outside ourselves and the questioning external self cannot ask any more; the buck stops 
with an objectively validated action because it ‘supplies an alternative to pure observation 
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of ourselves from outside’.109 In this line of argument, some philosophers, such as Gary 
Watson, have proposed the question-stopping quality of value judgements as a solution to 
the free will problem.
110
 Nagel remains unconvinced by this, and instead suggests that 
ethics provides a fragile harmony between an objective position and the acting self that 
might delay, but cannot ultimately put off doubts that are raised by the external view. 
Nagel dismisses the idea of a definite solution to this problem, and his offerings are 
intended more as attempts at reconciling ‘the objective standpoint and the inner 
perspective of agency which reduces the radical detachment produced by initial 
contemplation of ourselves as creature in the world’. Finding ways to root ourselves in 
action reduces ‘the degree to which the objective self must think of itself as an impotent 
spectator, and to that extent it confers a kind of freedom.
111
  
Nagel’s comments resonate with Shade’s theory of art, and offer a clarification of what I 
have been terming Shade’s ‘external perspective’. The epiphany occurs when he 
recognises that the tie between his internal life can be correlated with (what he regards as) 
objective fact:   
But all at once it dawned on me that this 
Was the real point, the contrapuntal theme; 
Just this: not text, but texture; not the dream 
But topsy-turvical coincidence, 
Not flimsy nonsense, but a web of sense. 
Yes! It sufficed that I in life could find 
Some kind of link-and-bobolink, some kind 
Of correlated pattern in the game, 
Plexed artistry, and something of the same 
Pleasure in it as they who played it found.
112
 
The invented ‘they’ are straw men behind the scenes of nature, placed there by Shade as 
correlates to his will. He seems to be reaching – through this self-constructed framework – 
toward something similar to what Nagel suggests is possible through ethics; a harmony 
between the acting self and the objective facts of determinism. This is Shade’s conceit, and 
                                                          
109
 Nagel, View, p. 136. 
110
 Gary Watson, ‘Free Agency’. 
111
 Nagel, View, p. 126. 
112
 Pale Fire, pp. 62–3, original emphasis. 
162 
 
through it he seems to attempt an escape into aesthetics through which he can block self-
questioning doubt through a validation of his action. His verse offers enough formal 
structure for him to claim it as a quasi-objective framework. Because this framework – 
through his poetry – is invoked to validate his actions and beliefs, he makes himself 
immune to error. However, because he himself creates his verse and constructs the formal 
features of the verse, the agency that he is claiming is in fact a tight self-verifying loop. 
An action-theoretical perspective reveals several levels at work in Pale Fire. The deep 
interpretative involutions of the commentary function as clues to Kinbote’s 
characterisation. This structural feature also provides a way of characterising Jack Grey in 
a way which offers an entirely distinct construction of agency, though this is created in 
parallel with Kinbote’s overbearing narration. Through the cracks in Kinbote’s 
commentary, Nabokov is able to escape psychologising narratives to produce a character 
who typifies non-agency; a structural feat which creates an almost-opposite example of 
agential writing to the more dominant characterisations in the novel. A more focused 
exploration of the feeling of agency emerges through Kinbote and Shade, whose narratives 
continually probe the idea, much explored in the philosophical literature, that autonomous 
agency is susceptible to doubt when viewed in retrospect. The negotiation of this common 
ground is observable in both Kinbote’s commentary and Shade’s poem, though only Shade 
treats this content with explicit care through his exploration of the link between the act of 
writing and the tenuousness of one’s feeling of autonomy. For Kinbote, this link is never 
made explicit, and the reader is led to draw conclusions from the style and slippage within 
his text. The significant moral content of the book occurs through the developments in 
Kinbote’s narrative, as the reader is drawn to consider a series of reactive positions in 
relation to Kinbote’s claims of heroism. Although his claims are unverifiable (though they 
are, in fact, plausible), the questions which the structural problems of the commentary 
produce develop a number of links between agency and moral judgment. Though the 
exegetical power of this evidence is scant, Nabokov leads us to recognise the way in which 
agency is both self-constructed and mediated through the interpretations of others. 
Through the emphasis on the relationships within the text, we are drawn to focus on how 
moral reactions intuitively chart the way in which intentionality is understood, and its 
relation to other dynamic forces; circumstantial, social and environmental. 
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Chapter Four 
Action and Addiction: Malcolm Lowry 
The last chapter focussed on the way in which moral judgment provides an intuitive 
structure which surrounds the attribution and interpretation of intention. In this chapter, I 
approach similar questions in relation to Malcolm Lowry’s Under the Volcano. Rather 
than approaching specifically moral questions, here I describe how models of addiction 
and intentionality interact with Lowry’s literary project. Theories of addiction provide 
different models for how we should view the intentional capacities of addicts. There is 
disagreement over the extent to which addicts have control over their own actions, as some 
models focus on the way in which addiction to a drug can provide action-motivations 
which bypass addicts’ intentions. This provides a set of theories which diversely model the 
agency of an addict, a capacity which is subject to shifting focus in Lowry’s text. 
Alcohol is a dominant presence in Under the Volcano, though its centrality to a full 
reading of the novel is somewhat contested. The excessive presence of alcohol defines 
much of the action in the novel, and the hermeneutic layers of the text, often mediated by 
the Consul, are in constant interaction with his drunkenness. However, these points are 
often downplayed in criticism of the text, perhaps because of the risk of over-identifying 
Malcolm Lowry with his character, the Consul; a temptation founded on their shared 
alcoholism. As Sue Vice suggests, this has been a mistake in previous studies of Lowry’s 
texts, which were frequently read as ‘an extension of his biography’.1 Andrew John Miller 
also flags this problem, noting the ‘pervasive tendency to substitute gossip about Lowry's 
alcoholism and sexual dysfunction for critical engagement with the historical and political 
implications of his writing’.2 Sherrill Grace assumes the existence of this bias and in 
response rejects both the biographical impetus and the biographical facts: ‘Because 
Lowry’s obsession with dipsomania is usually overemphasized, Volcano is too often 
described as a novel about drinking’.3 Grace suggests instead that Lowry’s ‘great theme, 
for which alcohol is a metaphor, is human isolation and the collapse of Western culture’.4 
This type of metaphorical expansion deemphasises the sense that the novel exposes or 
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explains alcoholism, and moves it to the text’s symbolic structure. This critical move has 
been repeated by several other critics. Even Thomas Gilmore, who maintains that drink is 
at the centre of Under the Volcano, depends on the symbolic analogues to Lowry’s 
depiction. For Gilmore, the act of drinking is itself enmeshed in symbolic action insofar as 
it allows the drinker access to alternate realities: ‘sober reality is so intolerably thin that it 
travesties itself. Intoxication, or hallucination, becomes a way to pierce this buffoonery, to 
discover important truth and seize its complexity’.5 Muriel Bradbrook follows a similar 
line in her suggestions for metaphoric alcoholism, both in a socio-historical sense that 
‘[the] Consul’s drunkenness is like the drunkenness of a world as it reels towards 
destruction’,6 and the quasi-psychological claim that Lowry deals with ‘the dark forces of 
the mind for which alcohol is perhaps only a symbol’.7 What emerges from these critical 
attitudes is the willingness to subordinate the alcoholic content of the novel to more 
general symbolic readings.  
To some extent, this reading is solicited by Lowry’s statements on the novel. In broad 
terms, he appears to suggest that drinking is allied with darkness, through which it operates 
as a general symbol for the darkness of mankind. This also blurs into a complex 
psychological aetiology more akin to what Bradbrook has in mind. In his letter to Jonathan 
Cape, Lowry suggests that:  
The drunkenness of the Consul is used on one plane to symbolise the universal 
drunkenness of mankind during the war, or during the period immediately 
preceding it, which is almost the same thing, and what profundity and final 
meaning there is in his fate should be seen also in its universal relationship to the 
ultimate fate of mankind.
8
 
This can be allied with Lowry’s 1951 ‘Work in Progress’ statement, in which he ties 
drinking more closely to a general dark psychology. Here, he is not describing the Consul 
of Under the Volcano, but Sigbjørn Wilderness, the protagonist of the later novel, Dark as 
the Grave Wherein my Friend is Laid: 
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[So] far as liquor is concerned, it is [Sigbjørn’s] realization later that if it was 
simply a question of enjoyment on that plane he could take it or leave it, that stops 
him: for it is the enjoyment of suffering, indeed of the participation in the infinite 
misery, that is the trouble.
9
  
These readings are not necessarily different planes of interpretation, but elements of the 
same symbolic code. In his Cape letter, Lowry changes the emphasis from the state of 
drunkenness to the act of drinking itself. In this, the emphasis shifts slightly from the 
symbolism that can be attached to the drunkard, to the symbols which themselves drive 
him. In doing so, it moves focus from the abstract state of drunkenness to the actions of the 
individual drunk, even if the causes of those actions are then abstracted again to form a 
universal pathology. Lowry invokes William James and Freud to pursue a vision of human 
psychology as inherently symbolic; driven most clearly by James’s thesis in Varieties of 
Religious Experience of universal spiritual need. Lowry’s claim that James and Freud 
‘would certainly agree with me when I say that the agonies of the drunkard find their most 
poetic analogue in the agonies of the mystic who has abused his powers’ is traceable to 
James’s chapter on ‘Mysticism’ in Varieties.10 Although James does not analyse the 
alcoholic specifically, he does invest alcohol with a mystical importance: 
The sway of alcohol over mankind is unquestionably due to its power to stimulate 
the mystical faculties of human nature, usually crushed to earth by the cold facts 
and dry criticisms of the sober hour. Sobriety diminishes, discriminates, and says 
no; drunkenness expands, unites, and says yes. It is in fact the great exciter of the 
Yes function in man. It brings its votary from the chill periphery of things to the 
radiant core. It makes him for the moment one with truth. Not through mere 
perversity do men run after it.
11
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Lowry’s ‘poetic analogue’ between drunkard and the ‘mystic who has abused his powers’ 
is not entirely clear, but it suggests incorrect use. The drunkard overuses alcohol, and in 
doing so abuses, in James’s terms, ‘its power to stimulate the mystical faculties of human 
nature’. This might also be an issue of control, as James is clear about the link between 
mystical states and the will: 
Although the oncoming of mystical states may be facilitated by preliminary 
voluntary operations, as by fixing the attention, or going through certain bodily 
performances, or in other ways which manuals of mysticism prescribe; yet when 
the characteristic sort of consciousness has set in, the mystic feels as if his own will 
were in abeyance, and indeed sometimes as if he were grasped and held by a 
superior power. This latter peculiarity connects mystical states with certain definite 
phenomena of secondary or alternative personality, such as prophetic speech, 
automatic writing, or the mediumistic trance.
12
 
This link provides another level to the symbolism of Lowry’s drunk, as his mystical 
operations become enmeshed with the will; another symbolic code which has a long and 
distinct tradition in relation to addiction. Lowry’s critics have occasionally touched on the 
will, but largely as a rhetorical addition to an already symbolically loaded interpretation. 
Tony Bareham suggests that: 
[Drink] has so dominated Geoffrey’s real will to live that he is now a volunteer for 
the inferno, travelling on a one-way ticket to his drink-ridden damnation. His entire 
last day is a downward progress via the drinks he takes, to his inevitable demise. 
His will is now utterly subservient to the authority of the bottle.
13
 
Here, Bareham uses the symbolic aetiology of the drunk’s dark psychology, but moderates 
it slightly to operate within binary strictures. In his version there is a ‘real will to live’, 
which is associated with autonomy, and a ‘drink-ridden damnation’ that emerges from the 
bottle. The will, then, is damaged and overridden by the ‘authority of the bottle’. This 
draws some distinction between symbolic planes in the novel; drink is separate from ‘the 
inferno’ because it is the cause of the Consul’s demise. Grace’s use of this trope is slightly 
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different. Her reading of the ‘real will to live’ is the will to ‘unceasingly strive upwards’’.14 
Grace suggests that this will is lost. However, she does not analyse the association between 
the loss of will and the overt control of ‘the bottle’. Instead, drunkenness and the will are 
buried allusively within the general symbolism of damnation: ‘it is a story of hellfire, and 
hellfire, for Lowry, means paralysis of the will’.15 It is uncertain whether Grace means 
here that a paralysis of the will comes about through drinking and that this is 
metaphorically ‘hellfire’, or if hellfire, paralysis of the will, and drinking are operating in a 
different relation, esoterically and without explicit causation.  
These critical opinions, correctly, demand a clear distinction between Lowry’s life and 
Under the Volcano, between his own proclivities and the Consul’s alcoholism. This is 
necessary, but the latent threat of reductionist readings seems to have prevented critics 
from touching the way in which alcohol is portrayed in the novel, except through – and as 
part of – a wider description of the symbolic and linguistic code of the novel. Although an 
idea of ‘the will’ emerges through some of the critical dialogue, this is generally described 
within a framework that focuses on the literary, theological, or metaphysical analogues of 
the concept.
16
 Although Lowry’s use of free will clearly interacts with these ideas, the will 
also has several other alternate and intersecting histories, both in the philosophical 
literature and in the field of addiction studies. Although there are fine differences between 
the usages of the terminology in these areas, there is significant overlap in scope and 
content. The will, in both cases, is part of the broad language of intentionalism, and is used 
to describe the way in which an agent interacts with an action; the agent who wills their 
actions has a specific kind of authority and control over them. In this, there is crossover 
with other descriptions of the will, in the Christian or literary sense. However, here the 
attempt to isolate a specific intentionalist definition is particularly illuminating. Insofar as 
Lowry’s Consul – despite his enmeshment in wider symbolism – acts, has a relation to 
those actions, and commits those actions within a public domain, those actions can be 
analysed. A philosophical approach can be utilised in order to show how Lowry describes 
the volitional content of these actions, and their status within an addictive framework. This 
reading attempts to show the underlying intentional content which supports the novel, and 
which is only hinted at in a statement like Stephen Spender’s: 
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The circle of Purgatory in which the addict moves is one of unreality, in which 
there is an illusion of choices being made […] but no real choice exists, for he has 
decided to be chosen by his addiction.
17
 
Rather than collapsing the Consul’s choices into fatalism, I suggest that the way in which 
the Consul’s choices are described, and the way in which autonomy and addiction interact 
in these descriptions, give a specific texture to the action of the novel. To elaborate this, I 
use biographical material to suggest how much knowledge of addiction theory and 
therapeutics might be assumed on Lowry’s part. I position this against occurrences which 
illuminate the question of alcoholic action within Under the Volcano. What emerges is a 
layer of references and concepts in the novel which refer specifically to theoretical ideas of 
addiction and action. This becomes a further interpretative plane which interacts with other 
exegetical invitations – symbolic or otherwise – within Under the Volcano. 
This alternative reading of Under the Volcano can be seen in dialogue with some of 
Lowry’s less explicit statements on his novel. In the preface to the first French edition of 
Under the Volcano, Lowry describes both the allegorical postures of the novel and the 
separate intention to ‘write at last an authentic drunkard’s story’.18 In addition, in his 
‘Work in Progress’ statement, he hints at other operative levels: 
It is also true that the realization that one will never get enough, no matter how 
much one drinks, may make a person stop. However here, as in the Volcano, you 
will be right to suspect that dinking is a symbol for something else, wrong to 
imagine that I imagine that to the drinker, while drinking, a drink is symbolic of 
anything else but the next drink.
19
  
The claims in this statement do not necessarily contradict each other, they suggest planes 
of interpretation. The oppositions that Lowry sets up in this statement are not mutual 
exclusions within the text, but a disentanglement of the symbolic and non-symbolic. The 
final deflating claim of the passage does not necessarily suggest that the phenomenology 
of the drinker is not present in Under the Volcano. If taken with the desire for authenticity 
expressed in his ‘Preface to a Novel’, we are pointed towards an ‘authentic’ anti-
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symbolism which would also need to be present in order to fulfil his ‘drunkard’s story’. In 
addition to this, the first claim of this passage hints at an experience of addiction which is 
embedded in the act of drinking; a separate framework within which ‘the will’ is also 
operational, but which is distinguished from the symbolic web of the novel. Here then, we 
can distinguish two separate instantiations of the will and its relation to drink; one which is 
embedded within Lowry’s metaphorical alcoholism, and one which operates as part of 
Lowry’s phenomenology of alcoholism. In the former, drinking can always mean 
something else insofar as it is a symbolic act. In the latter, the act of drinking is an action 
of an agent who is drinking because they want a drink. This is action as the manifestation 
of a choice in the moment, the elusive sense of first-person agency. However, just as non-
addictive actions are difficult to describe ‘in the moment’ without rationalisation or 
motive-hunting, so too is the phenomenology of addictive-choice entangled in the same 
wider frameworks of action-comprehension. The phenomenological and metaphorical 
positions are extricable, either in addiction studies or in Under the Volcano. However, the 
intellectual framework of intentionalism that Lowry touches on deserves specific attention, 
as do its multiple crossings between the literature of action and the literature on addiction. 
This is an effort to disentangle these concepts from the symbolic code, before re-
entangling them once more later in the chapter. Expansion of the will within this 
framework reflects insights back onto Lowry’s multi-layered approach, and his use of the 
intentionality of addiction within this scheme.  
  Addiction and Intention 
Addiction is subject to constant academic misuse; both as the subject of study and as a 
test-case in tangential debates. There is not a defining model of addiction. Instead, its 
conceptualisation is tied to a host of other definitional problems. The term ‘compulsion’, 
for example, is regularly – though contentiously – used in connection to the addict-
experience. Compulsion is closely associated with conceptions of freedom insofar as it 
describes a state in which there appears to be no space for agency. Compulsion denotes 
action which is controlled by factors which are not intrinsic to the self. Agency is 
associated with autonomy and control, and this is the sense in which ‘the will’ is often 
used in the literature; to describe the conscious volitional input of an agent in relation to 
their actions. What emerges, then, is a clear distinction between the autonomous agent 
with a will, and the agent who is subject to compulsion, from whom these powers of 
170 
 
control are wrested. Neil Levy offers a clear description of how these terms are often used 
in relation to addiction: 
So devastating are its effects on the will that addicts do not even get into the 
autonomy ball-park. Addiction does not merely impair autonomy, it is widely felt; 
instead its effects go much deeper, destroying agency itself.
20
 
The history of addiction literature that Levy is drawing upon is perhaps best encapsulated 
in the following example from William James, in which addictive compulsion – the 
craving – is conjured with particular lucidity: 
The craving for a drink in real dipsomaniacs, or for opium or chloral in those 
subjugated, is of a strength of which normal persons can form no conception. 
‘Were a keg of rum in one corner of a room and were a cannon constantly 
discharging balls between me and it, I could not refrain from passing before that 
cannon in order to get the rum’; ‘If a bottle of brandy stood at one hand and the pit 
of hell yawned at the other, and I were convinced that I should be pushed in as sure 
as I took one glass, I could not refrain’: such statements abound in dipsomaniacs’ 
mouths.
21
 
This idea of compulsion, as a state which is out of control, leads free will theorists to 
frequently make anecdotal use of the addict as a test case for our common-sense notions of 
what it takes to be ‘free’.22 However, the idea of diminished, or even non-existent, 
authority results in a further set of conceptual issues. Not only is the idea contentious as a 
description of the phenomenology of addiction, but it is also problematic within the 
surrounding legal and medical discourses. As I described in the last chapter, moral 
responsibility is closely associated with agential control. If addicts are conceptualised as 
subject to compulsive behaviours which are out of their control, then there is a sense in 
which they are apparently not morally responsible for their actions. As Gary Watson 
suggests, this is adopted in different ways according to different medico-ethical 
interpretations; either as a ‘necessary step to a more humane policy’, or as ‘morally 
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evasive – indeed, countertherapeutic’.23 Aside from the position of compulsion in relation 
to other theories, Watson notes that the term itself does not even have a fixed meaning. If 
intrapersonal compulsion is taken non-metaphorically, then – to stay in line with the use of 
the term in the medico-legal sphere – it should act as a kind of irresistible desire which 
directly contradicts the desires of the agent, and which they are powerless against.
24
 To 
contradict this, Watson directs us to Joel Feinberg: 
Strictly speaking no impulse is irresistible; for every case of giving in to a desire 
[…] it will be true that, if the person had tried harder, he would have resisted it 
successfully. The psychological situation is never – or hardly ever – like that of the 
man who hangs from a windowsill by his fingernails until the sheer physical force 
of gravity rips his nails off and sends him plummeting to the ground.
25
    
If compulsion does not operate as irresistibility, then, as Watson and Levy make clear, 
addiction cannot be conceptualised according to these codes. As Levy suggests, statistics 
from within addiction studies corroborate this: drug use is financially sensitive, and intake 
is often deliberately regulated in order to maintain the efficacy of a hit.
26
 Here, then, is a 
discourse related to the problems of conceptualising compulsion, and the way in which 
desires, autonomy and action relate to the case of the addict. This provides one plane in the 
debate. 
The philosophical and therapeutic approaches to addiction are not always in harmony. 
Although there may be some interaction between the two, there is also a clear sense in 
which pragmatism dictates therapeutics more directly. Owen Flanagan, for example, is 
clear about the debate surrounding addictive volition, but focuses on the way in which 
ideas of compulsion can be useful, even if they stray from accuracy:  
Addicts speak about themselves as if they are and were responsible in all the 
normal ways other people speak about such matters. Addicts think they are 
responsible for what they do. However, it has proved useful for addicts to admit 
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that they are powerless over __, where __ is the addict’s drug of choice or list of 
[drugs of choice].
27
   
Although Flanagan recognises that addicts generally self-identify as responsible, he also 
notes the ‘performative inconsistency’ which characterises much addictive behaviour; the 
sense that they have oscillating preferences which lead them to act by contrarily 
renouncing drug use and continuing to take drugs. In this respect, addictive behaviour is 
subject to a different action pathology from the norm: ‘Normally, reasons for action that 
pass all things considered evaluation find their way onto the motivational circuits as 
causes. This does not happen normally in cases of addiction’.28 For Flanagan, normal 
action is in part constituted by considerations of value, while addictive motivation 
bypasses these value considerations and has undue influence on repeatedly directing action 
towards a specific end. It is in response to the oscillation in choice – between considered 
motivation and drug-motivation – that Flanagan recommends the benefit of the addict’s 
self-identifying as non-autonomous in relation to drug use. 
Performative inconsistency is central to the medicalised language of addiction control, and 
is written in to the basic distinctions in response. Although Flanagan’s recommendation 
might be useful in some cases, a finer grained appraisal of the social construction of 
addiction can offer a better sense of how moral responsibility, autonomy and drug-use are 
conceptualised in relation to each other within different discourses. The fourfold model 
developed by Brickman et al.,
29
 and repeated by Marlatt and Fromme, is particularly useful 
in its demarcations of these concepts. In this schema, the combinations of two questions 
with two answers produce four different results. In turn, these correspond to separate 
models of addiction and responsibility: 
(1) Is the individual (addict) considered to be personally responsible for the 
development (etiology) or the addiction problem (yes/no), and (2) is the addict 
considered the responsible agent for changing the problem (yes/no)?
30
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The separation of these questions makes the mechanisms of social and personal 
responsibility slightly clearer, and importantly distinguishes the structure of recovery from 
the original causation involved in the beginning of an addiction. Further, Brickman’s 
schema makes it clear that responses to addiction are conditioned by the way addicts are 
conceived as agents more or less in control of their own state. The responses point to ways 
in which the individual addict’s self-conception is tied into a feedback loop with the 
therapeutic style that they encounter. The addict’s self-description of responsibility is in 
part dependent on the conceptions of responsibility conveyed by the therapeutic discourses 
they come into contact with. Although Brickman’s responses are not exhaustive, the 
divergence that emerges from so few variables makes the discourse and response dynamic 
particularly striking: 
 (1) the medical/ disease model, which assumes that the addict is considered free 
from personal responsibility for the development of the addiction, but that change 
is impossible unless one submits to some kind of medical treatment program 
(presumably geared toward the alleviation of the underlying disease); (2) the moral 
model, which holds that the addict is to blame for becoming addicted (e.g., due to 
lack of willpower or moral fibre) and that he or she is also to be held responsible 
for changing or failing to change the addictive behaviour; (3) the so-called 
enlightenment model, which holds that the addict is to some extent personally 
responsible for the emergence of the addiction but must give up the notion of 
personal control in order to change (as in AA, where the alcoholic becomes 
enlightened to the notion that change is possible only by relinquishing personal 
control to a ‘higher power’); and (4) the compensatory model, which holds that the 
individual learns to ‘compensate’ for a problem by assuming active responsibility 
and self-mastery in the change process but that the individual is not held personally 
responsible for the problem (e.g., addiction develops as a function of multiple 
biopsychosocial determinants, and not as a failure in personal will).
31
 
What is clear from Brickman’s model is the way in which the concept of free will enters 
the categories of description. The idea of a will is clearest in responses (2) and (3). In the 
former, it is the responsibility of the addict to use their ‘willpower’ to break the addiction, 
and in the latter (as in Flanagan’s model) the addict gives up the concept of willpower to a 
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greater spiritual authority. Models (1) and (4) interact with the concept of willpower by 
largely avoiding the concept of personal responsibility by emphasising either the biological 
or social determinants of behaviour. Although these concepts are not neatly partitioned in 
Malcolm Lowry’s work, they are all present. The idea that there is feedback between the 
therapeutic experience of alcoholism and the conception of addiction allows a reading of 
Lowry’s work which also utilises his biographical material without reductionism, 
emphasising instead the way that concepts of autonomy and the will feed into Under the 
Volcano through Lowry’s use of different addictive discourses.  
 Lowry’s Models of Addiction 
The exact details of Lowry’s own treatment are unknown. However, biographical evidence 
suggests that, even if his therapeutic experience was largely unsophisticated, he was aware 
of several theoretical and medical approaches to addiction. Gordon Bowker, in his 
biography of Lowry, makes a clear opposition between the standard treatment of ‘drying 
out’ and the possibility of a more extensive plan in the form of psychiatric attention. 
Lowry’s first wife, Jan Gabrial appears to have been the first to bring the psychiatric 
response to alcoholism to Lowry’s attention. In 1938, she made repeated attempts to have 
Lowry admitted to the Menninger Clinic, after reading Karl Menninger’s Man Against 
Himself.
32
 However, her attempts were not successful, and Lowry’s treatment remained 
basic:    
On 15 August, [1938], Lowry entered a clinic at La Crescenta for drying-out, 
something which Jan [thought] would be useless; he had gone through this before, 
in Moretonhampstead and in Bellevue, and it had never helped him. What he 
needed was in-depth psychiatric treatment.
33
 
Had Lowry gone to the Menninger Clinic, he might have been treated with ‘confinement, 
plus psychoanalysis, plus the proper direction of the increasing capacity for externally 
directed aggressions’.34 Menninger claims that this broad approach can bring about a cure 
‘not only of drinking but of the infantilism which accompanies it and the character 
deformities which produce it’, a claim that could not have been said ‘of any other 
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treatment of alcohol addiction at the present time’.35 Although Lowry was never subject to 
Menninger’s treatment, the episode reveals an opposition which is frequently repeated in 
the history of alcoholism studies between interventionist cures and willpower cures. 
Although this distinction is not fixed, there does seem to be an ideological difference 
between the two. The interventionist cure situates alcoholism as a holistic problem which 
needs to be approached on several fronts. In contrast, the willpower cure demands 
increased self-control from the patient by providing the minimum conditions for this self-
control to occur. Drying-out is the conventional first step. There is clearly an operative 
distinction between the ways in which each approach apportions individual responsibility, 
as the willpower cure places almost total responsibility for recovery on the addict. 
Despite the differences between them, these treatments also form part of the debate around 
the ‘disease concept’ of alcoholism. What both approaches have in common is a more or 
less explicit refusal to define alcoholism as a disease. In the drying-out process, the 
purgative approach removes the offending substance and does not treat the ongoing 
addiction. Conversely, Menninger’s approach is explicitly focussed on the addiction, but 
does not see this as a disease in its own right, but rather as a symptom of another, 
psychological, disease:   
No, the victim of alcohol addiction knows what most of his critics do not know, 
namely, that alcoholism is not a disease, or at least not the principal disease from 
which he suffers; furthermore, he knows that he does not know the pain or nature of 
the dreadful pain and fear within him which impel him, blindly, to alcoholic self-
destruction.
36
 
Menninger’s formulation places the cure in the hands of the therapist who is able to coax 
the real disease out from under the guise of the alcoholic symptoms even if self-knowledge 
is latent in the patient. As is apparent in his writing, Lowry seems to have been aware of 
psychoanalytic approaches to alcoholism other than Menninger’s. This is evident in his use 
of the phrase ‘return to the presexual revives the necessity for nutrition’ in Lunar Caustic, 
the composition of which began following his stay in Bellevue.
37
 Although the exact 
sources of Lowry’s psychoanalytic education are not known, the phrase is diagnostically 
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close to Sándor Radó’s 1926 article on ‘The Psychic Effects of Intoxicants’, one of the 
first psychoanalytic papers to explicitly treat the subject of addiction. Ralph Crowley, in 
his early review of the psychoanalytic literature on drug addiction, notes Radó’s use of oral 
eroticism to describe addicts: 
How does oral eroticism account for those individuals who do not take drugs by 
mouth? This is explained by regarding oral eroticism as including not only the 
mouth region, but also the stomach, intestines, the processes of digestion and 
absorption, and the diffusion of well being over the whole organism. The latter 
[Radó] calls alimentary orgasm and compares it to the happy state of the suckling 
after eating.
38
  
[…] 
Radó regards pharmacogenic orgasm as a special instance of alimentary orgasm. 
Phylogenetically, alimentary orgasm is the original form of pleasure and is bound 
up with the self-preservative function. In the course of evolution the genital has 
taken over from the nutrition part of its orgastic function. In the use of drugs, man 
recaptures in a more satisfying form the original alimentary orgasm, and eliminates 
the need for genital satisfaction.
39
 
In Radó’s own words, the ‘alimentary orgasm represents the original form of orgastic 
gratification, and […], accordingly, the highest pleasure-function of primitive living beings 
is bound up with their most important self-preservative function’.40 The addict’s 
attachment to the ‘alimentary orgasm’ prevents his sexual development, returning him to a 
presexual state and eliding nutrition and sexual gratification. Bill Plantagenet of Lunar 
Caustic is supposed to have reaped his psychoanalytic insight from ‘a little book’.41 Even 
without the original source it is clear that Lowry’s phrasing is congruent with the 
psychoanalytic establishment view. At least in this case, it is clear that Lowry’s use of the 
psychoanalytic phrasing in his literary work is an introduction of a particular discourse into 
the work. Plantagenet’s self-analysing reflects a particular way in which Lowry constructs 
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his character reading himself and his addiction in relation to a specific medical discourse. 
Here, self-scrutiny is a way of representing Plantagenet’s interaction with the social 
construction of his drug use. By setting him within a social discourse, Lowry obliquely 
introduces connotations of the relationship between the addict and responsibility.      
Lowry continued to come into contact with medical conceptions of alcoholism, and by the 
time he was writing Under the Volcano, it is clear that he was well versed in contemporary 
alcoholese. One letter to Conrad Aiken from 1940 shows Lowry trying to shed the idea of 
himself as an alcoholic: 
As to drink rotting one’s honesty, alas, that is true. At one time I felt indeed that 
more than rotting my honesty it was destroying my identity as well. Many of my 
troubles, but also many of my wisest decisions, are due to it but I am not, as Parks 
has suggested, allergic, whatever that means, to it. I have at last gotten wise to it, 
ceased to tell myself polite little lies about it, forced myself to realize what 
allowances are made for one when tight, and hence how much one deceives one’s 
self, and have at last put this bogy where it should be, as simply a concomitant of 
social intercourse.
42
 
The letter is striking both in the way in which Lowry manipulates the language of alcohol 
and responsibility, and in the way in which this is mixed with a report of Parks’ quasi-
medical claim that alcoholism is an allergy. The inward-turned rhetoric of the letter 
provides a hedged admission through which he presents himself slightly ironically. As 
such, it acts as a mildly self-exculpatory plea; it balances ‘troubles’ against the ‘wisest 
decisions’, concedes to recognising ‘what allowances are made for one when tight’, 
intimates responsibility through the suggestion that alcohol implies self-deception, while 
also skirting this responsibility by defining the problem as ‘a concomitant of social 
intercourse’. Into this shifting picture, the allergy (or any other medical theory, it is 
implied) is singled out as an absolutist position, and rejected.  
Although the allergy concept of alcoholism was never widely adopted by the medical 
establishment, it was well-known, as E.M Jellinek notes, following ‘Toulouse’s study in 
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1896’.43 More significantly, the concept was revived by W.D. Silkworth in 1937, and 
‘from 1939 on it became widely spread through the book “Alcoholics Anonymous” and 
members of the fellowship of the same name’.44 Predating this letter by a year, it is not 
unlikely that Parks’ terminology was influenced by the A.A. movement and the 
publication of the first Big Book. Although Jellinek notes that the allergy concept has been 
used both literally and figuratively, it is clear that in the first edition of Alcoholics 
Anonymous, the concept is used in an overtly literal sense. The 1939 edition begins with 
‘The Doctor’s Opinion’, an embedded anonymized letter:45  
We believe, and so suggested a few years ago, that the action of alcohol on these 
chronic alcoholics is a manifestation of an allergy; that the phenomenon of craving 
is limited to this class and never occurs in the average temperate drinker. The 
allergic types can never safely use alcohol in any form at all.
46
 
This is framed by A.A.’s opinion of the doctor’s approach: 
The doctor’s theory that we have an allergy to alcohol interests us. As laymen, our 
opinion as to its soundness may, of course, mean little. But as ex-alcoholics, we 
can say that his explanation makes good sense. It explains many things for which 
we cannot otherwise account.
47
 
Later in the book, this becomes explicitly linked with the disease concept: 
An illness of this sort – and we have come to believe it an illness – involves those 
about us in a way no other human sickness can.
48
 
Another book of popular psychology, from 1938, also determines the ‘allergic’ nature of 
some alcoholics. However, for Strecker and Chambers, this is an explicitly ‘psychic 
allergy’, which is vaguely accompanied by an exculpatory ethic: 
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[It] might be mentioned that there is nothing any more humiliating or disgraceful 
about having a psychic allergy to alcohol than there is about having a physical 
allergy, or sensitivity, to fish or strawberries, or any other article of food.
49
 
The allergy concept, literal or metaphorical, psychic or physical, plays in to the long-
history of drug discourse which attempts to conceptualise the slippery notion of a repeating 
behaviour which is carried out by an agent who appears to consistently reject the act.
50
 
Addiction seems to incorporate both physical and psychological factors, insofar as addicts 
can recover despite distinct withdrawal symptoms. A theory of addiction must be 
malleable enough to incorporate both the notion that ‘the addict is not in control of her 
behaviour’ and the deliberateness with which she ‘purchases, possesses, and consumes her 
drug’.51 As explored above, this definitional complexity is compounded by the way in 
which addictive behaviour fits into more elaborate conceptualisations of addiction and 
responsibility. If the allergy model above is taken to represent a particular etiology of 
addiction, then it has repercussions for the way in which both addiction and recovery are 
conceptualised. This is particularly clear in treatment plans like the A.A., in which an 
acceptance of the disease model becomes the catalyst for a reliance on spiritual aid, the 
one-day-at-a-time model, and the addict-for-life ethos.    
An understanding of these models becomes particularly useful turning back to Lowry, 
whose letters show how the attempt to explain addiction can become an entangled 
justificatory exercise. An exceptional letter from Lowry to his father from 1942 shows him 
explaining the results of a series of medical examinations, and attempting to pinpoint the 
effect his heavy drinking might be having on his health:    
As you know what was decided was that nothing was wrong with me more or less 
save liquor and self neglect. There was a dental problem, munificently taken care 
of. There was a morbid psychological problem too – there still is – but it is one that 
I am largely solving myself, and too much emphasis – my fault again – was 
damagingly laid on that. After a certain point, psychological problems are a matter 
of guts. However, that there was a serious medical problem beyond that of mere 
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weak will everyone seemed predisposed to deny, including eventually myself, 
because the disposal to accept the medical solution seemed part of the morbid state 
I was half heartedly trying, and being encouraged to shake off […] To get on – it 
was decided that I was simply drinking because I couldn’t make up my mind to 
stop – and there is a great element of truth in this – and that that was the cause of 
my ills.
52
 
This passage steers away from the disease concept, both by emphasising that the 
physicians were ‘predisposed to deny’ any medical etiology for his drinking, then by 
signalling the feedback that this apparently had on the way in which he ‘eventually’ 
conceptualised his drinking himself. After abandoning the medical crutch, Lowry’s 
physicians seem firmly to attribute total responsibility to him. Weak-willed, Lowry ‘was 
simply drinking’, not because he couldn’t stop himself, but because he couldn’t make up 
his mind to stop. Although this seems to make the apportioning of responsibility very 
clear, Lowry begins the explanation with a pre-emptive caveat: a ‘morbid psychological 
problem’ is still persistent. This is dismissed as a reparable ‘matter of guts’, but here the 
weak-will thesis holds up less convincingly, and in turn provides a shaky foundation for 
the later declaration of abstinence by retaining the ‘morbid psychological problem’ as a 
phantasmal etiology. The way in which Lowry frames the distinctions between disease and 
willpower become more complex later in the letter when, after ostensibly abandoning the 
disease concept, Lowry tells his father what is really wrong with him: 
Secondly I had not (nor have had) any venereal disease, nor any liver trouble nor 
any lasting ‘result’ of alcoholism in the past, however alcoholic I might have been. 
Third, I did have, what might be worse than all these if not taken in hand 
immediately, namely a largely streptococcic multiple glandular infection, and this I 
had had not one, not two, not five, but possibly for as long as ten years, during part 
of which time it must have lain dormant. In short I have been, without knowing it, 
toxic, living in a state of being slowly poisoned and undermined physically and 
mentally, for the best part of a decade. As I have said drink cannot cause this, 
though naturally it aggravates it.
53
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Here Lowry is describing, not the medical causes of his drinking, but the physical results 
of it. Again, responsibility is interwoven in the description, and the ‘multiple glandular 
infection’ becomes a way of explaining his ills without recourse to alcohol. Although drink 
‘aggravates it’, the separation of the infection from his alcoholism allows him to regard 
himself as not responsible for his ill health; a morally neutral conclusion that reflectively 
justifies his alcoholism on the basis that it has no lasting physical effects other than those 
that occur through its combination with infectious circumstances beyond his control.  
The ranging obscurantism of the letter mirrors the vagaries of the medical discourse that 
Lowry is attempting at once to marshal, explain and rhetorically manipulate. This is even 
written into what appears to be the simplest admission in the letter, that ‘it was decided 
that I was simply drinking because I couldn’t make up my mind to stop’. This pragmatism 
doesn’t shed light on the physical, behavioural and social complexities of stopping, but it 
does point towards the heart of the difficulty in addiction models. As Neil Levy correctly 
suggests, numerous findings reveal that addiction is not compulsive or irresistible. Instead, 
addicts frequently act rationally, both in the ways in which they take drugs, and the ways 
in which they abstain. Because of this, it is hard not to conclude as Levy does:   
So why do addicts consume their drugs? The short and only somewhat misleading 
answer is that they take drugs because they want to. Indeed, there is a very real 
sense in which they choose to take their drug. […] It is not compulsion, or 
coercion; it is, in some sense, volition.
54
 
This doesn’t entirely characterise the problem of addiction. As Levy’s slightly qualified 
ascription of ‘volition’ suggests, there is still an inclination to view addictive action as not-
quite as freely executed as non-addictive action, even if all evidence suggests that the term 
‘volition’ still correctly applies. This minor caveat notwithstanding, there is certainly a 
deep sense in which addicts are still thought of as agents. Indeed, much of the tragedy in 
Under the Volcano is dependent upon the conflict between the Consul’s agency – through 
which he is able to choose what to do and how to do it – and his behaviour which 
constantly undermines the trust in this agency. The idea that there is a volitional aspect to 
addiction also appears in Under the Volcano, in a remarkable echo of Lowry’s letter to his 
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father. Lowry’s phrase is repeated in the words of Dr Guzmán, from whom Hugh buys the 
Consul’s strychnine, and of whom Hugh says:  
I tried to persuade him to see Geoff. But he refused to waste time on him. He said 
simply that so far as he knew there was nothing wrong with Papa and never had 
been save that he wouldn’t make up his mind to stop drinking. That seems plain 
enough and I dare say it’s true.55 
Here, as in the letter, the phrase becomes immediately entangled with slightly conflicting 
appraisals of the situation. While Guzmán claims that the Consul ‘wouldn’t make up his 
mind to stop drinking’, he says this while prescribing him strychnine.56 This move itself 
plays equivocally with the disease concept. Not only does the very act of prescribing seem 
slightly conflicted, but the choice of drug is also interesting. Strychnine cannot be said to 
play directly into the disease concept, because its benefits and medical history are simply 
too confused. It is a thoroughly ambiguous medicine, and it is possible that Lowry chose it 
for this reason.  
Strychnine does not have clear medical uses or benefits. The closeness of its therapeutic 
and lethal doses led to it falling out of favour with the medical establishment, and its 
appearance in Under the Volcano must have been anachronistic even in the 1930s (though 
this might also indicate Dr Guzman’s out of date medical approaches). Although the 
benefits of strychnine have been largely rejected for some time, it seems to have been used 
to treat chronic alcoholism, among other things, in the decades leading up to 1930. In this 
usage, it seems to have been administered predominantly as a palliative rather than a cure; 
as a general stimulant and tonic. Pharmacological indexes seem contested on its exact use. 
A 1906 Text-Book of Pharmacology notes that ‘Strychnine is said to be of value in chronic 
alcoholism in lessening the depression which forms one of the chief difficulties in the 
treatment’, which might suggest that it was being used in conjunction with a process of 
abstinence, or as a general stimulant to counteract the depressive action of alcohol on the 
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body.
57
 However, the British Pharmaceutical Codex of 1923 notes a range of broad 
medicinal uses: ‘[strychnine] is much used as a gastric tonic in dyspepsia, and as a general 
tonic in convalescence from acute disease; with atropine it is used in dipsomania, 
hypodermically, and by the mouth’.58 Research on strychnine-alcohol antagonism 
conducted in the 1930s suggests that there was some effort made to formalise the relation 
between strychnine and alcohol, with specific regard to strychnine as a counteractive 
stimulant. The results of testing on animals brought back minimal results:  
Strychnine reverses the alcohol depression of the higher centres only to a slight 
degree; it does not effectively abolish ataxia or the loss of postural reflexes induced 
by large doses of alcohol.
59
    
Although the research is largely concentrated on the effect of strychnine as a respiratory 
stimulant, following alcohol-induced respiratory paralysis, attention to the effect of 
strychnine on the ‘higher centres’ suggests that the drug may have been used, not simply 
as a general stimulant with regard to alcoholism, but perhaps more specifically as a way of 
counteracting drunkenness. This certainly seems to be how the Consul uses it:  
‘But my lord, Yvonne, surely you know by this time I can’t get drunk however 
much I drink,’ he said almost tragically, taking an abrupt swallow of strychnine. 
‘Why, do you think I like swilling down this awful nux vomica or belladonna or 
whatever it is of Hugh’s?’60  
Although neither the Consul nor Hugh is ever explicit about the benefits of the strychnine 
solution, it seems to be acting less as a general stimulant than as a method for accelerated 
drying out: 
‘I shall sober up.’ He returned and poured some more strychnine into the other 
glass, filling it, then moved the strychnine bottle from the tray into a more 
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prominent position on the parapet. ‘After all I have been out all night: what could 
one expect?’61 
Here, the strychnine is dispensed in direct relation to the Consul’s self-addressed 
justifications. Rather than moving to a point of analysing the underlying actions 
themselves, the Consul is attempting to operate and manipulate the effects of those actions; 
i.e. how drunk he feels. Despite the ambiguity of the cure, the mentions of strychnine are 
also frequently accompanied by the most frank insights into alcoholism in the novel. The 
disease concept is never approached directly in Under the Volcano, though the following 
passage comes closest by casual allusion:  
‘I am too sober. I have lost my familiars, my guardian angels. I am straightening 
out,’ he added, sitting down again opposite the strychnine bottle with his glass. ‘In 
a sense what happened was a sign of my fidelity, my loyalty; any other man would 
have spent this last year in a very different manner. At least I have no disease,’ he 
cried in his heart, the cry seeming to end on a somewhat doubtful note, however.
62
 
In this passage, the slippery concept of alcoholism as a disease and the more direct idea of 
physical diseases play into one another, the Consul begins by claiming to ‘have no 
[venereal] disease’, as if citing Lowry’s letter to his father, but ends on a ‘doubtful note’, 
clearly aware that his year spent drinking might also constitute an illness, but secure in his 
quasi-moral claim that he didn’t spend ‘last year in a very different manner’ precisely 
because of his drinking. This small joke is the only appearance of the disease concept in 
the novel. While Dr Guzmán’s comments directly evoke a willpower thesis of addiction, 
the strychnine, though ambiguous, points to a more complex phenomenology. As well as 
apparently counteracting the physical effects of alcohol, the tonic also briefly becomes an 
alcohol replacement that stands as surrogate in the habits and rituals of the Consul’s daily 
life. Though this potentially points to a way of understanding the addiction that escapes the 
absolutist terms of the disease or willpower models, the Consul’s recovery is hampered by 
what he regards as the counteractive social dominance of the willpower thesis: 
But can’t you see you cabrón that she is thinking that the first thing you think of 
after she has arrived home like this is a drink even if it is only a drink of strychnine 
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the intrusive necessity for which and juxtaposition cancels its innocence so you see 
you might as well in the face of such hostility might you not start now on the 
whisky instead of later 
63
 
Here he is most concerned with the ‘intrusive necessity’ of the habit. He rejects the 
strychnine because it replaces the alcohol, and is equally indicative of his dependence as 
whisky itself. The covert posturing of the willpower thesis underlies this statement, which, 
in its Manichean dynamic, allows the Consul’s justificatory rhetoric to swing towards 
drink, as that at least is written into the plain opposition between total abstinence and total 
sobriety. In this way, the habitual status of the Consul’s drinking only really makes itself 
known when he attempts to replace the drink with strychnine; the strychnine highlights the 
habit of his drinking.  
 Free Will  
The idea of free will, as Richard Holton suggests, is not a unified concept.
64
 In the analysis 
of addiction above, there are distinctions between even the central concepts of freedom as 
it is used in the moral and phenomenological senses. A phenomenological sense of free 
will is given by the experience of agency, and when philosophers suggest that addiction 
infringes on freedom, they are drawing on the idea that addiction infringes on agency. The 
moral meaning of the term, as described above, draws on the idea that free will captures a 
sense in which an agent is responsible for their actions. If the agent is not acting according 
to free will – as might be argued is the case in addiction – then there is a way in which they 
might not be deemed responsible. Willpower seems to be a further, separable, idea which 
is also connected but distinct from other categories invoked in the term free will. 
Willpower might describe an experience of agency, but it is clear from the literature on 
addiction that it is also used rhetorically to describe ways of acting that exhibit greater or 
lesser free will in opposition to the control of a drug. The slippage and range of these 
categories suggest the inadequacy of a single unified idea of ‘the will’. In the unified ideal, 
the notion of ‘the will’ is used reciprocally to constitute the definition of ‘free will’:  
                                                          
63
 Under the Volcano, p. 74. 
64
 Richard Holton, ‘Disentangling the Will’, in Free Will and Consciousness: How Might They Work?, ed. by 
Alfred Mele, Roy Baumeister, and Kathleen Vohs (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 82–100. 
186 
 
[Freedom] is dependence of action upon the will […] the relative dependency 
relation defines the relevant notion of self-determination; the self is the will. Hence 
self-determination is determination by the will.
65
  
In these absolute terms, exercising the will is both the constitutive mark of self-
determination and – reflexively – of free will itself. However, as the different facets of 
‘free will’ suggest, several concepts have to be tied together in order to give substance to 
the experience of freedom. A definitional usage of ‘the will’ alone seems too thin for this 
purpose, as it is unable to capture the phenomenological complexity of the feeling of 
agency.
66
 To add further complexity to the idea of free will, it is clear that the concept of 
human freedom is not restricted to moral and agential categories, but extends to a 
metaphysical usage. Holton also describes this third facet, which he describes as the 
‘modal’ concept of free will.67 In Under the Volcano, Lowry’s treatment of addiction 
touches on aspects of moral and phenomenological free will, in addition to the willpower 
theses. The broad conceptual scope of the terminology of free will allows him to 
interweave these uses with distinctly metaphysical uses of the term. From this point, 
Lowry’s scope is not limited to the individual, but widens to involve concepts invoking 
both historical and political freedom. Even within this deeply entangled structure, it is 
possible to distinguish how the language of addiction and intention continues to 
reverberate among the more distinct symbolism of the novel.    
From early drafts of Under the Volcano, Lowry has included a discursive section of prose 
in which the Consul, Hugh and Yvonne are eating a meal, following the episode in which 
the pelado robs the peon. This scene is interwoven with a long history of colonial politics. 
The peon is a native Mexican, who is found by the side of the road, dying of a head 
wound. The Consul, Hugh and Yvonne are on their way to Tomalín on a bus, when the 
vehicle is stopped to allow inspection of the body. The pelado is another passenger on the 
bus, a ‘Spaniard’ who ‘came over [to Mexico] after the Moroccan war’.68 The term pelado 
is defined in the novel as follows: 
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A Spaniard, say, could interpret it as Indian, the Indian he despised, used, made 
drunk. The Indian, however, might mean Spaniard by it. Either might mean by it 
anyone who made a show of himself. It was perhaps one of those words that had 
actually been distilled out of conquest, suggesting, as it did, on the one hand thief, 
on the other exploiter.
69
 
The pelado in this scene is a belated conquistador, who also symbolises the historic 
exploitation of the people of Mexico. His position is summed up in his action of robbing 
the dying man of his few remaining coins. Although the pelado robs the peon, the main 
crime, which is shared by all of the onlookers, is their collective non-intervention. They do 
not help the dying man because of a law, as the Consul explains, to prevent others 
becoming an ‘accessory after the fact’.70  
This scene of non-intervention and guilt forms the background for the argument in Chapter 
Ten. The conversation emerges in complex waves of abstractions as the Consul attempts to 
justify their passive inaction, both as metaphysically sound, and as part of a larger, global-
historical dynamic. In the conversation, the excursus on freedom and responsibility is 
dominated by the Consul’s use of arguments from Tolstoy’s Second Epilogue to War and 
Peace. Although the scene was present from early on in the drafting stage of Under the 
Volcano, the Tolstoy allusion, and its structural significance within this scene, has 
markedly changed between drafts.
71
 An early draft of the novel embeds the quotation in 
the rather plain exchanges of the conversation, with the allusion acting predominantly as 
an ironic comment on the Consul’s drunken state: 
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‘This is the way I should begin it, something like this.’ He cleared his throat and 
spoke slowly, trying to make the ponderous, long-created phrases sound 
impromptu, as though he had just though he had just thought of them himself: in 
fact, it was his main idea now to make them think this, since he had forgotten 
having mentioned War and Peace a minute ago. Nevertheless he felt quite capable 
of repeating what he had not had occasion to repeat in public since those days 
seventeen years ago as a lecturer at Tortu, that seat of learning where knowledge 
was so literally imbibed, and where work, as the English had it, was so admittedly 
the curse of the drinking classes. ‘The act of a madman or a drunkard,’ he said 
flatly, ‘or of a man labouring under violent excitement, seems less free and more 
inevitable to the one who knows the mental condition of the man who performed 
the action, and more free and less inevitable to the one who does not know it.’72  
When, in later drafts, this section is developed, the modifications embed the Consul’s 
Tolstoy in a more rhapsodic atmosphere. Lowry’s drafting period for Under the Volcano 
took place over a period of ten years. During this time, the novel was radically altered. In 
terms of the form of the novel, the clearest stylistic change took place in narration. As Vice 
notes, the early versions of the text often include statements which are set within ‘the 
consciousness of the characters’. Part of the editorial process that Lowry conducted was to 
unmoor these statements from their ‘ostensible originators’, whose original voices seem 
‘stilted and unlikely, precisely as if the people, who are simply the pretexts for certain 
verbal snippets to appear, are also merely speaking for the sake of it’.73 In later drafts, the 
quotations and claims which made up these ‘verbal snippets’ are truncated, erased, 
redistributed, or reattributed to other sources within the text, with the resultant effect of 
increased density and polyphony.
74
  
Instead of ‘trying to make the ponderous, long-created phrases sound impromptu’, the 
Consul now talks: 
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[L]ike Sir Thomas Browne, of Archimedes, Moses, Achilles, Methusleh [sic.], 
Charles V and Pontius Pilate.
75
 The Consul was talking furthermore of Jesus 
Christ, or rather of Yus Asaf who, according to the Kashmiri legend, was Christ – 
Christ, who had, after being taken down from the cross, wandered to Kashmir in 
search of the lost tribes of Israel, and died there, in Srinagar –  
 
But there was a slight mistake. The Consul was not talking. Apparently not. The 
Consul had not uttered a single word. It was all an illusion, a whirling cerebral 
chaos, out of which, at last, at long last; at this very instant, emerged, rounded and 
complete, order: 
‘The act of a madman or a drunkard, old bean,’ he said, ‘or of a man labouring 
under violent excitement seems less free and more inevitable to the one who knows 
the mental condition of the man who performed the action, and more free and less 
inevitable to the one who does not know it.’76 
The change is from the Consul reciting the quotation and laboriously attempting to make it 
sound spontaneous, to the narration removing speech from the conscious efforts of the 
Consul, and making it a ‘chaos’ from which emerges the small habitual remembrance: 
[L]ike that little piece one had learned, so laboriously, years ago, only to forget 
whenever one particularly wanted to play it, until one day one got drunk in such a 
way that one’s fingers themselves recalled the combination and, miraculously, 
perfectly, unlocked the wealth of melody; only here Tolstoy had supplied no 
melody.
77
  
By redirecting the narration, Lowry makes the interaction between the Consul’s mind-
states, the drink, and the effort to produce the quotation, more of a complex operation. In 
the amended version, drink takes an operative role by making the act of recall appear 
spontaneous. This has a more nuanced relation to the Tolstoy quotation itself, because we 
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are given free-indirect access to the Consul’s surprise at his own miraculous inspiration. 
This has a different emphasis to the draft version, in which the labour of recollection is 
clear: 
‘Let’s get to the bottom of all this.’ Of all what, he thought. His mind was like a 
tempestuous sky in which the sun, chasing through galloping clouds, disappears for 
long periods at a time, then emerges, shedding a baleful, untrustworthy radiance. 
But he was going to make a supreme effort.
78
 
In this example, the effort of recall points in two different directions. On the one hand, 
effort is indicative of the will, and so the laboriousness of the Consul’s quotation is 
evidence of his free intent. On the other hand, the labour is conducted from the inside of 
the Consul’s alcoholised senses, and the slow workings of his recall reveal a time-lag that 
gives an inevitability to his actions from an external (and impatient) viewpoint. The final 
copy slightly obscures these differing interpretations by submerging the explicit intent of 
the Consul and focussing on the idea that his thoughts oscillate between focus and free-
association, dampening any explicit connotations of control and determinism and giving 
temporary emphasis over to the more allusive distinction between rationalism and anti-
rationalism. The Consul’s free-associative thoughts signal him as an anti-rationalist hero, 
but when the ‘whirling cerebral chaos’ gives way to perfect order, a slice of recall, it 
appears that drink has facilitated the rationalist project by allowing the quote to emerge 
unhindered from where the Consul deliberately set it ‘so laboriously, years ago’.79 
The Consul’s miraculous recall brings the discussion to a sub-personal level. This has 
interesting repercussions for the analysis of the quotation, and its intellectual role, both 
within the Consul’s and Lowry’s arguments. The Consul’s literary excerpt comes from 
Tolstoy’s Second Epilogue to War and Peace. The element of Tolstoy’s argument that is 
quoted by the Consul is part of a larger theory, expounded in War and Peace, but in the 
Consul’s speech only touched upon. Following the ‘rounded and complete’ remembered 
quotation, the Consul reveals a little more of Tolstoy’s argument in an attempt to elucidate 
his point: 
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When we have absolutely no understanding of the causes of an action – I am 
referring, in case your mind has wandered to the subject of your own conversation, 
to the events of the afternoon – the causes, whether vicious or virtuous or what not, 
we ascribe, according to Tolstoy, a greater element of free will to it.
80
 
Although the Consul can remember the basic points of Tolstoy’s formulation, he has 
trouble turning the abstract observations into an argument. Confusedly, the above point 
leads him to conclude that ‘[according] to Tolstoy then, we should have had less reluctance 
in interfering than we did’.81 This is not just in direct opposition with the tone of the rest of 
his argument, but is a practical point that is then obfuscated by the next stage of his 
speech: 
‘Moreover, according to Tolstoy,’ he went on, ‘before we pass judgment on the 
thief – if thief he were – we would have to ask ourselves: what were his connexions 
with other thieves, ties of family, his place in time, if we know even that, his 
relation to the external world, and to the consequences leading to the act …’82  
Although the Consul’s argument falls to pieces, mainly because of his inability to maintain 
a direct line of thought, it is also worth noting that the overwrought dependence on Tolstoy 
further complicates matters, because the original points in War and Peace are also riddled 
by the same complexities that beset the Consul. Tolstoy’s overarching claim, a part of 
which is his discussion of responsibility, is based on the theoretical belief in determinism. 
The deterministic claim implies a resumption of our ordinary ways of thinking about 
freedom and control insofar as it, in Tolstoy’s view, means giving up the idea that we are 
effective agents who have some control over the events in which we take part. Isaiah 
Berlin recognises freedom as the ‘great illusion’ which Tolstoy attempts to expose in War 
and Peace: ‘that individuals can, by the use of their own resources, understand and control 
the course of events’.83 Berlin explains how this intersects with epistemology in everyday 
circumstances. The point of contention that is implicit in the deterministic scheme is over 
‘true causes’. Although agents might think that they know the true causes of an event, and 
act accordingly in the opinion that they can alter the course of events, the Tolstoyan view 
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insists that understanding events within the determinist scheme would involve plotting 
‘every drop of which the stream of history consists’.84 Because we are ‘pathetically 
ignorant, and the areas of our knowledge are incredibly small compared to what is 
uncharted’, the real workings of the universe are inaccessible to us.85 Freedom of the will 
is an illusion because we cannot know the first causes of our actions or the complexities of 
the stream in which they are embedded.  
This argument dovetails with the Consul’s favoured quotation, though he seems to miss 
the larger implications of his statement. In the case of the balance between freedom and 
inevitability upon which the Consul draws, Tolstoy remarks the following: 
In all these cases the conception of freedom is increased or diminished, and the 
conception of compulsion is correspondingly decreased or increased, according to 
the point of view from which the action is regarded, so that the greater the 
conception of necessity the smaller the conception of freedom and vice versa.
86
  
Determinism holds that there is the observable possibility which recognises the total 
necessity of all action; it is only the limited ‘point of view’ of our own observations that 
allows us to insert a ‘conception of freedom’ into events. Tolstoy uses the differential 
balance between freedom and inevitability, not to show how we should judge the 
blameworthiness of certain actions, but to show that our changeable knowledge of events 
points to the fact that we are ultimately ignorant of the true course of events. It seems, 
then, that the deterministic viewpoint has a spectrum of repercussions. While total 
adherence to the deterministic scheme seems to remain speculative or theoretical, 
knowledge of determinism also widens the field of questioning by repeatedly invoking 
antecedent causes. However, recognising the scope of theoretical determinism does not 
elucidate, or lend strength to the Consul’s argument from Tolstoy, as the answer that the 
argument invites lies beyond the capacity of the enquiry; indeed, it is ultimately 
unattainable.     
The Consul invokes Tolstoy’s argument as a way of examining external circumstances. 
However, the determinist paradigm, when framed as the Consul’s miraculous recall, points 
to another self-reflexive criticism implicit in the allusion. Even if the extent of the 
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connections within the determinist universe could be known at minute levels of interaction, 
it is still not clear that this knowledge would help us to understand the way in which we 
directly experience feelings and actions. Daniel Dennett, in ‘Personal and Sub-Personal 
Levels’, argues for a sharp distinction between the knowledge systems of, on the one hand, 
conscious processes and feelings, and on the other, ‘blind’ anatomic facts about the 
interaction of neurons and stimuli.
87
 Because the Consul’s experience of the quotation is 
through the shock of spontaneous recollection, a Tolstoyan level of deterministic 
knowledge still couldn’t elucidate the process in a way that would tie into first-hand 
experience. The Consul experiences his recall as miraculous, and that feeling would not be 
diminished by deep causal explanation.  
As I have tried to show above, the Tolstoy allusion is not embedded as a direct insight into 
an elucidatory system, but is posed to confuse an exact or operable stance in the Consul’s 
relation to the events surrounding the pelado.
88
 Lowry makes an assessment of the 
Consul’s mind-states particularly difficult by representing his drunken thoughts and 
actions as complex interactions between rational and non-rational systems of thought, 
consisting of conscious and non-conscious levels, and with varying degrees of control. 
This dynamic representation has interpretive ramifications for the scene. With reference to 
the Tolstoy quotation, it is evident especially in the microcosm of the Consul’s thoughts 
and utterances that it is impossible to come to a satisfactory assessment, not even of what 
is free and what inevitable, but more simply of what seems free or what inevitable. While 
the Consul’s Tolstoy asks us to take an external stance on events, Lowry is working 
against this by corrupting our observational purity with the hopelessly overwrought and 
heterogeneous quality of the Consul’s thoughts. The final draft of Under the Volcano 
renders the Consul’s actions largely without comment, relying instead on the complex 
movement between observable states, and erasing the broader claims which would 
simplify our judgment of the Consul. In the third draft of the novel, it is clear that the 
Consul’s Tolstoyan rejection of political or state interference is in fact a manifestation of 
his own introspective paranoia and self-justifications: 
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‘And you needn’t sit there looking so goddamn stupid,’ he cried aloud, turning on 
Yvonne, ‘Father dear father, why don’t you stop drinking! I know all about you. 
Yes.’ He staggered to his feet. ‘You’re all the same, all of you, Priscilla,89 Jacques, 
you, Hugh, trying to interfere with other people’s lives, interfering, interfering, 
interfering, without the goddamned guts to take any of the normal responsibilities 
of your own life, of your own country, on your shoulders […]’90     
In similar style, another point which is cut from later drafts is the Consul’s use of the 
Tolstoy distinctions in moral responsibility to comment directly on his own behaviour:   
The Consul grabbed his arm and addressed himself to Hugh’s back, gibbering in 
his ear.  
‘What I’m driving at is this, Jacques,’ he said, ‘Hugh, I mean, I’m insane with 
liquor, and worse, and you must make allowances. Ha, yes, allowances!’91 
These cuts are also in line with a general simplification of the Tolstoy quotation, and a 
move away from explicitly rendering the intellectual ramifications of Tolstoy’s philosophy 
on the pelado-scene. Drafts show Lowry giving more space to the Consul attempting to 
think through his detached position and filter it through the quotation. In one particularly 
confused example, the Consul attempts to make use of Tolstoy’s claim that, the further in 
the past an action is, the more we see it as inevitable, as we observe it as part of a larger 
course of events rather than an isolated act: 
‘[…] there was such a sense of unreality about the whole show, that we didn’t 
believe it. We didn’t belong to it. It was something that had happened hundreds of 
years ago, being re-enacted for our benefit, like those ghostly balls that one hears 
of held at Versailles from time to time […] what he did, didn’t seem so free – at 
least this would be the Tolstoyan argument – since no one’s actions seem so free a 
long time ago […]’ And he went on more rapidly, knowing that, philosophically 
speaking, or in any other manner of speaking, this was not right at all. ‘On the other 
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hand it did seem more inevitable he should do precisely what he did do and 
consequently we felt all the more reluctance about interfering.’92  
The Consul’s argument is blundering, but although Lowry cuts this portion from the final 
text, he replaces it with a denser allusive texture that operates similarly, though less 
accessibly. One of the Consul’s rhetorical strategies in the above quotation is to bend the 
event to fit Tolstoy’s argument by introducing a time-slip – the purported similarity to the 
ghostly balls of Versailles – that makes the pelado-scene both of the moment, and an event 
that ‘had happened hundreds of years ago’. This confusing sophistry is not lost in the final 
copy, but deferred to the Consul’s allusions, among which Sir Thomas Browne takes a 
central role. The Consul’s dense arguments are in some ways mirrored by Browne, whose 
critical history is divided. The move towards Thomas Browne, and away from the 
explication of Tolstoy’s philosophy, is also a move away from the content of the argument 
and towards a suggestion that the argument is primarily a mirror of the rhetoricians 
themselves.  
The idea of an egotistical rhetoric is certainly foregrounded in Browne’s critical history. 
The literature on Browne has typically attempted to characterise the high prose style and 
convoluted arguments of his texts, with many assessments regarding his style as vacuous 
and inward looking. Samuel Johnson, for example, seems to recognise in Browne a kind of 
narcissism which, developed through scholarly seclusion, draws parallels between the 
fantastic subject matter of the prose and the high-minded ability of their observer:  
The wonders probably were transacted in his own mind: self-love, co-operating 
with an imagination vigorous and fertile as that of Browne, will find or make 
objects of astonishment in every man’s life: and, perhaps, there is no human being, 
however hid in the crowd from the observation of his fellow-mortals, who, if he 
has leisure and disposition to recollect his own thoughts and actions, will not 
conclude his life in some sort of miracle, and imagine himself distinguished from 
all the rest of his species by many discriminations of nature or of fortune.
93
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Extending this point into near-polemic, William Hazlitt regards Browne as a stylist of 
disinterest, whose facility with paradox constantly conjures a sense of doubt, but from a 
position of sublime remove:  
He pushes a question to the utmost verge of conjecture, that he may repose on the 
certainty of doubt; and he removes an object to the greatest distance from him, that 
he may take a high and abstracted interest in it, consider it in its relation to the sum 
of things, not to himself, and bewilder his understanding in the universality of its 
nature and the inscrutableness of its origin. His is the sublime of indifference; a 
passion for the abstruse and imaginary. He turns the world round for his 
amusement, as if it was a globe of pasteboard. He looks down on sublunary affairs 
as if he had taken his station in one of the planets.
94
 
Hazlitt’s commentary even takes a Lowry-type turn, when he describes the distracted 
scholarship that characterises Browne’s persistent turn away from everyday matters:  
He stands on the edge of the world of sense and reason, and gains a vertigo by 
looking down at impossibilities and chimera. Or he busies himself with the 
mysteries of the Cabala, or the enclosed secrets of the heavenly quincunxes, as 
children are amused with tales of the nursery.
95
 
This sophistic reading seems important to the image of Browne as alluded to by Lowry. 
This takes on particular importance in Chapter Ten, in which Hugh and the Consul argue 
about the proper reaction to the pelado and the dying peon. The Consul’s ‘whirling 
cerebral chaos’, and the eventual quotation from Tolstoy, can be read both charitably and 
uncharitably; charitably if we assign some importance to the Consul’s shifting allusions; 
uncharitably if we assign importance to the appearance of Thomas Browne, and assume 
that the Consul’s argumentative strategy draws the attention away from the real concerns 
of the world, and into a confused web of esoteric symbolism. The argument between Hugh 
and the Consul is poised on this balance, between what, in an earlier draft, Lowry refers to 
as the ‘different worlds’ of their positions.96 In the final Under the Volcano, the argument 
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takes a slightly more ironic twist, with Lowry adding emphasis to the separation between 
the basic points of the crime and the Consul’s confused abstractions:  
‘Of course we’re taking time to find out all this while the poor fellow just goes on 
dying in the road,’ Hugh was saying. ‘How did we get on to this? No one had an 
opportunity to interfere till after the deed was done. None of us saw him steal the 
money, to the best of my knowledge. Which crime are you talking about anyway, 
Geoff? If other crime there were…And the fact that we did nothing to stop the thief 
is surely beside the point that we did nothing really to save the man’s life.’ 
‘Precisely,’ said the Consul, ‘I was talking about interference in general, I think 
[…]’97 
Here, Hugh’s attack is broadly against the symbolic capital that the Consul is attempting to 
invoke in support of his argument. While the Consul is attempting to rationalise his actions 
in relation to the dying man by linking the event to recurring patterns and universal laws, 
Hugh rebuffs this with his emphasis on the ethical urgency invoked by the ‘poor fellow 
[…] dying in the road’. The Consul’s emphasis on ‘interference in general’ is 
indistinguishable from the other generalities that form his historico-political excursion. 
The Tolstoy allusion is central to this chapter, and as I have suggested, it is with this 
allusion that Lowry buries the Consul’s putatively political argument under the vagaries of 
his interpretation of the free will issue. In this way, the free will problem as it appears 
through Tolstoy’s philosophy becomes largely symbolic within the Consul’s argument.   
 Addiction and Conversion 
The Tolstoy quotation – or more particularly, the Consul’s spontaneous recollection of it – 
does not only form part of the symbolic web of Under the Volcano. It also acts as a 
significant connective section, both thematically and in relation to specific content, 
between the symbolism of the novel and the sub-layer of alcoholic intentionality explored 
above. The appropriation of William James’s ideal of religious conversion by Alcoholics 
Anonymous forms an instance in which the action-discourse of addiction becomes 
enmeshed, both in the pragmatism of therapeutics, and the oblique interactions between 
conscious volition and mystical knowledge. This seems to be a point of intersection 
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between the agent-centred analysis that I have concentrated on so far, and the symbolic 
and metaphorical uses of alcoholism which are examined by other critics; a combination of 
psychology and psyche. It is clear that Lowry mixes these discourses thoroughly, multiply 
embedding several levels of interpretation within a single allusion. While the Tolstoy 
allusion broadens the concept of freedom in the novel, the mystical operations of the 
Consul’s miraculous recall widen the content of addictive discourses.   
The way in which the Consul’s sentence emerges, ‘rounded and complete’ from his 
‘whirling cerebral chaos’ recollects the way in which James illustrates his discussion of 
how the self is primed without conscious input, and how this can lead to the point of 
spiritual conversion. In Varieties of Religious Experience, James distinguishes between 
‘volitional type’ religious conversion and ‘type by self-surrender’.98 He distinguishes 
between these based on the type of effort that brings them about, likening the conversion 
by self-surrender to the experience of effort ‘when you try to recollect a forgotten name’.99 
Here, initial effort is fruitless, but it starts ‘[some] hidden process […] which went on after 
the effort ceased, and made the result come as if it came spontaneously’.100 Bringing the 
anecdote closer to Lowry’s drunken pianist, James additionally uses the example of a 
music teacher who ‘says to her pupils after the thing to be done has been clearly pointed 
out, and unsuccessfully attempted: ‘Stop trying and it will do itself!’’.101  
The idea that James builds is that the ‘subliminal’ effort that goes into remembering a 
name is similar to the role of subliminal effort in religious conversion. Even if conversion 
is desired, it can often be hard to bring it about by conscious effort. However, the 
candidate’s conscious efforts are related to a subconscious framework which becomes the 
operative conversionary force: 
A man’s conscious wit and will, so far as they strain towards the ideal, are aiming 
at something only dimly and inaccurately imagined. Yet all the while the forces of 
mere organic ripening within him are going on towards their own prefigured result, 
and his conscious strainings are letting loose subconscious allies behind the scenes, 
which in their way work towards rearrangement and the rearrangement towards 
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which all these deeper forces tend is pretty surely definite, and definitely different 
from what he consciously conceives and determines.
102
 
It is clear that here James is distinguishing between the will as a conscious tool, and the 
‘subconscious allies’ which potentially aid the work of the will. James makes stronger 
claims later in his argument, and suggests that, in the pursuit of goodness as such, 
overreliance on the conscious will to direct one’s life can have negative effects: 
[T]o exercise the personal will is still to live in the region where the imperfect self 
is the thing most emphasized. Where, on the contrary, the subconscious forces take 
the lead, it is more probably the better self in posse which directs the operation. 
Instead of being clumsily and vaguely aimed at from without, it is then itself the 
organizing centre.
103
 
James’s argument here posits the centrality of self-surrender to religious conversion. This 
is one of the main premises that Alcoholics Anonymous took from James in their 
repositioning of religious conversion as a conversion to abstinence.
104
 James touches on 
the anti-rationalism of spiritual conversion in his description of spiritual truths appearing 
as ‘cold-blooded falsehoods’ to the pre-convert. Alcoholics Anonymous reframe this 
distinction between the alcoholic and the recovering-alcoholic, though their discourse 
appears to reverse the images of rationalism; here the alcoholic becomes anti-rational, 
though infinitely rationalising, and the schematised conversion becomes the single, 
rational solution because of its efficacy. By apparently drawing on both of these 
references, Lowry further entangles ideas of volition in the discourses of addiction. In 
Under the Volcano, this largely emerges through the conflict between the repeated self-
rationalisations which fuel the Consul’s drinking, and the conversionary promise of a 
renewed relationship with Yvonne.  
Insidious rationalising is well documented in the addiction literature. George Ainslie 
expresses the idea most clearly in his concept of ‘hyperbolic discounting’, which aims to 
characterise the way in which addicts prioritise drug consumption in the immediate period 
before they consume, even if the desire for the drug is consistently rejected up until that 
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point. Central to this idea is the observation that ‘[r]ationalization […] is the most 
notorious threat to willpower’, as an addict can self-identify as rationally endorsing the 
desire to consume, despite its conflict with their longer term plans.
105
 Moving away from 
rationalist labelling, the similarities between Alcoholics Anonymous and James become 
clearer, insofar as A.A. do not seem to dispute James’s basic assumption that the conscious 
will does not necessarily have executive control. This is evidenced by conversionary 
reliance upon subconscious mechanisms, and the complementary inability of conscious 
effort to bring about a similar result. In this way, the discourse around conversion is 
implicitly based on reforming assumptions about the relationship between subliminal and 
conscious control. Through its reliance on subliminal control, conversion overturns the 
idea that action is reliant upon conscious control as a distinct executive mechanism. Even 
in a spiritual format, the discourses of addiction remain tied to ideas of autonomy and 
intention.  
Lowry plays into these discourses by giving voice to the Consul’s ad hoc rationalisations. 
It is through these he justifies his taking another drink. Illustrating the insidious 
malleability of rationalisation, the Consul appears to offer a series of sound reasons for 
drinking. However, his logic is often made paradoxical by the very circumstances in which 
he rationalises. The prospect that the Consul can ‘[drink] himself sober’106 means that he 
continually needs to drink in order to face the effects of his drinking:  
[O]ozing alcohol from every pore, the Consul stood at the open door of the Salón 
Ofelia. How sensible to have had a mescal. How sensible! For it was the right, the 
sole drink to have under the circumstances. Moreover he had not only proved to 
himself he was not afraid of it, he was now fully awake, fully sober again, and well 
able to cope with anything that might come his way. But for this slight continual 
twitching and hopping within his field of vision, as of innumerable sand fleas, he 
might have told himself he hadn’t had a drink for months. The only thing wrong 
with him, he was too hot.
107
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The same justificatory language is repeatedly used with reference to his relationship to 
Yvonne, in which the rationalising process is pushed to logical absurdity by the destructive 
incompatibility of his drinking and his marriage:  
But a look of tenderness came over Yvonne’s face and the Consul thought once 
more of the postcard in his pocket. It ought to have been a good omen. It could be 
the talisman of their immediate salvation now. Perhaps it could have been a good 
omen if only it had arrived yesterday or at the house this morning. Unfortunately 
one could not now conceive of it as having arrived at any other moment. And how 
could he know whether it was a good omen or not without another drink?
108
  
This passage is important, not only for its evidence of the Consul’s convoluted 
rationalising, but for the way it holds up the prospect of ‘immediate salvation now’. The 
saving of their marriage is appealed to several times in generally religious terms which 
recall James’s conversionary ideal. The interaction between the Consul’s reasoning and the 
possibility of conversion is entangled with implications of autonomy and control, both in 
the assumption that his rationalisations are embedded within addictive desires, and in 
relation to the prospect of self-surrender that is invoked in the possibility of salvation. 
Interacting with this action-discourse are the Consul’s symbolic fixations, here ironically 
revealed in their flexibility they are bent to the service of his logical deviation. Later in the 
novel, the conversion appears with special urgency, and a more distinct Jamesian 
character:   
‘Darling…’ It ran in Yvonne’s mind that all at once they were talking – agreeing 
hastily – like prisoners who do not have hands clasped, with their shoulders 
touching. […] ‘This isn’t just escaping, I mean, let’s start again really, Geoffrey, 
really and cleanly somewhere. It could be like a rebirth.’ 
‘Yes. Yes it could.’109  
Configured in this way, the relationship implies the possibility of the kind of contextual 
and cognitive shift that James notes in conversion, that instance when ‘amid tremendous 
emotional excitement or perturbation of the senses, a complete division is established in 
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the twinkling of an eye between the old life and the new’.110 Again, the symbolic 
suggestion of a ‘rebirth’ is undergirded by the embedding of agential problems within the 
Jamesian formulation. The promise of cognitive change seems to be operating both at the 
level of the Consul’s addiction, and in play with the infernal connotations of his troubled 
psyche. The Consul’s addiction is multiply refracted through these allusions; as the cause 
of his marital strife, as a metaphor for his metaphysical burden, and as a psychological and 
physiological fixation that influences his action.  
Because Under the Volcano provides a multifaceted approach, both to agency and to 
addiction, it is very difficult to read the novel according to a single concept of intention, or 
to assess what the novel has to say about the concept of intention per se. Rather than 
attempt a unified theoretical reading, I have given space to the complex layering that the 
novel exhibits, and the multiple relations that these clues invite with a variety of 
interwoven theoretical positions. The movements of the text and their embedding in the 
Consul’s oscillating preferences make it very difficult to distinguish any suggestion that 
the novel is attempting to elucidate a position regarding the relationship between addiction 
and autonomy. Instead, an exegetical emphasis on the language of intentionality in its 
multiple guises in the text is able to suggest the complexity of the position of intention 
within the novel. My analysis suggests both that discourses of addiction are deeply 
concerned with notions of agential control, and that these discourses play a key role within 
the text. Lowry repeatedly uses tropes of addiction and action which correlate clearly with 
sources in the literature in which the relation between drug use and autonomy is of central 
concern. It is through this use of material that Lowry produces the foundations for a deeply 
layered treatment of addiction and action in the novel.  
Models of addiction – both those which are specifically referenced by Lowry, and more 
recent models which postdate Under the Volcano – provide a particularly rich source of 
how actions are moderated because they bring the relationship between autonomy and 
responsibility into strong relief; a relationship which is implicit in much of the action of 
Under the Volcano, and which reverberates through the postures taken by the Consul in 
relation to both drunkenness and the possibility of abstinence. This layer of the text, in 
which a firmer philosophical action framework is operational, is in constant interaction 
with the broader, symbolic level of the text. As the Tolstoy allusion in Chapter Ten makes 
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 James, Varieties, p. 217. 
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clear, Lowry blends several distinct discourses at the same time; concepts of free will 
which are individual, collective, phenomenological, moral, metaphysical, symbolic, 
political and historical. These further interact with clear traditions and ideologies within 
the addiction literature. Although these levels are deeply enmeshed, the distinctness of 
their discourses suggests that alcoholism in Under the Volcano is not merely part of the 
general symbolic explorations of the novel. It appears that Lowry constructed the Consul’s 
actions in constant dialogue with discourses of addiction. If action underpins the 
movements of the novel then it is clear that the relationship between addiction and action 
creates a separate plane of interpretation which interacts dynamically with Lowry’s more 
symbolic language. Scrutiny of the relationship between action and addiction reveals the 
alcoholic content of the novel to be much deeper than assumed in other studies. This 
enriched critical vocabulary allows a more responsive reading of Lowry’s Consul, and his 
elaborate agency.   
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Conclusion 
A strong thread in this thesis has been the intuition that we, as readers, approach prose 
with an agency-centred perspective. This might operate at levels as different as basic 
sentence comprehension, local character intention, motivation cues, text-wide planning 
structures, and moral interactions and responses between characters and between 
characters and ourselves. My broad approach to the topic of agency has attempted to show 
just how joined up these concepts – and methods of reading – are, and how they are all 
focused upon the fictional character as a quasi-rational, quasi-autonomous being. My 
explanatory structures have largely come from disciplines which are not concerned with 
literature, so we might assume that their fruitful application to textual interpretation 
suggests that the study of agency in real life transfers, at least in part, to the study of 
agency in fiction. There are certainly norms of interaction between individuals in the real 
world, and there are structures which we bring to every interpersonal interaction which 
determine and aid our interpretation of our fellow agents. These mechanisms are deeply 
engrained, and it is intuitive to suggest that the same mechanisms – though in a moderated 
form – determine aspects of the way in which we consume and interpret fiction. This 
approach should not be thought of as simply a model which readers apply to fiction, since 
the direction of flow is more complex. My study approaches the ways in which authors 
play with, adopt, and manipulate the automatic postures that we adopt when we approach a 
text. This means that the flow is bi-directional, authors control and create the ways in 
which we use the mechanisms of agency and interpretation in the creation of literature. 
Agency is deeply ingrained in fiction and the reading of fiction, but it is not static.  
I have largely taken these background claims for granted, as it was not my intention here to 
investigate the specific mechanisms involved in reading norms. However, my adoption of 
this approach, and the theoretical underpinning of these claims, owes much to recent 
philosophical and literary critical work which has sought to transfer insights from the 
philosophy of mind to aesthetics. As recent work suggests, insights from the philosophy of 
mind can help to clarify what interpersonal and communicative mechanisms are involved 
in readers’ interactions with fiction, and particularly with fictional characters. Much of this 
work has used concepts relating to everyday mindreading and folk psychology, concepts 
which attempt to describe the lay-mechanisms through which we understand the actions of 
other agents. Mindreading has come into interdisciplinary focus in recent times, as it seems 
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to offer ways of describing interaction and communication which are not theory-laden; 
models which fit with our intuitions and experiences of agential understanding. The turn 
towards folk theories has included the rise of experimental philosophy, which adapts 
philosophical reasoning to the results of empirical testing. Similarly psychology, which is 
traditionally test-based, has also sought to tailor experiments toward how concepts of 
intention and behavioural comprehension are used in folk discourse, with the expectation 
that the folk usage can feed back into the definitional and theoretical task. The theoretical 
leaning of this work has largely focused on the use of folk concepts within action 
description. While philosophical work on mindreading has largely sought to characterise 
how agents interpret and understand the behaviour of others, experimental work on folk-
concepts is largely concerned with the everyday use of action language, and how they can 
feed back into theoretical discourse. These underlying ties to folk theorising link these 
approaches to literary application, as the folk understanding of action and how action is 
understood is presumed to remain broadly constant across everyday life, as well as in the 
description or representation of agents in numerous literary, or non-literary, media. 
Because folk models offer ways of describing our automatic and intuitive ways of using 
action terminology, they offer a key entry point for the discussion of what constitute the 
automatic and intuitive ways in which we approach literary texts, and the characters within 
those texts.  
Folk concepts – largely as they appear in the philosophy of mind literature on mindreading 
– have recently come into usage by literary scholars, particularly in the burgeoning field of 
cognitive poetics. The broadened theoretical base that studies like these present is a very 
exciting development in critical discourse. However, as I made clear in Chapter One, the 
transfer from philosophy into literary theory has not necessarily maintained the 
terminological discipline that is needed for accurate cross-disciplinary application. New 
work on folk psychology reveals a more nuanced picture, with theorists suggesting that 
action interpretation does not always involve the inference of beliefs and desires in the 
comprehension of another agent. Instead, our understanding of the behaviour of others 
happens fluently because, in most cases, we recognise actions in context according to 
common scripts that we can predict. Because we have seen certain action sequences 
before, or because we have enough environmental information to come up with a likely 
outcome, we can attribute actions and intentions with functional accuracy. This conception 
of mindreading, which avoids the automatic use of desire/belief models, puts these theories 
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in closer communication, both with action-theoretical conceptions of intention as plan-
based and literary studies which have suggested that fiction comprehension is largely 
facilitated by the goal structures of characters. This ties into the wider idea that single 
actions are usually understood, not in isolation, but embedded within broader cross-
temporal planning structures. For these structures to be able to function, we assume a 
certain amount of rationality of our fellow agents (and of fictional characters), because 
their actions are subject to norms of coherence and cohesion. Although there is not direct 
transfer between second-person comprehension in real life, and the comprehension of 
fictional characters, I think that – as a minimum – it can be assumed that readers read for 
coherence. In doing so, they are reading for rational action. 
Although this comprehensive ability on the part of the reader allows the author to present 
complex levels of information within the fiction, it also constrains the type of action that 
can be portrayed. If readers automatically infer quasi-rationality to the actions of 
characters, then authors have to subvert this in some way in order to show mental states 
which diverge from the norm. Nabokov does this with subtle brilliance in Pale Fire, in 
which he tells the story of Jack Grey through the cracks in Kinbote’s dominant narrative. 
In addition, Beckett subverts the norm with deconstructive power by attacking, not only 
coherence and rationality, but the very construction of fictional character. Although it is 
not my task to establish what the exact norms of fictional characterisation are, Chapter 
Two comes closest to expressing these norms in negative. If Beckett breaks down fictional 
characterisation by attacking features which make up agency (and these features of agency 
as they are examined in the real world by philosophers) then it seems very likely that the 
norms of literary agency utilise very similar concepts to the norms of real world agency. 
These do not only include the second-person interpretive features that I have examined 
above, but also include the automatic understanding of one’s own actions and the 
understanding of one’s own body; the core experiences which dovetail with one’s broad 
sense of agency and intention. In general, characters understand themselves and other 
characters in the same way that we understand ourselves; but it is this generality of literary 
experience that is under attack through Beckett’s experimentalism.      
My task in this thesis has been to show the interconnectedness of various discourses of 
agency, and the place of the terminology that these discourses provide in the interpretation 
of literary agency. I have sought to illustrate this through example, and as a result, the 
207 
 
thesis is dominated by close textual analysis. Through this approach, I have also attempted 
to exhibit new readings of Kavan, Beckett, Nabokov and Lowry, which illustrate the ways 
in which they manipulate and examine the concept of agency in their fictions. The 
assumption that I have been making throughout this thesis – that agency is rendered in 
fiction in ways which are recognisable from everyday life – is an intuitive claim. I think 
that the claim is strong, and a tacit strategy of my close readings has been to strengthen it 
further by evidencing the application of action-theory within literary analysis. However, as 
I suggest in Chapter One, some attempts to explain directly the link between action 
comprehension in the real world and in fictional have severely overstated the transparency 
and ease of transfer. A lack of theoretical rigour and understanding has meant that the idea 
of transfer has largely remained intuitive. There is a clear necessity then, for 
interdisciplinary work which attempts to solve some of the more pressing questions 
associated with fictional agency; what are the processes involved? Are these the same 
processes as in the real world? Do norms of understanding emerge through literary 
reinforcement of tropes or through norm-transfer from the real world? What is the role of 
the narrator in mediating action-understanding and how does this intersect with fictional 
mindreading? Are there automatic responses which are always deployed in literary 
comprehension, despite the massive variety of literary artefacts and experiences? These are 
just some of the many complex questions which emerge when the idea of transfer is given 
attention. I have not had the scope to address these questions directly in this thesis, but I 
hope I have made a claim for their study. Research which maps the automatic frameworks 
which allow us to understand fiction would provide an invaluable model for any reading of 
fiction. If we knew more about the ways in which readers understand fiction, then we can 
better understand how authors manipulate, control, and make use of these models in the 
creation of narrative stories; how formal aspects of storytelling anticipate the projected 
responses of readers.  
Sometimes, folk language can become mired in additional theoretical complexities. 
Although a folk framework can offer remarkable clarity on some issues, on other points, 
its claims to offer a consensus of understanding or usage seem inappropriate. In Chapter 
Four, I moved away from folk models, and the intuitive grounding of reader-
comprehension because the resources and terminology at my disposal seemed 
inappropriate for the explanatory context. Because Chapter Four uses models of addiction, 
and addiction is particularly difficult to fit within a tight folk schema, I move to discuss the 
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theory directly, and apply aspects of addiction theory to a reading of Malcolm Lowry. 
Addiction is the topic of a multitude of diverse, and theoretically and ideologically distinct, 
interpretations. Under the Volcano provides a complex case, because the Consul’s mental 
states, as well as his topics of conversation (and the symbolic significance of these 
conversations), are constantly changing. He has clear physical effects from alcohol, 
including tremors and hallucinations, and at points he seems to be driven by the desire to 
drink. However, I’m not sure that the novel paints a portrait of a man who is unwaveringly 
compulsive. He might feel driven to drink, but at the same time Lowry portrays the 
Consul’s constant rationalisations, the minutiae of his choices, his preferences, and his 
understanding of his own mental state. What emerges is not the image of a compulsive 
addict, but of an individual with very complex intentions which often oscillate between 
strongly contrary positions. Addicts do not have entirely ‘normal’ intentional states, as the 
desire to take drugs gives a strong motivating factor. However, this kind of motivation 
does not mean that the act of choice and intention is removed. Instead it is augmented. By 
including Lowry’s novel in this thesis, I have tried to suggest a liberal position which is 
increasingly held elsewhere; that addiction is best characterised using the language of 
intention, and that addicts – even though some of their choices are strongly influenced by 
drugs – have intentions in relation to their consumption of drugs, and in every other aspect 
of their lives.     
My move away from folk theories in Chapter Four reflects the complexity of the topic. 
This does not mean that Under the Volcano is immune to this kind of theory, but simply 
that my scope prevented the full exploration of the topic that the novel demands. Readers 
must approach Under the Volcano with the same assumptions and automatic patterns of 
comprehension which underlie their other reading experiences. However, because of the 
alcoholic theme in the novel, there are an extra set of questions which need to be raised. In 
everyday action comprehension, there is a limit on accuracy. Most mindreading occurs in 
seconds, and gives enough information for the agent to navigate the world and in relation 
to others. There is, as I have already suggested, a rationality constraint on mindreading, 
whether in standard belief/desire models of folk psychology, or in norm-based narrative 
models of mind. This constraint is important, because fiction often focusses on non-normal 
mind states, or delves into the mind states of characters at a deeper level than that which is 
usually dealt with by everyday mindreading. In Under the Volcano, these complications 
are exacerbated because they also intersect with the deep problems of addiction-theory and 
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the controversies – as presented in my chapter – associated with describing the actions of 
addicts within intentionalist models. The element that my chapter did not address is the 
intersection of these problems with broader folk approaches to behavioural 
comprehension.  
Divergent theoretical approaches to addiction conceptualise the addict as more or less in 
control of their actions. The idea of compulsion, for example, suggests a motivating force 
which entirely overrides the decision-making apparatus of the individual. This suggests a 
trajectory of action which is not compatible with conventional mindreading, which 
attributes intentions and minimum rationality to other agents as part of the process of 
comprehension. The liberal approach to addiction, because it suggests that the addict’s 
choices are intentions of a kind, seems to fit more intuitively with folk models of second-
person understanding. Now that there is a move toward fitting addiction within 
intentionalist frameworks, a research gap has emerged. Experimental and theoretical 
exploration into how addictive choice is understood in the folk mind would be a 
productive line of enquiry, as would the attempt to describe how a folk concept of 
addiction interacts with everyday mindreading. Because mindreading and everyday models 
for action comprehension are deeply entangled with more purely theoretical varieties of 
action theory, an empirical folk theory of addiction also has the potential to feed back into 
theoretical models of addiction and action. Legal models for addiction already present a 
folk response of sorts, by offering pragmatic judgement-based solutions to criminal cases 
which involve addicts.
1
 However, the particularities of these legal responses could be 
fruitfully tied into a more joined-up approach to our folk understanding of addiction and 
intention, and the relation of these models to action theory in general. A future reading of 
Under the Volcano which would be able to adopt both an integrated folk theory of 
addiction and a unified model of reading norms would be well placed to provide a fresh 
interdisciplinary analysis of the novel.   
The approach that I have taken towards the novels under analysis has revealed, not only 
that agency is central to literary characterisation, but that the authors that feature in this 
thesis all take fascinating steps to present agency. This occurs formally, often through 
                                                          
1
 For an explanation of the legal and philosophical positions of addiction, see: Michael Louis Corrado, 
‘Addiction and Responsibility: An Introduction’, Law and Philosophy, 18 (1999), 579–88 and; Stephen J. 
Morse, ‘Hooked on Hype: Addiction and Responsibility’, Law and Philosophy, 19 (2000), 3–49. These are 
the introductory articles to which open two special issues on addiction and responsibility. 
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narratorial style; whether in the intense focus on character mind-states in Kavan, the 
fragmented introspection in Beckett, the layers of narratorial truth in Nabokov, or the 
interweaving of a multitude of sources in Lowry. Although, as I have tried to suggest 
through different theoretical foci, these various styles reflect the diverging concerns of 
each novel, it is also the case that their approaches resonate with each other as facets of 
agency and the agential experience. The topic of agency is so closely related to the human 
experience that it is hard to imagine a limit to the ways in which it can be represented. The 
novel provides a unique way of exploring the diversity, changeability, and malleability, of 
experience. Through the course of this thesis, in my primary and theoretical material, I 
have attempted to describe just a small selection of the questions and approaches germane 
to the concept, and our understanding of, agency and action. The historical moment in 
which these novels were published – the mid-twentieth century – does not restrict the 
exploration of, and interest in agency to that period. However, this was a time during 
which there was a massive growth in the understanding of the self, in the humanities, 
sciences, and the social sciences. This boom gave us concepts and terminology to 
accurately describe the sensations and intuitions of the agential experience, as well as 
uncovering new aspects of agency which have given new ways of thinking about 
ourselves. We are still in this moment, and current research is increasing our knowledge of 
the brain at a faster rate than at any other period of time. It is the place of the humanities to 
absorb and understand this knowledge, and to join it up with what we already know of 
human agency as it is experienced in our own lives, disseminated through social discourse, 
and rendered in artistic practice. Some of this work has already begun, in cognitive and 
experimental approaches to fiction.
2
 
Aside from the theoretical extension that could emerge from this project, there are specific 
literary concerns which would point to different directions in the application of the broad 
term, ‘agency’. As I have suggested, the idea of agency spreads from the minutiae of 
neurophysiology to the world wide dynamics of political autonomy. In the literary context, 
these ideas are in constant interplay with the formal aspects of writing. As such, it would 
be interesting to develop studies which explore the idea of agency in different areas of 
literary enquiry. This might be in relation to works of experimental fiction, such as that of 
Alain Robbe-Grillet, Muriel Spark or Christine Brooke-Rose. I explored this in relation to 
                                                          
2
 For an interesting experimental response to the question of the ethical effects of reading fiction, see: 
Jèmeljan Hakemulder, The Moral Laboratory: Experiments Examining the Effects of Reading Literature on 
Social Perception and Moral Self-Concept (Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2000). 
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Beckett, but a generic survey would be of comparative value. Alternately, there is space 
for a study which explores the political ramifications and conceptualisations of agency and 
fiction, of the kind that might be found in Arthur Koestler,
3
 J.G. Ballard, or W.G. Sebald. 
In this thesis, I have concentrated entirely on prose fiction. This has intuitive appeal 
because narrative has the space to develop characters, and frame their actions within 
motivational structures. Poetry would be an interesting extension because it abbreviates 
and condenses action and agency, and sets characterisation within an entirely different set 
of formal concerns and norms. If, as I have suggested, readers comprehend texts according 
to automatic frames of understanding that are similar to those of the real world, then 
reading poetry should demand some of those same responses. However, this idea would 
have to be moderated in line with the different generic expectations that poetry demands. 
This thesis aims to provide a launching point for the exploration of agency within literary 
criticism. Although it poses a number of unanswered questions, and is restricted to a 
narrow field of enquiry, I hope to have shown how the philosophical and psychological 
language of agency can be used in conjunction with literary interpretation. If agency is 
central to literary works, then the language of agency can provide a vital tool for the 
exploration of action and characterisation. The close readings offered in this thesis provide 
a testing ground for this theoretical terminology within literary criticism, and offer 
enriched readings through the use of this technical vocabulary. Although this approach 
often focuses on small details and complications of characterisation, it offers way of 
describing action with accuracy and clarity. The close focus of action readings provides 
one level to the literary-critical project, but I believe it to be a vital one. As I have 
attempted to suggest, agency is entangled in a multitude of discourses at multiple levels of 
description. Close reading is just one approach, but it can provide the foundation for the 
exploration of agency in broader political, social or historical forms of criticism. At any 
level, action description can help to explain what we mean when we talk about autonomy, 
and to clarify the complex apparatus out of which authors build their fictional agents.   
  
                                                          
3
 Koestler’s fiction and later theoretical work would be of interest, not least because he directly responds 
both to political questions and to theoretical concerns. Arthur Koestler, The Ghost in the Machine (London: 
Hutchinson & Co, 1976) for example, directly addresses the theoretical grounding of behaviourism and puts 
forward an original idea of the interaction between the individual agent, the automatic responses of the agent, 
and the social network in which the agent in embedded. 
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